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1. Introduction (Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
All that changes is fascinating, and also the high technology industry. The branch can 
be characterized as instable and unpredictable, but at the same time the initiator of 
significant innovations. Hence trying to illustrate the internationalization process of 
firms that are active in this field is obviously no straightforward task. It is more an 
exciting challenge to analyze this strategy from the perspective of a highly innovative 
industry. 
 
As if that isn’t sufficient for a challenging diploma thesis topic, the authors also take 
this to the next level. How does the internationalization process look like if the focus 
lies on undeveloped and new firms within an instable and innovative industry? Many 
studies that analyze the high technology industry are observed from the point of view of 
multinational firms. This thesis focuses on the contrary, on new established and not yet 
developed enterprises that were founded a few years ago. The so-called start-up 
companies. 
 
When putting together these two characteristics, namely high-tech and start-ups, it is 
obvious that literature might be rare, and if available, maybe outdated or far from 
applicable in practical experience. Therefore two case analyses shed light on the validity 
of the theoretical internationalization process. Based on these mentioned factors the 
diploma title “market entry of start-up companies – a case analysis of Austrian and 
Hungarian high-tech firms” was formed. 
 
1.1. Approach and Aim of Thesis 
This thesis tries to frame a picture of the prerequisites and arguments of international 
market entry strategy especially for start-up companies active in the high technology 
industry. In order to reach an empirical result it is necessary to outline the theoretical 
approaches of international market entry strategy first. These theoretical concepts are 
enriched by arguments and reasons especially for start-up companies involved in the 
internationalization process. 
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The reason for deciding to analyze the high technology industry is because of the 
unique characteristics these branches have. As for instance Datar et al. (1997) describe 
this industry as a fundamental “trigger” of global competiveness, innovativeness and 
employment creation. Besides examining an international market entry of high-tech 
firms present a challenge, due to the complexity of this dynamic industry and its 
products and services. All these factors increased the attractiveness to undertake the 
thesis in perspective of the high technology branch. 
 
By conducting case study analyses in the high-tech-sector of Austrian and Hungarian 
companies, which internationalized during their start-up phase, this thesis tries to 
illustrate to which extent theoretical statements are valid in practice for these two 
markets. The previous theoretical investigation, which was conducted before starting to 
work on this thesis, points out that there are deficits of empirical studies especially for 
smaller markets like Austria and Hungary. As the authors are both native speakers in the 
investigated markets they have the advantage to avoid misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations, which is decisive for drawing conclusions from empirical results.  
 
The main reason for choosing the method of in-depth interviews in the practical 
investigation is that the research area (high-tech enterprises which went international in 
an early phase) is hardly explored. As a consequence it is essential to gain a deeper 
insight into this segment.  
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1.1.1. Research Questions 
Based on a general theoretical framework that tries to disclose the strategies of high-
tech start-up companies when they decide to go international, a practical investigation is 
conducted that further examines the international market strategy of Austrian and 
Hungarian high-tech firms. Hence the main research questions this thesis tries to 
answer are: 
 
- What is the efficient internationalization strategy for a high-tech start-up from a 
theoretical perspective? 
- What is the practical conducted internationalization strategy of the interviewed 
and therefore analyzed high-tech firms during the start-up phase? 
- Is there a fit of theoretical arguments to the practical investigation?  
- And if so, to which extent do the theoretical statements apply to the practical 
investigation? What are the differences and consistencies? 
- Which entry modes are preferred/declined theoretically compared to the 
practical investigation? 
 
 
1.2. Thesis’ Structure  
This thesis is divided into five main topics, each treated in separate chapters. First, in 
chapter two main definitions are explained on which the later thesis is based on. The 
main terms international market entry, start-up company, the high-tech sector and the 
high-tech start-up are described here precisely. 
 
Chapter three is concerned with international market entry theories, focusing on several 
approaches that are of importance in the case of high-tech start-ups. This part of the 
thesis also delivers a critical view concerning the included theories. Limitations of those 
approaches are included in this section.   
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In the next main part of this thesis various internationalization theories are discussed. 
The international market entry strategy of high-tech start-ups is examined from a 
theoretical perspective in detail. Chapter four is based on various studies by different 
authors treating international market entry in general and in aspect to the high-
technology industry. Authors are included that focus on high-tech start-ups with regard 
to international market entry strategy. This internationalization process is divided into 
three major steps, each examined from different perspectives.  
First the question of the adequate foreign market location is answered. Afterwards the 
different entry modes are discussed and followed by the accurate foreign market entry 
time for a high-tech start-up. Also motives and risks of the high-tech start-up’s 
internationalization purpose are treated here precisely. 
 
After this extensive flow of information chapter five includes an aggregated table that 
combines the most important data from chapter three and four clearly and 
demonstratively. In this chapter all the aforementioned is included and most of the 
important information for high-technology based start-ups is summarized.  
 
Chapter six involves the practical part of this thesis where a case study analysis based 
on two high technology firms was conducted. The Austrian firm Anagnostics 
Bioanalysis GmbH and the Hungarian company Thor Medical Systems Kft were 
questioned for this analysis. These two start-ups are active in the medical engineering 
industry. The results of the in-depth interviews are presented, evaluated and compared 
to the theoretical part, which is described in chapter three to five.  
 
Chapter seven summarizes the results of the theoretical and practical investigation, 
discloses limitations and future research recommendations. 
 
 
 5 
2. Definitions 
Chapter two defines the terms this thesis is based on. If these definitions are used below, 
characteristics and limitations of the terms are valid, which are described in the 
following subchapters. Chapter two interprets the following definitions: 
 
- International Market Entry 
- International Market Entry Strategy 
- Start-up Company 
- High-Tech Sector 
- High-Tech Start-up 
 
2.1. International Market Entry (Peter Nemes) 
In the scientific literature on international management numerous approaches are 
available that attempt to explain the activities of companies in foreign markets. The 
historic starting point is developed in the economic theory of trade theories, which 
examine the desirability of cross-border exchange of goods at internationally immobile 
factors of production. (Welge & Holtbrügge, 2006, p 53)  
 
International market entry describes the action of entering a market abroad. A firm is 
able to take this step when previously an internationalization strategy has been 
formulated. Hence an international market entry requires fundamental considerations 
about the internationalization strategy as a whole. 
 
Besides this definition there are several motives that describe the desirability of 
companies deciding on an international market entry in general. Glowik (2008, p. 72) 
cites following points: 
 
- small and/or mature local markets force the company to enter markets abroad 
- foreign market attractiveness (size, high purchasing power) 
- expanded sales volumes provide economies of scale effects 
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- unique technology, product, service with attractive potentials in foreign markets 
- access to rare or desired recourses (for example technology, natural recourses, 
labor) 
- seasonable fluctuations of product sales 
- better customer proximity 
- risk diversification (increased number of country markets) 
- investment benefit 
- cognitive preferences towards internationalization of the 
entrepreneur/management  
- necessity to follow a strategically important customer abroad 
 
Summing up, international market entry mainly represents the reasons for 
internationalization of companies. Here it is attempted to answer the question why 
internationalization happens. 
 
2.1.1. International Market Entry Strategy  
At this point the question is asked, how, when and where  internationalization happens. 
 
A company that is trying to enter a foreign market needs to make an important strategic 
decision about which market, entry mode and entry time to choose as part of its 
internationalization strategy. The selection of a specific entry mode, location and  
accurate timing are decisive and very important decisions as they involve not only 
financial resource commitments but also considerable time efforts. (Agarwal Sanjeev, 
1992, p. 2) 
 
Besides this general definition Porter defines strategy as the creation of a unique and 
valuable position, involving a different set of activities. (Porter, 1996, p 68) He states 
that the essence of strategy is choosing what not to do. The significance of uniqueness 
especially in the case of high-tech start-ups is very important, as illustrated later in this 
thesis. 
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Passing Porter´s opinion on market entry strategies this thesis tries to identify the risks, 
chances and challenges when high-tech start-ups enter foreign markets. This specific 
strategic decision process is very complex and the outcome normally has a fundamental 
impact on a company’s future destiny. (Glowik, 2008, p.72) 
 
To sum it up Hynes (2010, p. 87) defines internationalization strategy as a “series of 
interrelated activities that should be embedded as part of the overall growth strategy of 
the firm.” In the following theoretical part this thesis tries to identify these different and 
interrelated factors that influence the choice of a high-tech start-up’s international entry 
strategy. 
 
2.2. Start-up Company (Marlene Wiedorn) 
During the dot-com bubble in 2000 the concept of a start-up became widespread 
throughout the world. Therefore a start-up company is generally associated with high 
growth and technology oriented firms. But in fact a start-up could originate from every 
industry sector. The literature describes the term start-up company often in a distinctive 
way. This thesis is based on and restricted to the following definitions and illustrations. 
 
The term start-up (Answers) itself is defined through: 
1. The act or process of setting into operation or motion. 
2. A business or an undertaking that has recently begun operation: grew from a tiny 
start-up to a multimillion-dollar corporation. 
 
In Gabler’s encyclopedia of economics 2009, a start-up company is defined as a young 
and not yet established company, which is founded for the reason of realizing an 
innovative business idea, reaching this goal with few seed capital. Generally start-ups  
start soon with business expansion and try to strengthen their equity base by raising of 
venture capital (optionally through Business Angels) or by going public. (Winter, 
Mosena, & Roberts, 2009) 
 
Keppler (2001) describes this type of organization, as follows "Start-ups are the 
classical entrepreneurial companies whose founders have no previous employment ties 
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to other firms in the industry." For this thesis Keppler’s perspective is too simplified 
and often not valid, as illustrated later. 
 
Hayn (1998, p. 16) delivers a more complete definition of a start-up company. This type 
of firm can be seen as a young, dynamic and disproportionately growing company. The 
term “young” describes the company’s factual duration of its economic existence. In 
general the faster an enterprise is able to become established in its market and branch, 
the shorter the period is, in which the company is described as young. Hence young can 
be equated with not established.  
 
The second characteristic of a start-up firm is “dynamic”. This results out of the need 
for continuous adaption to an instable environment. Therefore almost every firm can be 
described as dynamic, which will not be liquidated in the near future. However the drive 
of young enterprises is characterized, beside the adaption enforcement caused by 
dynamic business environment, additionally by an inherent dynamic.   
(Hayn, 1998, p. 17) 
 
Compared to established firms, start-ups construct the environment by its own initiative, 
by seeking innovations and benefitting from opportunities, which others do not 
recognize or simply overlook. (Hayn, 1998, p. 22) In general start-ups differentiate from 
established firms by for example seeking and serving niches. 
 
The final characteristic of newly established enterprises relates to its disproportionate 
growth. The crucial factor is not the already occurred increase, it is more the 
disproportionate growth expected in the future. (Hayn, 1998, p. 22) This leads to a 
considerable demand for capital, not only for developing investments in the start-up 
phase, but also for continuous and reflationary expansion investments. The amount of 
available equity or capital resources determines decisively the rate of development 
process. (Hayn, 1998, p. 30) To ensure a continuous and disproportionate growth, a 
critical saturation limit, caused by shortage in financial resources, has to be overcome. 
(Hayn, 1998, p.10) 
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More general guidelines for start-up company qualifications (by Alberta Ingenuity 
Fund) are the following ones:   
 
-  A new company in product development mode 
-  Time in business does not exceed 4 years 
-  No public offering 
-  Annual sales do not exceed $1,000,000 
-  A minimum of one full-time employee and no more than 12. 
 
As mentioned in the beginning, the most widespread kind of a start-up company, 
especially at the end of the 1990s, was a dotcom enterprise. The reason therefore is 
simple: Obtaining financial resources was not one of the most complex and lengthy 
processes for such a dotcom company. Quite the contrary was the case, many investors 
wanted to speculate on the emergence of these new established businesses, therefore 
one thing these start-ups had easily access to: venture capital.  
 
Unfortunately, by the end of the boom it soon became apparent that these companies 
were not able to fulfill the profit expectations the investors envisioned. The main 
reasons were that these firms had not focused enough on their business plans or on 
obtaining sustainable revenue. By the year 2000 many of these start-up companies went 
bankrupt, just a few still exist today, some of them are successful, as the Internet 
bookseller Amazon.com and the Internet auction portal eBay. 
 
The following subchapters deal with some general chances and challenges start-ups 
have to face during their existence. This is carried out more broadly for being able to 
apply this information on any type of start-up company. 
 
2.2.1. Challenges and limitations start-ups deal with in general 
Starting with probably the most considerable challenge or constraint, demonstrates the 
situation of a start-up company in more detail. One of the major limitations such a 
company has to deal with results from the constraints in capital. In general a start-up 
does not have access to an ongoing stream of cash flow; in fact these companies have a 
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hard time to convince potential investors of the future value and earnings of its business. 
Most start-ups in fact do not even provide assets that a financier would consider as 
precious and therefore worth investing in. So the question where the start capital derives 
from still remains and illustrates one of the major challenges start-up companies have to 
deal with. (Bhidé, 2000) 
 
This restriction of funds leads to another limitation start-ups are confronted with, 
namely the available human capital. Human resources are very limited due to the 
missing financial capabilities and probably the absent attractiveness for potential 
employees. (Bhidé, 2000) 
 
Another restriction a start-up in general has to cope with is the lack of a deeper business 
or industry experience of the entrepreneur. This limitation is connected to the above 
described ones, as an entrepreneur does not start with a great deal of business 
experience, this deficiency often renders impossible the raising of capital from 
investors. (Bhidé, 2000, p. 52) The factor experience is a further decisive criterion in the 
development of a start-up business, and hence will be discussed in more detail later. In 
general this thesis does not entirely share the opinion of Bhidé (2000). Later in the 
thesis this issue is discussed in more detail as a lack of experience is not always the case 
in start-ups. 
 
Bhidé (2000, p. 59) notes some additional challenges for start-up enterprises in general. 
They are facing uncertainty and this factor encircles the start-up in every decision it 
takes, as in deciding on which market to enter or on estimations of potential demand 
and competition. Moreover, the ability to satisfy customers wants cannot objectively be 
estimated. Uncertainty demonstrates another major challenge a start-up has to learn to 
cope with because there is no possibility available to eliminate this criterion completely.  
General alternatives exist to limit uncertainty like conducting research or analyses. It is 
important to add here that not only start-ups have to deal with uncertainty, but also 
multinationals are exposed to this factor. However the latter have the therefore 
necessary resources available for surviving a crisis, for conducting analyses or for 
engaging a consulting service. 
 11 
 
This list of arguments is not exhaustive; it should rather deliver a first very general 
impression for being able to classify a start-up business. This thesis treats limitations 
and challenges in more depth later, adapted to the chosen branch of high technology 
based start-up companies. Furthermore it is interesting how these general challenges 
and limitations differ when analyzing some start-ups that are active in the high 
technology branch. 
2.2.2. Opportunities start-ups afford in general 
It is obvious that a start-up enterprise is not merely confronted with restrictions; this 
type of business offers many chances due to its unique characteristics. One major 
advantage, and therefore a chance is its flexibility.  
This chapter presents a first overview of some opportunities, divided into internal and 
external chances. (Unterkofler, 1989,p. 110) 
 
Internal Opportunities 
- Direct responsibility of employees’ tasks may lead to achievement of higher 
quality. 
- Marginal developed corporate hierarchy results in individual and direct 
management style. 
- No daily routine, which maintains flexibility. 
- Motivated founder generates above-average job performance. 
- Due to the start-up’s size a direct and open communication is practicable. 
- Start-up firm is rather  under constraint being innovative and creative. 
 
External Opportunities 
- Start-up firm is able to serve markets a large-scale enterprise would not consider 
as attractive due to lack of profitability. 
- Various customers prefer a start-up company due to for example a more private 
support which they can offer. 
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This list is again not exhaustive; rather more a thought-provoking impulse to understand 
some general opportunities of newly established firms. 
Regarding productivity Acs and Audretsch (1990) investigated start-ups concerning 
innovations. The result discloses that start-up enterprises invest in total less on R&D 
compared to established companies, but they are twice as productive.  
 
But in relative terms these R&D expenditures lead to a totally converse picture, here the 
high-tech start-ups clearly outperform established firms. The proportional higher 
expenditures on R&D might be one reason why new established firms are often seen as 
drivers of radical innovations. (Almeida and Kogut, 1997)  
 
Based on the possibility to receive funding for investigating in rather unexplored and 
new technological fields, start-ups concentrate on those more often than established 
companies do. This again explains why newly established firms have the opportunity of 
being innovative and creative as Unterkofler (1989) describes. (Almeida and Kogut, 
1997, p. 22) Another explanation why start-ups tend to be more inventive than larger 
firms can be based on the fact that innovations are characterized as being of regional 
origin. These firms rely more on local networks. As an illustrative example Silicon 
Valley in the United States can be mentioned. (Almeida and Kogut, 1997, p. 23) 
 
This thesis treats opportunities and challenges of start-ups later more precisely, the 
reasons described here are presented in a generally admitted way for familiarizing with 
the topic. 
 
2.3. High-Tech Sector (Peter Nemes) 
As the term start-up is defined in chapter 2.2., here this supplementary definition limits 
the scope of research to companies in the high-tech sector.  
High technology by definition is difficult to specify, as there are no explicit attributes 
associated with this term. According to some researchers there is a lack of agreement in 
the literature about the specific criteria to be used in deciding which companies should 
be included in this category and in classifying companies according to their technology 
level. (Amir Grinstein, 2006)  
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Koberg (1996) describes this situation as “definitional Tower of Babel” highlighting the 
weaknesses of available definitions. Several definitions from various researchers were 
listed in a research paper conducted by Grinstein and Goldman (2006), which tries to 
point out the limitations and the missing validity of definitions and characteristics. The 
first table shows definitions of technology firms and their limitations.  
 
 
Authors  Definitions Limitations 
Glasmeier et al. (1983) 
Harpaz and Meshoulam 
(2004) 
Employing engineers, 
scientists and academics in 
higher numbers 
A single perspective of the 
technology firm is used (e.g. 
human resources) 
Maidique and Hayes (1984), 
Medcof (1999) 
Investing at least 3% of 
revenues in R&D activities 
A single measure is used 
MacDonald (1985) Developing complex products Based on vague, undefined 
constructs 
Rogers and Larsen (1985), 
Nijkamp et al. (1990)  
Having a fast rate of growth 
and a worldwide market for 
their products 
Non-exclusive, associated 
with industries or firms that 
are not necessarily technology 
ones 
Table 1: Examples of definitions of technology firms and their limitations 
(Amir Grinstein, 2006, p. 125) 
 
Despite these various definitions, R&D expenditures as a percentage of total sales and 
R&D employees as a percentage of total employees have become the most frequently 
used definition in empirical research. These indicators represent reasonable 
approximations to identify technology intensive or knowledge intensive organizations. 
(Bürgel, 2000, p. 81) 
 
In addition to these common definitions high-tech companies are assigned to additional 
characteristics. These are often diverse and very descriptive and are not suitable to be 
termed as “high-tech”. As a consequence these attributes are less adequate for 
identifying companies. They have a descriptive nature and there is a necessity for 
further argumentation.  
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Grinstein and Goldman (2006) list specific characteristics explicitly mentioned in 
publications that are used to delineate and/or classify these firms. The authors state that 
this list of characteristics cannot be effectively used to perform this task because the list 
is very extensive and the interrelations among the characteristics have not been 
established. The following table includes definitions, which are sorted by year.  
 
Example source Characteristics Brief description 
Goldman (1982)  Products with a short life 
cycle 
A firm’s products are 
characterized by a short life 
cycle 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
(1984) 
Incentive and group-based 
reward systems 
A firm frequently uses 
incentive and group-based 
reward systems 
Shanklin and Ryans (1987) Relative number of R&D 
personnel 
A firm’s emphasis on 
employing R&D personnel 
Shanklin and Ryans (1987) Management commitment to 
R&D 
 
Top management 
commitment to, and 
involvement in R&D activity 
   
Shanklin and Ryans (1987) Ill-Defined market needs A firm’s market needs are not 
well-defined , are specified in 
general terms or are not stable 
   
Shanklin and Ryans (1987) R&D personnel movement A firm enables R&D 
personnel movement across 
various organizational units 
Von- Gilnow and Mohrmann 
(1990) 
Management attitude towards 
change 
A firm faces continuous 
changes and engages in 
adaptations to these changes 
Von-Gilnow and Mohrman 
(1990) 
 
Lateral career paths 
 
A firm frequently uses lateral-
technological career paths  
 
Von-Gilnow and Mohrman 
(1990) 
Decentralization of decision-
making processes 
A firm’s decision-making 
processes are highly 
decentralized 
Dvir and Shenhar (1990) 
 
Focus on innovative R&D 
 
Innovativeness as an objective 
of the R&D activity 
Shankiln and Higgins (1992) Technology-driven customers A firm faces customers which 
actively search for, and easily 
adopt technology-based 
innovative products 
 
Mohrmann et al. (1992) 
 
Flat organizational structure 
 
A firm maintains an 
organizational structure 
characterized by a small 
number of hierarchies and 
enables employees to 
communicate directly with 
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anyone relevant for 
accomplishing their tasks 
Mohrmann et al. (1992) Use of cross-functional teams 
in R&D 
A firm frequently uses cross 
functional teams in R&D 
activities 
Easingwood and Beard 
(1996) 
 
Product-driven competition 
 
A firm faces competition 
which is product based 
 
Easingwood and Bear (1996) Management attitude towards 
risk 
A firm undertakes risky 
projects and initiatives 
Bowonder and Yadav (1999) Relative R&D investment 
level 
A firm’s basic commitment to 
technological activity through 
its R&D expenses 
Howells (1999)  Outsourcing R&D A firm’s emphasis on 
conducting R&D in-house 
rather than outsourcing it 
Deeds et al. (2000) Number of new products and 
their innovativeness 
A firm’s emphasis on 
continually introducing to the 
market new and innovative 
products 
Table 2: The characteristics authors associate with technology firms (Amir Grinstein, 2006, p. 26) 
 
In the search of high-technology start-ups several characteristics and definitions are 
used to identify some relevant companies in this thesis. As the emphasis lies on a 
qualitative investigation it is not necessary to have a broad base of study objects.  
Rather the goal is to carry out a comparative analysis of similar examples where it is 
more important to identify similar companies in the same branch with homogenous 
properties and with a comparable starting point. 
 
The list of characteristics is important in this thesis as it helps to identify the properties 
of high tech start-ups. Moreover it supports the process of qualitative research and it is 
administrable in the creation of qualitative questionnaires.  
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2.4. High-Tech Start-up (Marlene Wiedorn) 
After defining a start-up company with its challenges and opportunities in general, and 
restraining the branch high-tech to fit this study, the next step is to declare what is 
meant by a high-tech start-up. Elucidating this term is essential due to the reason that 
the later theoretical part and case analysis is centered to high-tech start-ups.  
 
Bürgel (2000) explains that the demand for investigating such high-technology-based 
enterprises has its beginning in the United States, with famous companies such as eBay, 
Microsoft or Amazon. These firms illustrate two things very demonstratively: Firstly, 
they all expanded within a few years to dominant global players in their branch, and 
secondly, this rapid growth can be ascribed to the fact that these former start-up 
companies focused on technologic progress and research.  
They are known for generating additional benefit, workplaces, innovation and also for 
being a source of structural adjustment. (Bürgel, 2000, p. 5) 
 
Jones (2001, p. 207) notes that high-tech start-ups can be described as firms that explore 
recent and originating technologies and generally internationalize rapidly or instantly. A 
reason for this rapid internationalization is that start-ups that are technologically 
innovative face considerable drive to launch products, services or intellectual property 
onto foreign markets because they soon recognize that the home market does not offer 
sufficient possibilities in terms of sales, growth and development. That is also why 
high-tech start-ups generally are not in the position to gradually develop a domestic 
presence because of the persistent pressure to internationalize. (Crick and Jones, 2000, 
p. 63)  
 
Further high-technology start-ups are in many cases managed by researchers, 
technologists or engineers who have notable competence in the certain field of business. 
(Jones, 2001, p. 207) This statement is treated critically in more detail later. 
 
Aside from the technological know-how the head of the company holds, this person 
often lacks business competence and experience. (Oakey and Mukhtar, 1999) This lack 
leads to a higher risk for the company failing in more general business activities such as 
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for instance the protection of the firm’s technology. Hence if the leader of the start-up 
lacks general business knowledge, the company has to consult assistance. (Jones, 2001, 
p. 208) This thesis doesn’t follow the approach by Oakey and Mukhtar (1999) exactly, 
surely a high-tech start-up lacks experience and know-how, but later in this thesis it is 
explained how these limitations can be simply overcome. 
 
Due to Crick and Jones (2000, p. 65) high-tech start-ups are further characterized as 
innovative, qualified for being part of a technological imposition and able to generate 
recent technological prospects. Certainly innovative firms exist in different industries 
too, but high-tech companies have a higher proportion of research and development and 
generally initiate more radical innovations compared to other industry branches.  
 
As all major definitions used in this thesis are described the following chapter 
introduces the main internationalization theories. The structure follows a top down 
approach by introducing the reader into the theoretical basics of internationalization. 
This establishes the basis for further strategic and practical insights.  
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3. Internationalization Theories (Peter Nemes) 
In the following part five main internationalization theories are described. The subject 
of high tech start-ups is examined in the context of these theories in order to identify 
relevant peculiarities of these special companies. As a by-product the shortcomings of 
internationalization theories are discussed. 
 
The existing theories contribute largely to models, which try to explain why companies 
internationalize and hardly offer models for real decision making. Managers can hardly 
derive recommendations from existing internationalization theories as the relationships 
between the determinants either remain open or are very vague. These theories include a 
list of explanatory variables, which can have a relevant impact on the process of 
internationalization.   
  
Many approaches are bi-national and give no answers to questions as in how many 
countries a company should have operations and how the operational network should 
look like.  Additionally almost all approaches consider businesses as one single unit. 
For example looking at an entire multiproduct enterprise can be problematic when 
different products have a different level of internationalization.  
Furthermore most theories are static and do not consider the process of 
internationalization. 
 
Despite this criticism, theories of internationalization if seen holistically provide basic 
mental material for the development of strengths and weaknesses.  
 
By working out particularities for high-tech start-ups in these theories a basic 
requirement for an own eclectic model for decision-making is laid. This is investigated 
and enriched by empirical results in the practical part of the thesis. (Perlitz, 2000, p. 
133) 
 
By narrowing the investigation on high-tech start-ups some deeper insights in entry 
mode decision-making and more practical implications for managers can be gained.  
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Amongst others this research strategy is recommended by Zhao and Decker (2005) who 
try to outline emerging trends in market entry mode theory and try to develop starting 
points for further research. 
 
3.1. The Stage Development Model 
The stage of development (SD) model, also called learning theory of 
internationalization or Uppsala model was proposed by Johanson and Paul (1975) while 
studying internationalization strategies of small and medium sized enterprises. They 
argue that the major driver for international operations is an organizational learning 
process.  
 
The starting point of the considerations is the assumption that companies with no 
foreign experience prefer exports as the lowest risk form of internationalization. Only 
with increased knowledge and experience of the opportunities and challenges of 
international expansion higher risk forms will be chosen. While a company has very 
small market knowledge in the first stage of internationalization process it gains more 
information about local market conditions and extends market specific knowledge. With 
increasing market knowledge enterprises spend more resources abroad and tend to 
choose entry forms, which are characterized by higher risk. Furthermore it argues that 
firms start their foreign operations from culturally and/or geographically close countries 
and move gradually to culturally and geographically more distant countries.  
 
The main message of the internationalization process research is that the 
internationalization of companies takes place by means of the so-called Establishment 
Chain and the Physic Distance Chain. Through permanent interaction of static and 
dynamic factors the company develops incrementally through learning and increases its 
international focus.  
 
The original approach was enhanced by several studies. For example Pedersen and 
Shaver (2000, p. 21) state that the process of internationalization can also be a 
discontinuous process where there is one, big, first, step. Furthermore Millington and 
Bayliss (1990, p. 15) state that there are various influencing factors depending on the 
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degree of internationalization. These have an influence on the internationalization of a 
company. According to them, companies with more international experience can skip 
some steps in the internationalization process as they can use their knowledge from 
other markets.  
 
The model argues that the internationalization is a long, slow and incremental process 
with two dimensions. The geographical dimension, the cultural expansion and the 
commitment. The discussion about the adequate market entry timing for high-tech start-
ups is treated later in this thesis more precisely, especially in chapter 4.5. 
 
Despite many studies confirming the learning theory some restrictions need to be 
considered. Its validity is widely restricted to the initial stages of internationalization 
where missing international experience is one major restriction for internationalization. 
Here it can be argued that this theory can have relevant implications for high-tech start- 
ups as it has less international experience as an organization.  
 
In recent years however there is an increase in creation of so-called born global 
companies that are founded by experienced entrepreneurs. These born globals have 
shortly after or already at the time of establishment significant exposure to international 
partners. With this method they demonstrate that they are capable of skipping several 
steps in the establishment chain (Holtbrügge and Enßlinger, 2004). In chapter 4.3.1. the 
special case of born globals and high-tech start-ups is discussed in more detail.  
 
Due to the fact that this theory is not capable of explaining why a newly established 
firm starts with wholly owned venture or other higher risk entry forms the SD model 
does not dominate in existent literature. (Zhao and Decker, 2005, p. 5) 
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3.2. The Transaction Cost Analysis model  
The transaction cost theory is based on transaction cost economies initiated by 
Williamson (1975 and 1985) as a tool to explain economic problems where asset 
specifity, behavioral- and environmental uncertainties play an important role. (Zhao and 
Decker, 2005, p. 5)  
 
The TCA framework has been widely extended and examined by researchers. For 
example by Nakos and Brouthers (2002), who try to show the implications of the TCA 
model for SMEs. The TCA model has been used extensively for MNE companies to 
demonstrate its robustness and its applicability but has barely been used for smaller 
companies like start ups or SMEs. (Brouthers and Nakos, 2002, p. 1) 
 
As SMEs have similar properties and characteristics as high-tech start-ups their 
arguments will be applied similarly and adapted to high-tech start-ups.  
 
The TCA model suggests that organizational structure and design are determined by 
minimizing transaction costs. In other words this means that companies choose a 
specific mode of market entry that maximizes the long-term risk adjusted efficiency. 
These transaction costs are made up of two main costs namely market transaction costs 
and control costs. (Brouthers and Nakos, 2002) 
 
As an example it can be said that only when internal organizational costs are lower than 
market costs it will be efficient for a company to organize itself in a hierarchy. 
(Hennart, 1988)  
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The two costs are mainly influenced by asset specifity, behavioral uncertainties and 
environmental uncertainties. These three factors will be explained in the following.  
 
Asset Specifity 
According to Williamson (1986) transaction-specific assets are non-redeployable 
investments that are specialized and unique to a task. Asset specifity refers to the extent 
to which a party is linked into a business relationship.  
 
Williamson (1983) identified four dimensions of asset specifity, which are following: 
 
- Site specifity (e.g. natural resources at a specific geographic location which can 
barely be moved)  
- Physical specifity (e.g. specialized machinery or tools which are designed for a 
single purpose)   
- Human asset specifity (e.g. highly specialized human knowledge which can be 
hardly externalized)  
- Dedicated assets (isolated investment into specific machinery which cannot be 
used for other purposes) 
 
Researchers have extended these specifities by time specifity (Malone et al., 1987) and 
procedural asset specifity (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1994) that are described as 
following: 
 
- Time specifity (e.g. if a product needs to be delivered in a short specified period 
of time)  
- Procedural asset specifity (e.g. refers to the degree of individualization and 
customizations of business workflows and processes to utilize the partners’ 
capabilities) 
 
Applying asset specifity to high-tech start-ups it can be argued that the occurrence of 
physical, human are very high for high-tech companies. Assuming that high-tech firms 
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can have very specialized and sophisticated instruments and machinery which can only 
be operated by highly skilled and specialized individuals for particular purposes.  
Time specifity applies rather less to high-tech products, as they cannot be copied as 
easily and have a lower turnover ratio as low-tech products.  
 
For instance Osborne (1996) found that New Zealand SMEs that possessed a higher 
ability to develop complex technically differentiated products showed a tendency to use 
equity entry modes, while companies selling undifferentiated commodities used non-
equity modes. This tendency is also shown in Bürgel and Murray (2000) who found a 
positive relationship between R&D intensity and the use of equity modes for a sample 
of UK high tech start-ups companies.  
 
These findings would suggest that high-tech start-ups would tend to prefer equity entry 
modes if asset specifity is high but only if asset specifity was the major factor for 
decision makers. As specific assets require extensive training and investment it could be 
argued that it could be problematic for start-ups to prefer equity entry modes as they 
have major financial and human resource restrictions.  
 
Behavioral Uncertainties 
These uncertainties result from the inability of a company to predict the behavior of 
individuals in a foreign country, which may lead to opportunistic or dishonest behavior. 
Companies need to establish internal control mechanisms to reduce these uncertainties. 
One option may be hierarchical ownership that gives the owning party the legal rights to 
control foreign-based employees. (Klein et al. 1990)  
 
As this control function requires special managerial skills, controlling systems and 
processes it can be argued that high-tech start-ups need international control related 
experience. This factor may discourage high-tech start-ups from organizing in a 
hierarchical form as start-ups have less developed controlling systems and processes. 
This argument can only be supported if it is assumed that the founders and management 
team of high-tech start-ups are inexperienced and this not appropriate for every start-up 
as described later in chapter 4.3.1. Born Globals. According to Reuber (1997) a more 
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internationally experienced top management will use foreign strategic partnerships to a 
greater extent, which will promote the internationalization of the firm. The relevance of 
managerial experience is elaborated in more detail in the chapter 4.3.1. concerning born 
globals.  
 
Environmental uncertainties  
All uncertainties created by the target market environment associated with the host 
market like political or legal risk can be subsumed under environmental uncertainties 
(Williamson, 1985). In countries with high environmental uncertainty it can be argued 
that high-tech start-ups would prefer low-investment entry modes, as they need to stay 
flexible if environmental conditions change. In a highly uncertain surrounding the 
proprietary knowledge of high-tech start-ups may be less protected by regulations and 
patent laws, for instance as they have fewer resources to control patent infringements 
and assert their claims in a court of law these considerations need to be regarded.  
 
Patenting is treated in chapter 4. These considerations have parallels to the Stage 
Development Model from chapter 3.1. where the Physic Distance Chain has similar 
implications as it describes the internationalization as an incremental process where the 
Distance Chain also refers to cultural differences.  
 
To reinforce the argument of low-investment entry modes Oviatt (2000) found that US 
high-tech companies entering into markets with higher risk potential tend to select non-
equity modes of entry. On the other hand Bürgel and Murray (2000) found no 
significant relationship between country risk and entry mode for UK high-tech start-ups.  
 
Although theoretical findings provide strong support for applying the transactions cost 
model to international entry mode choice (Brouthers and Nakos, 2004) there are clear 
weaknesses in practice, for example the transaction cost framework has a limited 
explanation power when it comes to explain multinational choices: 
 
According to Zhao and Decker (2005) it neglects government regulations, which 
generally define the feasible sets of entry modes and production. Furthermore it fails to 
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include the larger strategic and competitive context and excludes non-transaction 
benefits. For instance it could be argued that high-tech start-ups internationalize in order 
to take advantage of synergies with international research partners. In this context the 
TCA model alleges that the only objective is profit maximization. Furthermore it can be 
reasoned that transaction costs can hardly be measured prior to a transaction.  
 
Summing up it can be said that transaction cost theory if used in market entry mode 
decisions can help decision makers to make better entry decisions, but in practice the 
model is hardly usable. As start-ups have limited resources that restrict search and 
analysis activities many tend to prefer non-equity modes of entry although TCA models 
would suggest equity modes.  
 
Here it needs to be stated that organizational capacity restrictions are also neglected. 
This demonstrates the shortcomings of the TCA theory and creates demand for a more 
complete model that also includes capability and strategic factors. These shortcomings 
are addressed in the Organizational Capacity Model in chapter 3.4.  
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3.3. The Ownership-Location-Internalization Model 
The nature and extent of internationalization cannot be attributed to a single cause but is 
dependent on various factors. According to Dunning (1988) particularly, three factors 
are relevant, referred to as advantage categories. (Welge, 2006, p. 76) This eclectic OLI 
framework suggests that companies will select their entry mode structure by considering 
three factors, which are ownership advantages, location advantages and 
internationalization advantages. Dunning’s eclectic framework represents an 
improvement over transaction cost theory by adding locational owner-specific as well as 
transaction cost variables (Brouthers, 2002, p. 32).  
 
In the following these three variables will be described in detail and applied to the 
context of high-tech start-ups.  
 
Ownership advantages  
These advantages are specific to the nature and nationality of the owner and are 
necessary to compete with host country companies in their own markets. In order to do 
this these companies must possess superior assets and skills that can earn higher 
economic rents to meet the higher cost of serving a foreign market. (Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992, p. 4) For example several ownership advantages can be classified 
like management-know-how, access to resources, registered patent and governmental 
preferences.  
 
There are also advantages, which result out of the multi-nationality of the investing 
company like currency management or synergies and economies of scale in 
procurement. These advantages might not be that relevant for start-ups as they do not 
poses the resources and capabilities to exploit these advantages.  
 
According to Agarwal (1992) a firm’s asset power is reflected by its size, multinational 
experience, and its skills to develop differentiated products. Correspondingly they state 
that the impact of the firm size and its multinational experience is positive on foreign 
direct investment and the propensity to enter foreign markets in general. Accordingly 
higher international experience leads to prefer equity modes of entry. In the context of 
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high-tech start-ups it can be said that small firms have traditionally been advised by 
scientific literature to pursue differentiation as a means of competing against larger 
competitors. This differentiation can be reached by relying on product innovation or by 
higher relative product quality and an increased emphasis on service. (Shrader, Oviatt, 
McDougall, 2000 p. 1233-1234) For high tech start-ups high asset power can be implied 
as they have the skills to develop differentiated products. Additionally it may be 
possible that founders and a managerial team possess multinational experience.  
 
Location advantages  
These advantages arise from the fact that different locations feature different recourses, 
cultures, institutions and different regulations.  
 
These properties also reflect the investment risk in a host country. There can be changes 
in government policies that could be more restrictive like repatriation of earnings or in 
the worst case could lead to expropriation of assets. Additionally the market potential, 
which is determined by the market size and the growth, can also play an important role 
as all these factors influence the revenue and the cost of production. 
 
One argument by Dunning (1995) is also that companies seek growth in international 
markets when growth in their home market stagnates or declines. As high-tech start-ups 
have a very unique product portfolio the potential market size is small from the 
beginning of their operations. As a consequence their opportunities are unavoidably 
international and it can be argued that they are constrained to go international as the 
market potential is only given in foreign countries. According to Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992) for example in high market potential countries investment modes 
are expected to provide greater long term profitability compared to non investment 
modes as the company may obtain the opportunity to establish long term market 
presence even if economies of scale are not that significant. This argument would imply 
that also high-tech start-ups, which have fewer chances to exploit economies of scale, 
should make use of investment modes. 
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Internationalization advantages 
These advantages refer to ones that arise from transferring ownership advantages across 
national boundaries within the own organization. (Zhao and Decker, 2005) 
Internationalization advantages arise if transactions are carried out cheaper within the 
organization than if they are arranged externally on the market. (Welge, 2006, p. 76) 
This factor has its origins within the transaction cost theory that is already described in 
chapter 3.2.  
 
Low control modes would be considered to be advantageous as a company can benefit 
from scale economies of the market without encountering the disadvantage of an 
extensive integration. However low control modes have the same drawbacks and 
obstacles as described in the transaction cost theory. Asset specifity, behavioral- and 
environmental uncertainties can make the creation and enforcement of contracts that 
specify every eventuality and response too expensive to stay with low control modes. 
For high-tech start-ups the same arguments that were discussed in chapter 3.2. can be 
applied.  
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Implications 
The more OLI advantages a company possesses the greater is the propensity of adopting 
a high control entry mode. In the following illustration the interrelation between the 
three OLI advantages is shown.  
 
Figure 1: Decision Tree for foreign market development from Dunning  
(Welge, 2006, p. 77) 
 
Dunning’s (1995) framework has been applied and is supported in various empirical 
studies to explain entry mode decisions. It was updated several times by Dunning who 
argued that competitive advantages, market failure and collaboration as well as dynamic 
environments should also be integrated when decisions on international productions are 
made. Although Brouthers (1999) found that the OLI framework does well at predicting 
entry mode choice and has a normative validity with its great explaining power Zhao 
and Decker (2005) state that it is still a static model. As it neglects strategic factors, 
characteristics and situational contingency surrounding of the decision maker and 
competition. (Zhao and Decker, 2005, p. 8) 
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3.4. The Organizational Capability Model 
The OC model is based on organization theory and regards a company as a bundle of 
capabilities and knowledge where individual skills, organization and technology are 
inextricably woven together. (Nelson and Winter, 1982) The coordination- and 
deployment function of capabilities and knowledge is merged into the term capability 
management.  
 
According to Madhok (1998) capability management is a dynamic process where the 
information management attributes of the firm are critical. These are the companies’ 
abilities to acquire, evaluate, assimilate, integrate, diffuse, deploy and exploit 
knowledge. The term capability management refers to processes and routines by which 
a company’s knowledge base is developed and integrated into the functioning of an 
organization, enhanced through new combinations and subsequently deployed in order 
to exploit new sales opportunities. (Madhok, 1998)  
 
The OC model argues that entry mode decision is a capability related one and it is made 
under a calculus governed by considerations related to the development and deployment 
of company’s capabilities.  
 
The OC model was developed by the authors Auklah/Kotabe (1997) and Madhok 
(1998). In the study “The nature of multinational firm boundaries: Transaction costs, 
firm capabilities and foreign market entry mode” Madhok tries to shift the main focus 
of research attention away from market failure, resulting out of high transaction costs to 
capability related issues. It is the first time that organization capacity is taken into 
consideration and shifts away the main research focus from market failure 
considerations. It puts an emphasis on the nature and pattern of a companies’ experience 
and information management abilities.  
 
Madhok (1998) argues that in the global economy of today companies need to trade off 
transaction cost-related concerns against capability related ones. Madhok states that 
ownership mode decisions seem to be more influenced by issues related to companies’ 
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capabilities rather than transaction costs. He further states that the nature of competition 
has become much more intense and technology has become highly complex and 
dynamic. In these surroundings where multiple pressures need to be managed 
transaction cost considerations may become less important and capability considerations 
become more significant in shaping the companies behavior. (Madhok, 1998) This 
argument shows the importance of this model for high-tech start-ups. There are few 
arguments especially for high-tech start-ups as they attracted little interest from 
researchers concerning their organizational capabilities  
 
According to Madhok (1998) the TC theory does not address the larger strategic and 
competitive context within which the firm operates. As companies compete not on the 
basis of cost alone companies need to conduct analysis of their own capabilities in order 
to assess the appropriate mode of market participation.  
 
In the context of high technology based start-up companies it needs to be stated that 
Madhok’s and Auklah’s research was mainly conducted with large and internationally-
experienced companies, (Madhok, 1998). Auklah and Kotabe (1997) based their study 
on Fortune 500 companies. This means that both research papers have a strong bias 
towards multinational companies. This makes these studies less applicable for the 
context of start-ups. Here it can be stated that there is a lack of research in the area of 
high-tech start-ups when trying to apply this model. 
 
Nevertheless some arguments may be important for the context of high technological 
start-up firms. Also because Auklah and Madhok enriched internationalization theories, 
which were mainly restricted to transaction specific factors, with organizational 
capability factors. Auklah and Kotabe show this in their conceptual model illustrated 
below. (Auklah/Kotabe,1997, p. 150) 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Model (Auklah and Kotabe, 1997, p. 150) 
  
 
Transaction-specific factors have already been explained in chapter 3.2. These TC 
factors have been enriched by strategic factors and organizational capability factors. 
This extends Dunning’s eclectic framework, which has the disadvantage that it neglects 
strategic factors.  
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Furthermore it establishes ties to more strategic views and offers a more holistic 
approach to internationalization. As already mentioned internationalization models 
hardly offer support for real decision-making. It is believed that this model can improve 
this situation by bringing the various factors into a more coherent framework.  
 
After all, this model has also limitations as it ignores some factors as for example 
organizational efficiency. Zhao and Decker (2005) state that in the context of the model,   
measures for organizational efficiency have to be developed. This is necessary to 
enhance the applicability of the model. They state that, although collaborative 
agreements may change capacity and capabilities in a very positive way, efficiency 
related decisions are significantly influenced, for example the coordination effort in 
collaborations may increase dramatically which could decrease the organizational 
efficiency.  
 
Additionally Zhao and Decker state that the OC model neglects the impact of decision 
makers as well as sociological and political factors. Here it also needs to be added that 
Auklah and Kotabe (1997) point out that the three strategic variables which are 
considered in the model are not sufficient and do not utilize all possible strategic goals 
of companies.  
 
These limitations again confirm the difficulty of developing a holistic and universally 
valid internationalization model especially for high technological based start-ups. 
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3.5. The Stage Development Model  
According to Zhao and Decker the decision making process model suggests that the 
entry mode choice should be treated as a multistage decision making process. In the 
course of this decision-making several factors are taken into account. These are mainly 
the objectives of the intended market entry, the environment, and associated risks and 
costs. (Zhao, Decker, 2005).  
 
The major difference to the other internationalization models is that it focuses primarily 
on optimizing the decision making process. It does not further explore and extend 
possible factors for internationalization. According to Zhao and Decker this model was 
proposed by Root (1994) and further developed by Young et al. (1989) Kumar 
Subramaniam (1997), Pan, Tse (2000) and Eicher and Kang (2002). These papers were 
analyzed with the concentration on the context of high tech start-ups. In the paper “A 
contingency framework for the mode of entry decision” by Kumar and Subramaniam 
(1997) some context specific findings were identified. Therefore the following 
arguments are mainly based on this research paper.  
 
Kumar and Subramaniam present a contingency framework in their paper 
accommodating alternative decision strategies that result in a hierarchical model for 
entry mode decision. According to them this hierarchical model is predominately 
relevant for small and midsized companies. This is the main reason to mention it in this 
thesis. Aside from this reason, the authors state that most literature and research 
assumes that managers have enough time and resources to make an informed and 
rational entry choice. In their research they try to address this gap and consider 
alternative strategies for decision making by developing a contingency model.  
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The “contingency model of decision making“ consists of several stages (Kumar, 
Subramanmiam) as seen in figure 3 below.  
 
 
Figure 3: A Contingency Model of Mode of Entry Decision (Kumar and Subramania, 1997) 
 
- The first stage involves recognition of the problem. In the context of high tech start-
ups this would imply the need to have a successful operation in a foreign market. If 
this problem has been identified the decision maker proceeds to the next step.  
- In the following stage the manager needs to evaluate the requirements and 
prerequisites for the entry mode. The manager tries to answer the question, which 
factors affecting the entry mode need to be considered. In addition it is important to 
know from where this information can be obtained and at what costs.  
- In the following third stage the decision strategy is selected which enables the 
manager to solve the problem of the market entry mode. These strategies should be 
selected by assessing the amount of recourses that are required to use these strategies 
and by evaluating the ability of each strategy to obtain an accurate result. In the 
context of high tech start-ups this would mean that a manager needs to accurately 
estimate and value the financial and time resources a strategy incorporates. For start-
ups this cost/benefit analysis is of major importance as they especially face 
constrained circumstances.  
- The fourth stage includes collecting and processing information. This process may 
involve costly and time-consuming activities but could also be based on simple 
heuristics. According to Kumar and Subramaniam entrepreneurs operating in smaller 
entities will tend to use less formal and less elaborate strategies like simple 
heuristics.  
- In the final step of the decision process the decision maker decides on which entry 
mode to use when entering a market.  
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As mentioned already, decision makers in high-tech start-ups face a very constrained 
situation for decision-making. Therefore they would tend to use a hierarchical process 
to reduce the uncertainty and complexity in the decision of entry modes. In the figure 
four below the natural hierarchy of the various modes is shown.  
 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical Model of the Mode of Entry Decision (Pan and Tse, 2000) 
 
The modes of entry are classified in the first level of the hierarchy as equity and non-
equity modes. The equity modes are modes that require considerably higher resource 
commitments to enter a market. On the other side non-equity modes require decisively 
less resource commitment. What is ultimately crucial to this argument is the fact that 
only very few critical factors need to be considered at this hierarchy level. This implies 
that at different hierarchy levels different factors need to be considered. At the next 
hierarchy level other factors are decisive and relevant for the decision maker. As an 
example the decision between export and a contractual agreement at the second level 
may depend on factors like product properties or on the international experience of the 
management team.  
 
As an example if a product requires a high maintenance effort and specific know-how 
for production, exporting may be the only option for internationalization. On the other 
hand the factor time-to-market may require a direct presence in the market, which 
would favor contractual agreements to export.  
 37 
 
In addition to this very practical stage process the authors found that a decision made by 
a decision maker depends not only on external factors but also on the characteristics of 
the decision maker and the decision task. (These external factors were mentioned 
already in the previous models).  
 
Zhao and Decker argue that this model might be more practical than the other 
mentioned models but it would ignore the role of the organization itself and of the 
decision makers within the decision making process.  
  
This thesis shares this opinion but it is believed that this model could help especially 
decision makers in high-tech start-ups in their decision process if they use it as a 
fundamental decision framework and regard and use the different factors accordingly.  
 
As these factors can be derived from the previously mentioned internationalization 
models it is believed that these models can be of great assistance if they are combined. 
As an example decision makers may derive various factors from the OLI framework 
and use a hierarchical decision model to apply these.  
 
3.6. Summary of the Internationalization Theories and Models 
Except from the last model most of the existent studies aim to explore and extend 
factors related to entry mode choice. One of main issues regarding these theories is the 
fact that the surrounding of internationalization is very complex and dynamic. It is 
complex because there are various factors and circumstances with various importance. 
Furthermore every single individual company has different and unique conditions from 
their birth onwards.  
 
In addition the quality and validity of the models is only true for specific samples. As 
factors may play a different role in different contexts conflicting results are inevitable. It 
is hardly possible to have a normative model, which can accurately define and propose a 
certain entry mode. This makes the generalization of a market entry mode model 
difficult. Therefore Zhao and Decker recommend to narrow down investigation to 
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specific type of companies and to specify the associated environment. This might lead 
to deeper insights and some practical implications for managers (Zhao and Decker, 
2005) 
 
This approach is also used in this thesis by concentrating on companies in the medical 
technology branch. These companies can be characterized as high-tech companies and 
are expected to have a global market from its birth onwards. The chosen industrial 
sector will be described in more detail further in the practical part.   
 
In this previous first section three, the main attempt is to explain why high-tech start-
ups internationalize. In some further arguments also some factors for the entry mode 
decisions were discussed by various models.  
  
In the next step this thesis concentrates in more detail on the internationalization 
strategy of high-tech start-ups by specifying the various factors for market entry modes. 
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4. International Market Entry of High-Tech Start-Ups 
Jones (2001, p. 193) declares that today internationalization is less about entering 
foreign markets, it is more about enhancing and improving a company’s exposure and 
response to international business influences, opportunities, threats and imperatives. 
Further the mode of entry a start-up chooses describes the constitution of the entering 
firm, its disposable resources and its growth target. In addition the determined entry 
mode is not selected by the start-up alone; rather those decisions are based on the firm’s 
relevance in a market and the dependencies to different enterprises in that certain 
industry. (Brown and Bell, 2000) 
 
A research study of small British high-technology firms by Jones (2001, p. 201) 
indentifies that companies tend to initiate internationalization implementing several 
entry modes, in many cases more than one mode at a time. 
 
An international market entry always poses a challenge for any firm because it is far 
more than deciding for one single foreign market entry mode. If a start-up company 
decides for internationalizing its business, this decision presents a strategy, including 
many decision steps in a long-lasting internationalization process. Therefore this work 
is subdivided into such decision stages as for instance the market and location decision, 
possible entry modes and the choice of the accurate market entry point in time.  
At the beginning of each chapter these topics are defined broadly, followed by an 
evaluation and characterization for a high-tech start-up company.  
 
Since international market entry illustrates an integrated process, which means that 
market entry is made up by a number of interrelated decisions, chapter four follows 
such a structure by first describing motives a firm holds when planning a foreign market 
entry. Secondly, this chapter deals with different categories of risk such an 
internationalization decision includes. Thirdly, the question is tried to answer which 
market(s) a high-tech start-up should enter. Should the firm enter single countries 
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stepwise or all at the same time? Fourthly, all in this thesis relevant entry modes are 
explained and analyzed if they are of significance for high-tech start-ups. A critical 
examination of every market entry mode presents the conclusion of those sub-chapters. 
Fifthly and at the same time the last decision within the internationalization process 
presents the analysis of the accurate market entry timing for high-tech start-ups. 
 
All in chapter four included theoretical information is integrated in chapter five into an 
aggregated table, for presenting an overview of the most significant findings in the case 
of high-tech start-ups. In this diagram model the relevant statements are additionally 
evaluated in context to the internationalization theories described in chapter three. 
 
4.1. Motives and Stimuli for International Market Entry  
(Marlene Wiedorn) 
This chapter deals with the motives a start-up firm in the technological branch has for 
entering foreign markets. Which factors lead to the decision for being internationally 
active? First of all it is interesting if this determination is planned to some extent; 
therefore part of a company’s strategy, or to some extent spontaneous, resulting from 
miscellaneous circumstances, as restricted sales potential. In the case of a high-tech firm 
Crick and Jones (2000) tend to the first alternative, international market entry as an 
essential part of the firm’s strategy. The reasons therefore are the unique characteristics 
a start-up company in the high-tech sector possesses and in certain branches, including 
the modern technology industry, markets are innately international. Hence an 
international market entry is part of the high-tech firm’s strategy and demonstrates a 
coherent step in a firm’s existence. 
4.1.1. Market 
A common motive for a start-up company deciding on an international market entry 
depends on the market itself. If the firm operates in a market characterized by 
international competition, the firm tends to act in a much wider region compared to 
enterprises settled in markets with more regional nature. (Luostarinen and Hellman, 
1994) Hence one motive for an international market entry is the market situation itself. 
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In addition there are business branches whose sales market is in any case international. 
This applies to the high-technological sector including all its sub fields.  
 
Due to the fact that decisions for entering a market are not solely based on the 
individual firm, a broader perspective for entry motives has to be taken into account. 
Brown and Bell (2000) argue that every step towards internationalization demonstrates 
a reply to internal and external factors, including the before mentioned foreign market 
factors. External factors, for instance, include the chambers of commerce, industrial 
associations, banks, government agencies and other firms. (Summarized by Crick and 
Chaudhry, 1997) Besides these the business climate and home market’s trading 
prerequisites, domestic size of the market, the location and closeness of the firm to 
markets abroad are additional environmental factors influencing a start-up company in 
internationalizing. (Summarized by Crick and Chaudhry, 1997) 
4.1.2. Growth 
Growth presents another motive for an international market entry, which can be 
achieved by expanding a firm’s business markets. High-tech start-ups recognize the 
need for growth within the first years of existence, or even on establishment of the 
company. They are motivated to internationalize due to the limited growth possibilities 
the home market offers, therefore internationalization represents more a considered 
strategy than a spontaneous decision. (Crick and Jones, 2000) 
 
Growth can be obtained by developing links with the external environment. External 
links are for instance the network and contacts the company has access to or simply 
points of contact with the external environment. High-tech start-ups, which possess 
restricted resources, but on the other hand have the advantage of being innovative and 
flexible, mostly grow through links with the external environment. (Jones, 2001, p. 195)  
 
Jones (2001, p. 202) demonstrates in her research study that small high-tech firms hold 
such links already at the beginning of their internationalization process. About 90% of 
all firms she investigated had marketing and distribution links when they started to 
internationalize. These links derive from for example the entrepreneur or the local 
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network the start-up is active in. These links are essential for the start-up becoming 
global, which is treated in more detail later. 
 
In order to grow a high-tech start-up has to internationalize its technology rapidly and 
should also try to enhance the firm’s competence and know-how by cooperation with 
others in this branch or in fields the start-up lacks in skills. (Crick and Jones, 2000, p. 
66) The question if and when cooperation is an adequate strategy for a start-up in the 
case of business internationalization, is answered in the following chapters, dealing with 
the different market entry modes. 
4.1.3. Experience 
Maybe the most significant and important factor in start-up companies is the 
entrepreneur (for example the owner or manager) or the senior management team. 
These persons are the ones who are responsible for taking a decision within the start-up 
enterprise. Hence they determine the strategy and future of a firm, based on their 
personal experience. Often one person has the final say in questions how the company 
starts to internationalize. (Crick and Chaudhry, 1997)  
 
During the phase of internationalization a start-up firm, especially the entrepreneur, 
gains (additional) experience. Thereby this person might identify the adequate entry 
location, mode for the start-up. Aside from this and also very important is the 
experience the entrepreneur brings into the start-up. This already existing experience is 
an additional motive for business internationalization strategy.  
4.1.4. Technological Learning and Performance 
Zahra et al. (2000) define technological learning in their study as value-creating 
knowledge that companies acquire when internationalizing business. Technological 
knowledge facilitates the progress of skills and competencies that support the enterprise 
achieving competitive advantage. It is further helpful in differentiating a company’s 
products and in entering markets faster.  
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In addition technological learning provides a main foundation for the organizational 
routines that are necessary for strengthening present core capabilities and developing 
new ones. (Teece et al., 1997) Without it the company’s skills become outdated, its 
products obsolete and the business future insecure. 
 
Especially in the high technology sector an innovative product, a competitive advantage 
and the creation of organizational and technological know-how are decisive factors for 
being successful in the long run. All these criteria are developed and supported when 
firms attain technological knowledge by entering foreign markets. Besides gaining this 
knowledge, it is necessary to integrate this know-how into business practices and 
products, to influence the technological performance positively. 
 
In addition the potential for greater breadth and depth of technological learning for a 
start-up rises by the number of diverse foreign markets entered. The gathered 
knowledge can be applied to some extent in other markets, thus the benefit of 
technological learning increases again.  
 
Start-ups profit from technological learning by gaining significant knowledge that can 
be applied for (Zahra et al., 2000, p. 943): 
 
- Designing and offering greater variety of innovative products  
(breadth of knowledge) 
- Offering more differentiated and high-quality products  
(depth of knowledge) 
- Launching products to markets faster  
(speed of developing and using knowledge) 
 
All the above described benefits from technological learning should in the long run lead 
to an improved financial performance and hence motivate a start-up for 
internationalization. 
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4.1.5. Government Trade Promotion 
A lot of literature is published concerning government trade promotion in the case of 
business internationalization. The aim of this promotion lies in advancing a company to 
internationalize its business. Why does trade promotion demonstrate a motive for 
international market entry? First, it is important to determine what trade promotion 
incorporates, especially for high-tech start-up companies. Crick and Jones (2000, p. 66) 
explain that normally such promotion is composed of: 
 
- Export service programs: tutorials for potential and prospective exporters, export 
consultancy, field manuals for export and export financing. 
- Market development programs: offering firms the possibility to experience a trade 
exhibition, assistance and prearrangement of market investigations, newsletters 
covering subject areas like export. 
 
This listing illustrates exemplarily which services and programs governments offer to 
start-up companies and to small and medium-sized enterprises. It is interesting that all 
these actions are oriented to the entry mode of export. Considered from an economical 
point of view it is comprehensible why governments focus on this single entry mode 
due to the fact that export demonstrates a foreign entry choice that supports the home 
country (for example tax receipts remain in the home country, jobs are maintained and 
created etc.). But from a theoretical perspective this kind of government support clearly 
distorts the objectivity of a start-up when planning internationalization.  
 
Government trade promotion offers assistance and different programs with the aim to 
support companies. The main focal point is on small and medium-sized companies and 
on start-up firms. The latter are supported in increasing ones willingness to enter a 
foreign market. In addition governments’ aims are to diminish competition drawbacks 
of these kind of businesses compared to large multinationals. Further financial support 
is granted for start-up consultancy and for more common consulting services such as 
company management, adjustment to recent and modified competitive conditions and 
environmental protection. Other support is approved for briefing and training above 
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company level with the aim of enhancing firm’s efficiency or providing information on 
how to start-up a business. (In BAFA, 2010 by Beutel et al.) 
 
Offering a start-up the possibility attending national and international trade fairs, has 
been mentioned before and demonstrates another important field of activity conducted 
by the federal government. For a start-up company having the chance to take part in 
such a trade fair opens up new prospects such as sales promotion and networking. (In 
BAFA, 2010 by Beutel et al.) 
 
In many countries there exists a so-called “Technology Participation Program” that in 
particular is geared to support the financial situation of high-tech start-ups. 
Governments provide incentives to companies and private persons who are investing in 
technology-based firms during its development and start-up phase. (BAFA, 2010 by 
Beutel et al.) 
 
To sum it up government trade promotions motivate high-tech start-ups to 
internationalize business, due to attractive programs and assistance. At the same time 
this support leads to a restricted perspective when considering different entry modes. 
Crick and Jones (2000, p. 77) emphasize the limited government perception in their 
study.  
 
Firms also identify that government advisors can offer useful assistance in questions of 
export but they turned out to be less helpful in general issues concerning evaluating the 
adequate entry modes. In addition the study by Crick and Chaudhry (1997) arrived at 
the conclusion that government trade promotion overall is rated throughout low by 
firms and they evaluate it more as a promotion particularly for export. 
 
This listing of motives and stimuli is not complete, but focuses on the most effective 
ones in high-tech start-up’s internationalization planning. Besides these positive reasons 
for business internationalization risks also exist, which should be considered in a start-
up’s international approach. 
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4.2. Categories of Risk in International Market Entry Strategy  
(Peter Nemes) 
Perlitz and Seger (2000, p. 92) deal with the subject of risk categories if a company 
internationalizes business. This subdivision is considered from a very broad perspective, 
allowing classification of every mode and entry decision with the help of these 
categories. When it comes to the implementation of the firm’s internationalization 
strategy, the following categorization supports the high-tech start-up in measuring the 
accompanying risks beforehand.  
 
- Political Risks: governmental measures carrying negative impacts on foreign 
business operations. This risk category includes compulsory acquisition, 
discrimination in terms of taxes, trade barriers or military conflicts or strikes. 
- Economical Risks: Risk of payment, transport and currency. 
- Legitimate Risks: different legal orders and conceptions can turn out to be 
problematic in international business activities. 
- Further Risks: including risks of substitution and market. The former results 
from expert knowledge diffusion and hence in the long run causing the risk of 
the company being replaced and driven out of the market by imitators. The 
market risk comprises every risk going along with the choice and handling of a 
foreign market. (Grabner-Kräuter, 1992, p. 434 f.) 
 
This categorization presents a very broad subdivision that is applicable for every type of 
business. In the case of high-tech start-ups such a sub categorization is reasonable due 
to the unique characteristics such a firm possesses. Start-ups in general are more 
vulnerable to these risks, as for instance the business processes, structure and aims at 
this phase are not developed entirely. Hence choosing an entry mode that carries a high 
proportion of risk in all these mentioned categories could mean the end of the start-up’s 
business or foreign activities. As described in previous chapters that a foreign market 
entry of a start-up in the high technology sector is indispensable, a considered decision 
is vital for this type of firm. This is also mentioned in theories of physic and cultural 
distance as the SD model. 
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4.3. Market Location Approach (Marlene Wiedorn) 
The decision in which market a firm should enter is one major part in the 
internationalization process. In the case of a high technology based start-up 
internationalization is necessary for business survival, hence the question in which 
market to enter as well.  
 
Nordström (1991, p. 30f) argues that the global market increasingly becomes more 
homogenous referring to national requirements, technical standards and developments 
in communication, transport and information. Hence markets in general become global 
characterized by standardized conditions. It is obvious that this change has an impact on 
the market location approach of a firm. 
 
So which market should a high-tech start-up enter? Is it better to join several countries 
at once, or is the stepwise process the wiser decision? This chapter treats several 
questions regarding evaluating the most adequate market location decision for high-tech 
start-ups. First, more general approaches are discussed, as the “Born Global” 
phenomena and if this fits  high technology based start-up firms. Afterwards concrete 
advice for entering the right location successfully is given.  
 
4.3.1. “Born Global” phenomena 
In chapter 3.1. the Born Global approach is touched upon, here this model is discussed 
more exactly in matters of high-tech start-up companies. The term Born Global cannot 
be constrained precisely, neither theoretically nor empirically, Rasmussen and Madsen 
(2002) describe it as an “umbrella” concept. Therefore all new established firms that are 
rapidly internationalizing are under this umbrella.  
 
The term Born Global (McKinsey and Co., 1993) is a synonym for International New 
Ventures (Oviatt & Mc Dougall, 1994), Infant Multinationals (Rasmussen and Madsen, 
2002) and also for High Technology Start-ups (Jolly et. al, 1992). Historically 
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considered this concept is not new, firms simply “leapfrog” (Hedlund and Kverneland, 
1985) steps in the conventional stage approach. McKinsey coined the term “Born 
Global” and describes those companies as “firms that view the world as their 
marketplace from the outset and see the domestic market as a support for their 
international business.” (McKinsey and Co., 1993, p. 9) Some authors state that they are 
convinced that gradual internationalization is dead. (Cavusgil, 1994, p.18) 
 
Now the question remains if it is a realistic and wise approach for a high-tech start-up 
starting international activities from their birth, by entering several countries at once? 
The fact that the term Born Global stands for high-tech start-up is not sufficient for an 
informed decision. 
 
Baronchelli and Cassia (2008) define seven factors that influence a firm in choosing the 
global approach. These at the same time illustrate why especially high-tech start-ups 
increasingly become Born Globals. 
 
1. Drive and unstableness of company’s environment: many authors state that 
the changing environment drives firms to become a Born Global. Examples like 
falling trade barriers, improved information flows, faster communication, global 
sourcing, shortened life cycles of products, globalizing competitors and 
competition can be mentioned. (Rasmussen & Madsen, 2002). 
Internationalization is seen as a strategy for decreasing risk, due to the fact that 
even international economic factors have an increased effect on the home 
market. (Andersson et al., 2004) The changed and more open environment 
makes it easier for firms entering international markets. (Madsen and Servais, 
1997) 
2. Domestic market: especially in the high technology industry the home market’s 
size is too small for achieving profits or paying off the investments made for the 
start-up’s product.  Financial survival in this industry isn’t feasible without rapid 
internationalization. (Freeman et al., 2006)  
3. Industry: companies that are active in high technology based industries are 
described as having available innovative skills, unique capabilities and resources 
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that are important in a global approach. (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004) The high-
technology industry itself has a high level of globalization, which can be seen as 
a criterion for a global approach. Hence firms are not able to insulate themselves 
from foreign competition. (e.g. Andersson et al., 2004) 
4. Knowledge existence: In the classic stage approach knowledge and experience 
are evaluated as decisive factors for internationalization. (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977)  It is obvious that Born Globals are not able to improve these two factors 
before going global, as they internationalize from their birth. (Rasmussen & 
Madsen, 2002). These decisive criteria can be achieved in other ways, through 
the founder’s personal knowledge and experience that this person has developed 
before the start-ups existence. (Laanti et al., 2007) Further knowledge sharing 
through cooperation with local and international networks makes it possible for 
a start-up gaining tacit knowledge that is necessary for internationalization. 
(Freeman and Cavusgil, 2007) 
5. Entrepreneur and management previous experience: Often Born Globals are 
founded by businessmen who have gathered international know-how before. In 
addition these persons have a wider business network and relationships 
available. Born Globals have to be observed differently, they “exist” longer than 
their founding day. Due to the entrepreneur’s relationships, experience and 
knowledge start-ups are able to internationalize from their birth onwards 
because internationalization qualification is developed before the formation day. 
(Madsen and Servais, 1997)  
6. Business’ innovativeness and innovative skills: Changing environment (for 
example global competition) leads to shortened product life cycles and increased 
innovation intenseness. (Karlsen, 2007) All these raise R&D costs but time for 
earning returns on investment is shortened too. Hence innovativeness is seen as 
a decisive factor in internationalization. Unique and qualitative high products 
and the competence of the high-tech start-up developing these are necessary 
criteria in a global approach. (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004) 
7. Network links: Internationalization in isolation is not possible. (Madsen and 
Servais, 1997) Considering the different international market entry modes it is 
obvious that internationalization requires a network. For instance strategic 
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alliances with competitors or exporting with agents develop such a network. 
This overcomes the lack of resources the high-tech start-up faces and makes a 
global approach possible. 
 
These seven factors summarized by Baronchelli and Cassia (2008) clearly explain why 
high-tech start-ups are in the position to internationalize from the beginning. As a 
consequence the question, which foreign markets a high technology based start-up 
should enter is answered as well. Their market is a global one.  
 
Beside all the positive aspects of the Born Global approach, it has to be analyzed from a 
critical perspective as well. Being a Born Global involves many risks for the high-tech 
start-up; hence this step has to be evaluated accurately, even though the competitors in 
high technology industry are global.  
 
The next step in the internationalization strategy is determining how to enter these 
markets and afterwards the corresponding market entry timing has to be defined. 
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4.4. International Market Entry Modes (Marlene Wiedorn) 
In the next step of the internationalization strategy the high-tech start-up can choose 
between various entry modes, dependent on the degree and type of risks (see chapter 
4.2.) a start-up wants to expose itself. Perlitz and Seger (2000, p. 93) display the 
international market entry modes, which offers a first outline. 
 
International Market Entry Modes 
Export 
Contractual 
Agreements 
Direct Investment 
Other Entry 
Modes 
Indirect Licensing Virtual Corporation 
Direct Franchising Strategic Alliance 
 Contract Manufacturing Internet 
 Management Contracting 
Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
- Greenfield 
- M&A 
- Others  
 Turnkey Projects  
   
   
  
Joint Ventures 
- Minority JVs 
- 50/50 JVs 
- Majority JVs  
Table 3: Categorization alternative Market Entry Modes (Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 93) 
 
Table 2 provides a definitional differentiation between the possible entry modes a 
company can choose from. It does not tell anything about its validity for high-tech start-
ups. This topic is treated in the following chapters. All of these entry modes are not 
treated in detail due to the lack of relevance for high-tech start-ups as the entry mode of 
franchising. Besides this first overview of all possible entry modes, it is interesting what 
amount of resources is necessary for adopting one of them. As financial resources 
present a main restricting factor for every high-tech start-up, this classification might be 
valuable for the further thesis. 
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Figure 5: Degree of resources transfer (on the basis of Meissner and Gerber, 1980, p.224) 
 
Considering limited resources as the main characteristic of a start up, the above figure 
would suggest that export presents the most adequate entry mode for such business 
types. Export does not require huge resources in capital and management in foreign 
market, so all activities stay national. At first glance the categorization seems to be 
conclusive, but constraining the features of a start-up to the one of limited access to 
resources would treat the strategy of internationalization only superficially. Hence for a 
start-up company, especially in the high technology branch, a lot more has to be 
considered before being able to make a rational decision on which entry mode the most 
efficient might be.  
 
The following chapters try to find an answer to this complex situation by determining 
the risks of every entry mode for high-tech start-up firm. 
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4.4.1. Export 
The recent constantly increasing interest of firms in getting involved in export can be 
traced back to several reasons. For instance the intensified competitive environment, 
deregulation of international markets and the increased interconnectedness of those 
markets lead to a raised interest level. Hence export and its development, its chances, its 
promotion possibilities are the big issues in policy and economics. As illustrated in 
chapter 4.1.5. government trade promotion for instance dedicates its work squarely to 
supporting high technology start-ups in the range of export. (Crick and Chaudhry, 1997) 
 
Export is described as sales of a company’s own products and services into foreign 
economic territories. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 827) A further distinction 
presents the differentiation between direct and indirect exporting that is treated 
afterwards. Jones (2001, p. 192) explains export as the first step in the 
internationalization process by typically moving goods across national borders. (Note: 
when in this thesis the term “product(s)” is written, physical and non-physical products 
and services are included in this definition.) 
 
Some authors are convinced that exporting demonstrates the only available entry mode 
for new enterprises going international. (Hodgetts et al., 2006, p. 266) This would mean 
in this thesis limiting the possible entry modes for start-up firms to the strategy of 
export, which does not seem to be very reasonable from an objective perspective. It 
might be the preferred mode of entry for new established enterprises, but surely not the 
only one available. Smaller firms primarily internationalize through some kind of 
exporting actions as empirical studies document (e.g. Cavusgil, 1984). The focus of this 
work lies on the high-tech sector in the start-up phase, which must be analyzed 
differently due to its unique characteristics that are explained in Chapter 2.3 and 2.4. 
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4.4.1.1. Motives and Chances of Export 
Why do high-tech start-ups decide on export as a market entry? Widely accepted is that 
start-up companies are trying to avoid risk when starting international market entry, and 
(especially indirectly) exporting illustrates a low-risk and low-involvement possibility. 
(Jones, 2001, p. 193) Again it is important to notice that exporting presents not the best 
(see chapter treating risks) entry mode for start-up companies, and surely not the only 
one available. Jones (2001, p. 207) especially notes this for firms that are active in the 
technology sector. Crick and Jones (2000, p. 65) hold that high-tech firms go for 
internationalization very expeditiously and in general not only by implementing the 
entry mode of export. Those companies decide on several different possibilities to enter 
a foreign market because the start-up’s size does not present a restricting parameter in 
the technological sector any longer (also described in chapter 4.3.). This can be 
explained by the fact that the sales market of a high-tech firm is anyway international 
due to the high-tech company’s characteristics.  
 
Additionally in general start-ups are able to perform internationally from their 
beginning. Therefore exporting, by having the adequate capacity, ability and know-how 
is a realistic and resource-friendly mode. Further Crick and Chaudhry (1997) mention 
in their study that the chance for long-term profitability, obtainable through market 
diversification and long-term increase, motivates entrepreneurs starting to export. 
 
Definitely worth mentioning is the fact that export for a start-up presents a great chance 
for getting in touch with foreign markets without having to raise a lot of capital. 
Exporting might be the most straightforward and cost-effective entry mode a start-up 
could choose from. Besides the sales market of a high-tech start-up is rather global 
anyway, exporting presents a possibility to enter a foreign market and learn from the 
experience gained.  
 
Often (direct) export simply happens in a start-up company by the receipt of an 
unsolicited order from a client abroad. Crick and Chaudhry (1997) state that such an 
arrival of an unsolicited order does not present the reason for starting to export but it 
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can be seen as a trigger to begin at that certain moment. The completion of this 
unrequested order influences the company in further export actions, if settlement 
conducted rather ineffective, often managers worry about prospective export interest.  
 
According to Olson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1978) there are different factors that all 
have a favorable impact on export performance. They state the effect of government 
stimulation and the implication of economic integration as beneficial factors towards 
export orientation. 
 
As mentioned above start-ups in the high technology sector invest primarily in R&D 
activities. Export for this business type presents an effective method for extending the 
product life cycle. Products investigated and developed for the home market might be 
interesting for foreign countries, even if the technology is outdated on the domestic 
market. In addition this aspect of extra time reduces dependency of the home market.  
(Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 98) Surely this advantage of temporally lengthening sales 
opportunity is not restricted to export, but here this advantage can be utilized very 
flexible and fast. 
 
Formerly studies engaged in exploring internal firm-specific factors that motivate 
companies to export (summarized by Crick and Chaudhry, 1997): 
 
- Discriminative company advantages: this might be a decisive factor why 
especially high-tech start-ups due to for instance innovativeness’ or its 
innovative skills (e.g. chapter 4.3.1.) are motivated to export. 
- Aggregated unsold stock: valid for any type of business, therefore also for high 
technology start-ups. Unsold stock illustrates tied capital for any business. 
- Usable manufacturing capacity: if the start-up company’s capacity is not 
entirely utilized this might be a suggestive reason for exporting.  
- Savings resulting from additional orders: referring to economics of scale, for 
any kind of firm this factor should be taken into consideration. As high-tech 
start-ups have to invest a lot on R&D, but the time for return on investment is 
limited, additional orders are vitally important. 
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In addition to these internal factors and motives for export, there are also external 
criteria. Describing all these in the case of exporting would go too far, therefore chapter 
4.1.1. includes an overview of the most important factors for high-tech start-ups. 
Besides those factors Katsikeas and Piercy (1993) numerates external factors motivating 
firms to export: 
 
- Shrinking foreign country regulations 
- Availability of foreign market information 
- Increased domestic competition 
- Profit and growth opportunities abroad 
- Export promotion programs 
- Unsolicited orders from abroad (as mentioned before) 
 
Apart from the latter two arguments these external factors are formulated very broadly, 
they describe situations that might lead to international activities of start-ups in general. 
For this thesis these factors illustrate definite factors that motivate a firm to 
internationalize business in general. But these factors do not deliver sufficient reasons 
for solely relying on export. Rather unsolicited orders and special promotion programs 
would lead to preferring export activities. 
 
Crick and Chaudhry (1997) arrive at the conclusion in their study that certain factors are 
more motivating to start exporting than others. So-called high rated factors of firms 
deciding for export as an entry mode are competitive pressures, marketing benefits, 
chance of enlarging the existent delivery areas and at the same time lowering market-
related risk. Further additional sales, economic incentives and the high-tech start-ups 
inimitable commodities are additional high rated factors of companies deciding for 
exporting. On the other hand government trade promotions present the other side of the 
scale, and are low evaluated motives for exporting. 
 
In addition high-technology start-ups go for entering an international market by export 
if the chosen market is not given top priority. Hence markets that are not of high 
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relevance are often served by exporting from the home country or through agents. This 
comprises the advantage that the company has access to the market and at the same time 
less commitment. (Crick and Jones, 2000, p. 76) 
 
4.4.1.2. Risks of Export 
Every entry mode is accompanied with chances, dealt with in the chapter before, but 
also risks are included in an entry decision of a start-up firm. Chapter 4.1.3. deals with 
the topic of government trade promotion that might be one reason, although not the 
most crucial one, why high-tech companies are choosing export as a mode of entry. 
Financial and administrative assistance are vitally important for high-tech start-ups due 
to a number of different reasons. 
 
Start-up companies especially in the high-tech sector have to deal with the risk of 
deciding for export as an entry mode due to wrong motives (like government support). 
This risk has its roots in the policymakers’ attitude towards foreign trade. As they may 
see that all entry modes, aside from export, as not economically beneficial for the 
domestic market. Therefore governmental institutions try to pitch export to start-up 
companies, especially those that are active in the high technology sector. 
 
In addition a start-up should never be rushed to approve and conduct any unrequested 
order without estimating the consequences of such an activity. The firm has to wait for 
the right moment and has to be ready and able to deal with this chance. Surely such an 
unsolicited order includes opportunities for a start-up, as it might be the first contact 
with this type of entry mode triggering internationalization, but it should be investigated 
if the products and processes are ready for exporting. (Crick and Chaudhry, 1997) 
 
Export presents a very cost-effective entry mode for the start-up but there are situations 
that can lead to financial risks for the company. Kutschker and Schmid (2005, p. 836) 
state that direct export is dependent on the exchange rate. Deteriorations of the currency 
rate can hit the exporting firm in the start-up phase very hard. The currency appreciation 
in the home market or in the foreign market, which might be the reason for exporting, 
can result in a limited competitive position of the exporting start-up.  
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The Liability of foreignness is another risk of (direct) exporting, resulted from the 
missing acceptance a start-up faces in the foreign market, due to for example lacking 
presence. In addition the firm reacts with a lag of time to demands on the foreign 
market. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 837) 
 
Choosing export as the first entry mode might not be an incorrect decision for those 
start-ups, also due to the fact that the risk of capital loss in general is low. But in the 
long run Kutschker and Schmid (2005, p. 829) state that indirect export is decreasing 
the profit due to continuous market cultivation. This disadvantage is insignificant in the 
case of direct exporting, that is described in the following chapter. 
 
4.4.1.3. Direct vs. Indirect Export 
As different types of export exist it is important when choosing the most appropriate 
one for a high-tech start-up firm. High technology products can be characterized in 
general as requiring explanation, and often causes expenditures for the consumer that 
should not be underestimated. These expenditures are in addition a matter of importance 
as high technology products often demonstrate innovation and complexity. In the 
practical section of this thesis the focus lies on the industry of medical engineering. 
These products perfectly fit to the previous description, as medical machinery and 
laboratory equipment are complex, expensive and innovative at the same time. 
 
This situation combined with the start-up business type results in the theoretical 
question which type of export to decide for? For a start-up with limited experience in 
foreign trade indirect export would enable the firm entering unknown markets with the 
help of an intermediary that is familiar with different markets. A start-up could enter 
more markets at the same time despite the lacking foreign market know-how. Entering 
several markets at once is especially interesting for the Born Global approach, which is 
the ideal approach for high-tech start-ups in general. 
 
In the case of direct exporting the start-up has to raise more resources and therefore the 
financial risk might be higher, on the other side the firm retains control over its own 
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business activities. Direct export enables the start-up being able to analyze competitors 
more effectively, recognize market trends earlier, which is a decisive criterion in the 
high technology sector.  
 
Perlitz and Seger (2000, p. 97) advise that firms lacking knowledge in foreign trade 
should first apply indirect export. But due to the fact that high-tech products require 
explanation, the start-up should aspire to introduce direct export after gaining some 
additional experience.  
 
Theoretically it seems to be conclusive, starting with indirect exporting due to lack in 
foreign sales know-how and afterwards introducing direct exporting. But this 
consideration misses one very decisive factor, namely the distributor itself, in the case 
of indirect exporting. Such high-tech start-ups are normally only one of several accounts 
the distributor has to work with. Therefore the start-up has to face many problems in 
collaborating with a distributor, as low bargaining power or high projected sales 
volume. The latter often presents the criterion for exclusion in the case of not achieving 
the predefined sales volume. As a consequence of this start-up firms that might not be 
able to fulfill the distributor’s requirements have no other alternative than implementing 
direct exporting. (Bürgel and Murray, 2000, p. 55) 
 
Hence the decision for direct or indirect exporting in the case of a high-tech start-up 
cannot be described as a simple straightforward one. If the enterprise decides on indirect 
exporting, the above stated potential problems have to be taken into account. Bürgel and 
Murray (2000) also described in their study that not the limited resources prevent start-
ups from deciding for direct or indirect exporting, but rather the products’ 
characteristics  (like degree of customization and innovativeness) and the start-up’s 
existing network and experience influence the choice. 
 
4.4.1.4. Critical Examination of Exporting as International Entry Mode for a high-
tech Start-up 
In which situation should a high-tech start-up choose export as an entry mode? And if 
deciding for exporting, in which situation is direct or indirect exporting more 
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reasonable? Is it advisable to implement both modes at the same time or consecutively? 
Start-ups favoring export as an international market entry mode due to the fact the high-
tech firm normally faces lack of time and resources when entering foreign markets. 
 
Exporting demonstrates the quickest and most resource-friendly mode compared to the 
ones carried out hereafter. Also if time to foreign markets presents an essential criterion 
for a high-tech start-up this mode might be suitable. Bürgel and Murray (2000) affirm 
the preference concerning exporting in their study, it presents the entry mode applied 
most often by high-tech start-ups.  
 
Hence the question remains: Is exporting always an accurate entry mode for not 
established firms in the high-technology branch? In fact exporting is an effective way 
for the firm gaining experience in foreign trade. The financial risk is appreciable and 
experience received is valuable for the start-up. As described in the chapters dealing 
with the chances and risks of exporting, it is quite obvious that opportunities outweigh 
the risks when choosing exporting as a foreign market entry mode. Entering a foreign 
market is indispensable in the high-tech sector therefore exporting offers a low risk, 
high speed and (in the case of direct exporting) a high control mode for gaining 
experience. 
 
Bürgel and Murray (2000, p. 35f) engaged in the topic of the adequate entry choice for a 
start-up firm in the high technology branch. They agree on the fact that those firms 
favor entry modes that require little resource commitment and are oriented towards 
commercialization rather than foreign manufacturing. Further, as mentioned in the 
beginning of this thesis, technology-based firms most likely enter more than one foreign 
market within a short time period. All these facts support exporting as a market entry 
mode. Hence an additional remaining question is: Which export type the high-tech start-
up should decide for?  
 
Definitely technology-based start-up requires a network and relationships to get access 
to equipment and resources which they do not have available. It is obvious that indirect 
exporting would support the start-up towards reaching these requirements, but as 
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described in the previous chapter, this raises additional problems. A possibility to avoid 
these challenges when choosing indirect exporting is that the start-up should establish 
and intensify relationships within its home market from the beginning. These 
relationships and the thereby gained experience will support the start-up when entering 
foreign markets by indirect exporting.  
 
For the technology-based start-up orienting towards indirect exporting is relatively 
important, especially when it faces following circumstances (Bürgel and Murray, 2000): 
 
- Geographic and/or psychical distance and/or completely different market 
(compared to home market) 
- Cultural discrepancies between supplier and buyer. 
- Low degree of customization of start-up’s products (exception: if distributor 
offers portfolio of related products) 
- Missing reputation of start-up. Firm can utilize the reputation of an established 
intermediary. 
- Lack of relationships, networks and experience in foreign trade. 
- Use of indirect exporting on the home market. 
 
It is obvious that this listing is not complete; it rather presents indicators when indirect 
exporting might be an appropriate entry mode. One decisive criterion deciding for 
indirect exporting is the existing sales mode the start-up uses in the domestic market. If 
the company engages for example a distributor for selling its product, the start-up tends 
to introduce the same mode abroad. (Bürgel and Murray, 2000, p. 54) Madhok (1997) 
approves that established routines influence the firm in future decisions. 
 
To sum it up, indirect exporting for a high-tech start-up presents an effective entry mode 
if several of Bürgel and Murray’s (2000) determinants are fulfilled. In addition selling 
via indirect exporting appears to be straightforward due to the non established business 
processes of start-ups. But in either case potential drawbacks and risks have to be 
evaluated in advance.   
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4.4.2. Licensing 
Licensing presents a contractual agreement that provides a foreign license holder with 
intangible property holdings, enabled by the domestic grantor of a license. These 
intangible property holdings are often technologies, hence licensing is sometimes 
defined as a technology agreement. Licensing primarily occurs in divisions like research 
and development, production and sales. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 838) On the 
basis of this description, including and commenting on the entry mode licensing is 
relevant for this thesis and for the chosen business type, namely high-tech start-ups. 
 
Several different intangible property holdings exist, but in this thesis only patents and 
utility patent are treated in more detail. The relevance for outlining for example design 
patent, trademark or copyright is not given. At first starting with a general 
differentiation by Kutschker and Schmid (2005, p. 839) 
 
- Patents: granted by the state or by a community of states that allows making use 
of an invention unrestrictedly. This right is defined exclusively and restricted 
temporally. It is a precondition that the invention is new, involved an inventive 
step, in the field of technology; it has to be commercially usable and sustainable. 
 
- Utility Patents: often labeled as “petty patents” describing a working equipment 
or object of utility, which is given for instance a new design, arrangement, 
device or circuitry. This remodeling is useful for the intended use and for 
working purposes. The determining factor is the novelty in these categories and 
not the novelty per se. Novelty, degree of invention and technical progress aren’t 
criteria required for an entry as utility patent. 
 
For an international market entry it is important to state that a patent isn’t valid globally, 
it is restricted to a certain geographic area like country groups, single countries or 
regions within a territory. So how does the start-up profit from licensing? The licenser 
demands for the usage of such intangible property holdings lump sums or royalties, the 
amount depends on various factors such as duration or licensed object. 
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Besides these conventional charging types in practice there exist further remuneration 
types (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 842). Cross licensing might be relevant for a 
start-up company in the high technology sector. Due to its lack in resources and 
knowledge cross licensing might be a possibility extending a start-up’s skills. Here the 
business partners exchange licenses without demanding any fees. So both companies 
can benefit from additional intangible property holdings. For a start-up firm this 
exchange might open new alternatives. Perlitz and Seeger (2000, p. 100) further state 
that cross licensing delivers access to new technologies.  
 
Needless to say, cross licensing should not be considered by the start-up if the exchange 
would threaten the economic survival of the firm. It also creates high coordination effort 
and hence it is questionable if the start-up has available sufficient resources in addition 
to the day-to-day business. Risks of licensing are treated in more detail afterwards.  
 
A further fee type in licensing presents capital participation for the grantor of a license. 
Mentioning this additional possibility might be relevant for a start-up firm due to the 
fact that a capital participation in the licensee’s firm comprises many advantages such 
as independence, financial security and improved market position for the start-up. This 
financial support and security is vital for firms especially for those in the start-up phase. 
 
The question remains if and when licensing is relevant and lucrative for a start-up firm 
in the high technology sector? Therefore the next chapters deal with the motives and 
risks when high-tech start-ups are deciding for licensing as an entry mode. 
 
4.4.2.1. Significance of Patents for high-tech Start-ups 
To begin with, this part just deals with the significance of applying for a patent; it does 
not cover the case that a high-tech start-up acquires a patent. This is simply due to the 
reason that the start-up has not sufficient financial resources to acquire a patent. 
 
In general a high-tech start-up has not sufficient facilities for production or development 
and misses human resources for achieving economic survival. Hence applying for a 
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patent and making use of it could enhance the start-ups economic situation. (Motohashi, 
2008, p. 1554)  
But what is the real value of patents for high-tech start-ups? A generally accepted 
answer for the entire high technology industry cannot be given; it is proven empirically 
that there considerable differences exist within. In addition distinctions between 
countries are confirmed by several studies. 
 
In Europe, United States and Japan the number of applied patents is on the rise. 
Between 1992 and 2002 this increase turned out to be about forty percent. (EPO, 2007) 
What are the reasons for this considerable rush on the interest of patents? One of the 
main reasons therefore is the growing importance of proprietary knowledge of today’s 
economy that more and more becomes knowledge-based. Companies independent from 
its size recognize the significance and economic consequence of protecting their 
innovations. (Arundel, 2001; EPO, 2007) 
 
Globally considered the number of applied patents has, to some extent, been decreasing 
since 2008, in some markets, as in the US there was a drop of about 11.35% from 2008 
to 2009. 45,790 patents were applied for in the US in 2009. Quite contrary to this trend 
is Austria with 1,072 patens applied for, which presents an increase of 12.37%. 
Industries such as medical technology suffered from a drop of 5.8% in 2008. Panasonic 
Corporation presented the firm with the highest number of applied patents in 2009. The 
international firm published 1,891 patents in 2009. (WIPO, 2010) 
 
Secondly, the competition itself changed to the challenge of technical innovations. The 
existing price competition before has been replaced by competition based on 
innovation, especially in knowledge-based industries. This shift explains the upward 
trend of patent applications. Thirdly, the emergence of recent technologies can be used 
as a potential cause for the growing interest in patents. (Arundel, 2001) All these 
reasons are of major importance for high-tech start-ups therefore it is interesting to 
clarify how far these companies can profit from patents. 
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Positive aspects of patents for high-tech start-ups (e.g. Arundel, 2001; EPO, 2007; 
Mann, 2007) 
- Patents enable start-ups to attract venture capital that is helpful for securing the 
firm’s economic survival and growth.  
- Patents are valuable in developing and protecting a start-up’s market by 
independent growth. 
- Ability to make economically use of patents (e.g. licensing) and hence allowing 
start-ups to exploit the expenditures of internal R&D. 
- Patents are protecting the start-up’s invention (for some period of time) and 
provide opportunity to advance, extend and augment technological foundation. 
- Firms that have applied for patents generally exist for a longer period of time 
compared to ones without applications. 
 
 
Negative aspects of patents for high-tech start-ups ups (e.g. Arundel, 2001; EPO, 
2007; Mann, 2007) 
- Aggressive application of patents (and the further approval) makes it difficult to 
develop innovations. It might protect innovations but also leads to the 
establishment of monopolies due to the fact that larger companies can afford a 
higher number of patents. Start-ups lack financial resources and hence hold a 
weaker position in acquiring patents and cannot afford monitoring potential 
violations. 
- Decisive knowledge and fundamental inventions are protected excessively, 
which limits innovations for start-ups with its limited resources. 
- For patent application a start-up has to disclose its invention completely, which 
involves the firm’s (most) valuable information and makes it accessible to 
competitors or imitators. Moreover legal actions against imitators can have 
impact on the start-up’s economic survival. In addition patents allow firms to 
develop a modified solution. 
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Patenting involves both advantages and disadvantages for a high-tech start-up, so giving 
a concise answer to the question of the significance of patents cannot be offered. There 
are situations when the strategy of secrecy is more appropriate for those companies.  
 
Arundel (2001) treats the significance of secrecy compared to patents in his study and 
finds out that R&D intensive firms evaluate secrecy as more important and effective 
than patents. This might be due to the problem of the ease of “inventing around” a 
patent and due to the issue of disclosing. But Arundel further examines that both, 
patents and secrecy, are on the rise, which supports the growing importance of 
proprietary knowledge. He also states that patents are preferred by firms that engage in 
cooperation, like cooperating in R&D. On the other side companies that focus on 
internal development rate secrecy higher than patents.  
 
Summing up the decision to apply for a patent or deciding on secrecy might be made on 
the basis of the start-up’s business strategy. If the company plans to cooperate or to 
raise venture capital, patents enhance the start-up’s value and make it less difficult to 
reach these aims. In these cases patents really make sense.  
 
Secrecy can be applied when the start-up focuses on independence and if disclosing its 
invention would harm the firm more than not protecting it. But in either case it can 
happen that the firm’s product will be copied or that competitors “invent around” it.  It’s 
a moot question whether the start-up could struggle against imitators due to its limited 
resources. There is no right and universally valid answer to this problem; it depends on 
the start-up’s invention, its planned business strategy, the market situation and the 
current patent law in various countries. 
 
To sum up patents are essential for high-tech start-ups in protecting the firm’s core 
knowledge. The fact that patents are ignored in certain countries (for example China) 
has to be ascribed to missing control mechanisms. However, that does not change the 
fact that patents are necessary for high-tech start-ups for protecting their innovations 
and large expenditures on R&D. Imitation can happen with or without patents, but 
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patents simply identify the owner of an innovation and in the high-tech start-up’s 
situation this clarification is of prior significance.  
   
4.4.2.2. Motives and Chances of Licensing 
Kutschker and Schmid (2005, p. 842ff) have examined this subject in great detail, but at 
the same time in a more generally accepted way. This thesis is restricted to the most 
relevant motives and chances of licensing in the case of a high-tech start-up.  
 
In general licensing is adequate for firms that have just low financial resources available 
and limited experience in internationalization. Further it is interesting for companies 
that are developing products at a high quality level. (Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 99) 
Considering these arguments licensing for a high-tech start-up at first glance is relevant 
in general. 
 
Licensing requires neither high financial nor personnel resources. The only costs that 
arise are for the choice of the right licensee and the formulation of an adequate license 
agreement, which might be attractive for a start-up firm from an investment perspective. 
(Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 100) 
 
Compared to (direct) exporting licensing offers the start-up a more extended market 
access to different countries. Tariff and non-tariff barriers become less important if the 
firm decides to enter the market via licensing. In addition a complete foreign market 
development cannot be reached by for instance exporting, therefore licensing offers 
access to foreign countries that are not easily accessible because of geographic distance 
or financial effort. In addition smaller and fringe markets are attractive for entering by 
licensing, if other entry modes are too costly and less attractive. (Perlitz and Seger, 
2000, p. 100) 
 
Licensing avoids transportation costs, minimizes exchange rate risks and eliminates the 
risk of expropriation by the host country’s government. Hence licensing motivates start-
ups entering foreign markets that are politically and economically instable. (Welge and 
Holtbrügge, 1998, p. 105) 
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A further start-up characteristic, as described in previous chapters, presents the lack of 
knowledge in foreign countries due to rather limited experience of the firm. In this 
situation licensing offers the start-up the chance to serve markets with the license holder 
who is well grounded in this market. Besides this advantage for the start-up the 
company also profits from the established customer relationship the licensee has access 
to. Therefore licensing enables a rapid, low-risk and cost-efficient market entry with the 
help of the licensee. By paying license fees the licensee holder contributes to a faster 
amortization of the R&D expenditures, which presents the main cost factor in every 
high-tech start-up. In consideration of shortened product life cycles and increasing 
research and development spending, a shorter period of amortization is worthwhile for a 
high-tech start-up firm. (Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 100) 
 
4.4.2.2. Risks of Licensing 
At the beginning it is essential to state that licensing and the potential occurrence of the 
below presented risks are dependent on the form of contract. Hence this chapter should 
stress the importance of drawing the optimal license contract for the start-up with the 
aim of avoiding these possible risks. 
 
Probably the most decisive risk of entering a foreign market by deciding on licensing is 
the problem of know-how drain. In some foreign countries (especially the Asian 
markets) there the problem exists that often licensees hand these intangible property 
holdings on to third business companies because law regulates intellectual property in 
those markets only rudimentary. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 845f) Plagiarism can 
mean the end of the business existence of the start-up firm, due to many reasons as the 
not established business processes or the lack in human and financial resources. Further 
start-ups generally generate earnings through some few products, their portfolio at this 
stage is restricted, and so plagiarism would hit the firm’s core.  
 
Asian countries often conduct “reverse engineering”, which means that a product is 
disassembled into its components and afterwards assembled again to its original 
condition. It is obvious that this risk can occur with every entry mode, some product 
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groups are affected more than others. The level of this risk shrinks if for copying the 
product a lot of specific know-how is necessary or if the product is software based. In 
the case of licensing “reverse engineering” can happen more easily because innovations 
are disclosed to a certain level. 
 
In addition compared to other market entry modes the revenues generated from license 
fees are relatively small. Hence when implementing licensing the start-up would not 
consider this mode first of all due to restricted potential earnings. Further these revenues 
are limited to a defined length of time. (Hong, 1997) 
 
In the long term the licensee could become the start-up’s future competitor, especially 
in the high technology sector often licensee holders utilize this cooperation for 
advancing the firm’s own technology. Here strong importance should be attached to the 
license agreement itself, start-ups in such cases could agree on cross licensing avoiding 
the problem of raising a future competitor. (Hong, 1997, p. 83) 
 
Another potential risk of licensing for the start-up is the restricted influence on and 
control of the licensee holder and its corporate policy. Insufficient manufacturing 
quality of the licensed high-tech product could have a negative impact on the image of 
the start-up. (Welge and Holtbrügge, 1998, p. 105) 
 
4.4.2.3. Critical Examination of Licensing as International Entry Mode for a high-
tech Start-up 
Again this chapter tries to answer if and when licensing for a high-tech start-up presents 
an adequate entry mode.  
 
Hsu (2000, p. 204) claims in his study that in general start-ups face many barriers when 
deciding on licensing. These are summarized as: 
 
- High search expenses for evaluating adequate business partner(s) 
- Unidentified reputation of potential business partner(s) 
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- Disproportionate opportunities to cooperate (e.g. through differences in 
experience and value, fear of expropriation) 
- Start-ups lack in sufficient business development (e.g. difficult finding the 
adequate business partner) 
- Opportunism of partner 
 
Bürgel and Murray (2000, p. 47) identify in their study that licensing only plays a 
marginal role for start-ups in the internationalization process. Only two percent of 547 
market entry decisions by 362 British high-tech start-ups applied licensing as an entry 
mode. It is obvious in the previous chapters of licensing that the challenges and risks 
can overweigh the chances of going for licensing in the case of technological-based 
start-ups. This is ascribed for example in the development stage of these firms and the 
dependency on a few products, responsible for the further existence of the start-up.  
 
Due to the fact that high-tech start-ups are not focusing on one single market entry 
mode, licensing could be seen as an additional mode, relevant in certain circumstances 
as geographic distance or marginal relevance of the chosen entry market.  
4.4.3. Contract Manufacturing 
Perlitz and Seger (2000, p. 102f) define contract manufacturing as the production of 
products or parts of goods by a foreign-based manufacturer for a domestic-based (here: 
high-tech start-up) firm. Contract manufacturers do not post their name on the client’s 
product; hence the brand name remains with the start-up. (Lüthje, 2002, p. 229) The 
scope and kind of manufacturing varies. These range from manufacturing of parts to the 
entire production, and are defined in a contract between the involved firms. The 
distribution of the manufactured goods remains the task of the start-up company, so this 
differentiates contract manufacturing from licensing. Often the ordering party imports 
the manufactured goods into the domestic country to supply this market. 
 
Therefore in contract manufacturing primarily the added value divisions of procurement 
and production are concerned, distributing the products is not regulated in fixed-term 
contracts. Dealing with contract manufacturing in this thesis is essential due to the 
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reason that in high-technology industries this method is widely spread. (e.g. Wu et al., 
2005) Contract manufacturing might be advantageous if foreign production involves 
reduction in material and labor costs or if production capacity in the domestic market is 
exhausted. The latter is of particular importance in start-up firms and is treated in more 
detail in the following subchapters. But as with the prior described entry modes, there 
are also downsides of contract manufacturing. However, in the end the question remains 
if this mode is recommendable for a high-tech start-up. 
 
4.4.3.1. Motives and Chances of Contract Manufacturing 
Wu et al. (2005, p. 126) state in their study that especially in the high-tech industry the 
management of capacity is perhaps the most crucial factor for being able to achieve 
business success in the long run. Particularly for high-tech start-ups coping with 
capacity problems present a core mission. The high-tech industry is instable which 
means that demand cannot easily be forecasted. In addition the manufacturing capacity 
of start-ups is restricted and outsourcing production might be necessary anyway.  
 
Contract manufacturing facilitates the problem of capacity by making the start-up more 
flexible and therefore capable managing uncertainty in an instable industry. By placing 
contract manufacturing the start-up is able to manage its innovations more tactically, 
and introduce the products at the right point in time due to the manufacturing flexibility. 
In high-tech start-ups capacity is commonly a shortfall factor, therefore contract 
manufacturing could improve that parameter. (Wu et al., 2005, p. 126f) 
 
High-tech start-ups often consider contract manufacturing if the markets, it wants to 
enter, face political instability, import restrictions or if the foreign country offers 
support programs. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 855f) All these factors could make 
contract manufacturing additionally attractive for high-tech start-ups.  
 
Contract Manufacturing brings down direct costs, also if the high-tech company sells 
fewer products than it actually has planned for reaching economies of scale and scope. 
(Arruñada and Vázquez, 2006, p. 3f; Lüthje, 2002, p. 223) This cost reduction results 
from the fact that often contract manufacturer outputs similar products; from there they 
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can offer lower prices. (Arruñada and Vázquez, 2006, p. 3f) It is only logical that cost 
savings also occur if the contract manufacturer only produces part(s) of the entire 
product. 
 
Besides the savings of expenses contract manufacturing enables the high-tech start-up to 
concentrate on its core and most remunerative task, namely being able to focus 
primarily on R&D. (Arruñada and Vázquez, 2006, p. 4)  
 
4.4.3.2. Risks of Contract Manufacturing 
Apart from the advantages of contract manufacturing for high-tech start-ups, there exist 
several risks in the case of concluding such a contract. A central issue here is the risk of 
knowledge transfer when the start-up decides that a foreign-based manufacturer 
produces parts or the entire product. (Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 102) Know-how drain 
and the possibility that the contract manufacturer becomes a prospective competitor 
present common problems in such agreements. It is obvious that these risks would be 
fatal for the start-up firm, as it is especially vulnerable at this stage and maybe not 
established enough for averting e.g. bankruptcy. 
 
Arruñada and Vázquez  (2006, p. 3f) claim that the possibility of knowledge abuse and 
transfer in manufacturing contracts is high. This can happen in various ways. As an 
example the contract manufacturer may produce for several companies and transfer the 
start-up’s know-how to other clients. It has also occurred that the contract manufacturer 
established an own brand with the help of the client’s technology and knowledge. 
Surely the start-up could protect its innovation through patents, resort to legal dispute or 
other actions against any abuse. “But none of these is a panacea” as Arruñada and 
Vázquez  (2006) simply determine in their study. Especially if the attacked firm is in its 
start-up phase and is not able to afford a defense against the contract manufacturer. 
Another problem is that such a process simply takes too long and technology might be 
outdated after a trial.  
 
Another risk that should not be underestimated when start-ups are closing a 
manufacturing contract is the problem of coordination. The business partner that 
 73 
manufactures on behalf of the start-up has to be integrated into the firm’s network. This 
integration presents a temporal effort and needs to be managed efficiently because the 
adequate market launch in high-technology based industries is a crucial factor. 
(Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 856) Besides the coordination problem Lüthje (2002, 
p. 236) illustrates that manufacturing knowledge cannot be transferred easily to every 
market, due to the fact that sometimes certain domestic work, training and technologic 
tradition is enrooted in the home market. 
 
Furthermore it is not warranted that the contract manufacturer (continuously) produces 
at the given and needed quality standards. Hence permanent quality controls have to be 
conducted. Besides, in contract manufacturing the start-up is reliant to a certain extent 
on the manufacturer. This dependency involves quality, delivery reliability and accuracy 
issues. (Perlitz and Seger, 2000, p. 103f) Here it becomes obvious that contract 
manufacturing can damage the start-up’s image by not fulfilling the defined standards.  
 
The subsequent critical examination deals with some possible proposals for solution if a 
high-tech start-up is involved in such a contract. 
 
4.4.3.3. Critical Examination of Contract Manufacturing as International Entry 
Mode for a high-tech Start-up 
Arruñada and Vázquez  (2006, p. 1f) describe contract manufacturing as a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand it provides many advantages.  
It is beneficial for achieving economies of scale and scope and is of prior importance 
when facing capacity problems, as start-ups commonly do. But on the other hand a 
contract manufacturer can damage the start-up to the core of its business by transferring 
the clients technological knowledge to other firms or simply profiting from this foreign 
know-how by establishing an own brand. So contract manufacturing exposes a potential 
risk on the start-up’s intellectual property. 
 
At the same time contract manufacturing might be the only way for a start-up ensuring 
production capacity to meet demand. As high-tech start-ups face lack of financial 
resources, they often simply cannot satisfy demand at this business development stage. 
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Thus the problematic situation of the high-tech start-up becomes apparent: The question 
arises how to manage this contradictory situation? 
 
First of all the adequate business partner has to be evaluated by the start-up. This might 
not be a straightforward task, but conducting efficient and prior research and 
consideration could protect from later problems. Further the start-up always has to 
manage the relationship with the contract manufacturer in a way that the start-up does 
not become weak or the contract manufacturer too powerful.  
This problem is treated by Arruñada and Vázquez  (2006, p. 2) in more detail. The 
authors define some strategies for reaching this situation. The start-up should be 
cautious in circulating one’s secrets, considering with which partners they do business, 
maintaining a rational level of intimacy and loyalty with the firm’s business partners. 
 
Besides Arruñada and Vázquez  (2006, p. 4) state that a start-up should never outsource 
core competencies or processes the business relies on. If the firm for instance 
outsources the entire manufacturing it will sooner or later lose most of the production 
know-how. But at the same time this knowledge is required for controlling the contract 
manufacturer’s work. 
 
In addition a contract has to be defined according to the circumstances the start-up 
faces. If for instance the product is innovative, new and complex, as it is the case in the 
high-tech industry, the start-up should arrange a long-term contract with the contract 
manufacturer. The reasons therefore are for instance that in this circumstance a start-up 
is normally not able to find a substitute for the chosen contract manufacturer. The 
manufacturer is bound by the contract and cannot easily abandon the relationship. Long-
term contracts additionally legitimate the high costs for establishing such a detailed and 
complex contract. (Arruñada and Vázquez, 2006, p. 5) 
 
Summing up, contract manufacturing requires a close and trustful relationship with a 
reliable contract manufacturer in order to reduce the risks described before.  
Such a contract requires an ongoing process of monitoring the business relationship, the 
manufacturer’s reliability and the manufactured products’ quality. This process has to 
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be accompanied by constant communication in both directions. Due to the fact that 
contract manufacturing frequently occurs in high-technology industry and especially in 
circumstances in which firms are confronted with limited capacity, it is crucial to pay 
enough attention to the business relationship. 
 
4.4.4. Strategic Alliances 
Strategic alliances are defined as a long-term and formalized relationship to one or more 
firms, with the aim of compensating own weaknesses by the strengths of the alliance 
partner(s). Thus the competitive situation of the firms within this strategic alliance can 
be ensured and in the long run improved. (Sydow, 1993, p. 63) A strategic alliance is 
described as cooperation due to the fact that the collaborating firms stay legally 
independent and the firm’s economic co-operation is arranged by contractual 
agreements. (Welge and Al-Laham, 2001) Now the question remains if and when 
strategic alliances are relevant for high-tech start-ups including the chances and risks of 
this type of collaboration. 
 
For a start-up with its rather limited resources the traditional go-it-alone model, when 
considering an international market entry, is unrealistic and in general far away from 
financeable (e.g. setting up a subsidiary as explained later). In particular technology-
based start-ups are dependent on cooperation because the necessary investments for 
economic existence and growth normally cannot be fulfilled by the start-up alone. 
(Kelly, Schaan and Joncas, 2002, p. 11)  
 
The global “explosion” of alliances over the last twenty years illustrates this necessity 
for cooperation in the knowledge-based economy. (Contractor and Lorange, 2002, p. 
485) Further the classic one-to-one business relationships develop more and more to an 
extensive network of alliances. Especially in the high-tech sector nearly all incumbents 
are connected to each other in the form of networks of cooperative settlements.  
(Duysters et al., 1999, p. 347f) 
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In short the high-technology sector is characterized by high R&D investments, shorter 
product life cycles and intensified pressure to remain flexible and respond quickly to 
market changes and requirements. Hence strategic alliances become central to 
companies’ competitive strategies for achieving these challenges. Careful attention has 
to be paid when developing such collaborations because this partnership can be defined 
as a highly sensitive strategic process. However alliances have several advantages for a 
start-up enterprise, illustrated in the next subchapter. Especially because its importance 
grows steadily. 
 
4.4.4.1. Motives and Chances of Strategic Alliances 
The motives and chances of strategic alliances are widespread, hence focusing on the 
high-tech start-up for narrowing these statements. It is difficult to determine which of 
the following motives are of greater importance compared to others. It always depends 
on the start-up and its situation.  
 
One of the prime motives that at the same time act as a justification for including 
strategic alliances in this thesis is the reason for developing new markets and 
accelerating the market entry with the help of an alliance. (Kutschker and Schmid, 
2005, p. 872) The characteristics of high-tech start-ups clearly demonstrate that for an 
international market entry higher resources are essential. In general more than a single 
start-up is available. Hence a strategic alliance offers the start-up the chance of growing 
outside the home market, which is an indispensable criteria for the existence and 
success of technology-based companies. 
 
Considering this background a further motive for high-tech start-ups to decide on a 
strategic alliance with for example a competitor is the limited access to resources and 
capacities. Economies of scope and scale can be generated, which a single company 
could not obtain as easily. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 871) As newly established 
and small technology-based firms need to mobilize external resources for being able to 
survive and grow, hence strategic alliances are of major interest.  
These resources also include skills and competences that the start-up misses and which 
could be generated through the help of a strategic alliance. (Moensted, 2006, p. 19) 
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Start-ups consider strategic alliances as an effective strategy for sharing risks, 
exchanging ideas, gaining professional insight and lowering uncertainty in technology 
and market. High-tech start-ups face a high level of uncertainty and risk in conducting 
research and developing products that in the end just possibly have market potential. 
Hence developing strategic alliances at the stage of product development minimizes the 
risk of misjudging product and market attractiveness. (Moensted, 2006, p. 15f)  
 
Duysters et al. (1999, p. 346) claim that firms constitute strategic alliances by being 
prepared for enormous external turbulences that are usual in the technology industry. 
Thus such cooperation in the end might lead to less uncertainty in the international 
market entry. 
 
In addition strategic alliances offer a flexible collaboration with different business 
partners. Of course the decisions within such cooperation are defined in several 
agreements, but these can be adapted to new circumstances or in the worst case 
terminated. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 872) Remaining flexible in the technology 
industry is of vital importance for a high-tech start-up. 
 
Another decisive criterion for start-ups presents the ability to finance cooperation 
without putting oneself at risk of bankruptcy or dependency. For a strategic alliance just 
a little demand for capital is required which enables an implementation from a financial 
perspective. 
 
Often competitors become collaborators through the formation of a strategic alliance. 
Through this market situation and competitors change to a certain extent. (Kutschker 
and Schmid, 2005, p. 872f) A start-up can profit by for instance building up credibility 
in the case of working together with a reputable industry partner.  
 
4.4.4.2. Risks of Strategic Alliances 
Besides the positive aspects of strategic alliances for a high-tech start-up when planning 
international market entry, there are many risks the firm has to pay attention to. When 
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the start-up plans to establish a strategic alliance the first problem that arises is the risk 
of choosing the wrong partner(s). It is obvious that such a wrong decision can happen 
on both sides, start-ups may overestimate the capabilities of their potential business 
partners. The partner may turn out to be the wrong company for a specific purpose or is 
simply not willing to mobilize sufficient resources. In both cases the strategic alliance 
will not fulfill the aim for which it was created. (De Meyer, 1999, p. 327) 
 
In addition one or both partners in the strategic alliance often have a secret agenda, a 
hidden plan that is known only by one part and not shared with the other partner(s). In 
the majority of alliances there is a difference between the published and agreed aim of 
the collaboration and the actual objects. Strategies often include parts of secrecy and 
confidential zones, but this at the same time compromises the success of a strategic 
alliance. (Nueno, 1999) 
 
Companies also favor strategic alliances for hiding weaknesses and problems they are 
facing. As firms do not have enough insight into the partner’s situation, intentions and 
goals, it may happen that for instance the true financial situation is hidden to a certain 
extent. (Nueno, 1999, p. 321) 
 
Lack of trust between the partners in strategic alliances is a further common problem 
and often leads to the failure of such collaborations. Trust presents a key factor in 
business relationships and has to be built up conjointly from the very first day of 
planning the development of a strategic alliance together. Trust represents the 
confidence in the business partner and in the joint undertaking. Early uncertainties, 
disputes and tensions can precipitate mistrust and lead to an “us versus them” 
perspective. Hence trust has to be established from the beginning to maintain the 
collaboration. It can be seen as an enduring process. Especially in international strategic 
alliances it is extremely challenging to develop and protect trust. (Kelly et al., 2002, p. 
11f) 
 
In addition cultural differences in international alliances often cause risks in the stability 
of such collaborations. Differences in culture enhance the possibility of communication 
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and language barriers that might end in misunderstandings or failure of the strategic 
alliance. Cultural differences can initiate a broad range of additional costs like time 
expenses required for establishing the alliance and running it efficiently. (Kelly et al., 
2002, p. 16)  
 
Kelly et al. (2000) also states that especially in alliances between small and large 
technology-based firms problems in bureaucratic and entrepreneurial culture arise on a 
regular basis. Beyond that De Meyer (1999) states that considerable differences in size 
can be seen as an obstacle to success in a business corporation.  
 
Further know-how drain presents another crucial risk in strategic alliances, especially 
for start-ups that are dependent on few capabilities. In the case of collaborating with a 
competitor it is possible that this firm easily gets access to fundamental knowledge on 
which the start-up relies on. (Nueno, 1999, p. 320f) This risk can be (partly) managed 
by the use of patents. 
 
Besides, strategic alliances are often labeled as incomplete acquisitions. If for instance it 
is not possible to buy the other partner due to financial restrictions. (Nueno, 1999, p. 
320f) This buying intention often occurs when there is a huge difference in size and 
market position of one alliance partner. It is not surprising that this risk of incomplete 
acquisitions arises often especially when start-ups are involved in a strategic alliance. 
Sometimes it is in the interest of a start-up being bought by e.g. a partner; hence a 
strategic alliance might be the logical step towards reaching this acquisition in the 
future. This is treated in the practical part in more detail. 
 
The difference in size and market position also influences the stability of such 
collaborations. It is not unusual that the predominant partner (e.g. in terms of size, 
credibility, position in market) puts pressure on the start-up by forcing it to act in a 
certain way.  
This could happen in different ways like forcing the start-up to focus on products and 
markets they actually would not consider attractive or pushing it to invest into areas of 
research the start-up has not intended to focus on. (Nueno, 1999, p. 321) Further in 
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technology-based corporations often the start-up just gives off its innovative fruits of 
research to the more established partner, which is not interested in sharing the success 
of the final product. (Powell, 1998) 
 
Concluding, the division of responsibilities has to be monitored and met by the 
collaboration partners. Roles have to be defined and assigned carefully in order that no 
one within the corporation is passed over. Especially start-ups profit from an exact 
division of tasks and responsibilities, but on the other hand being ignored would have 
negative impacts on the corporation. (Kelly et al., 2002, p. 16) 
 
Apparently creating a strategic alliance cannot be seen as “making a deal”, it is by far 
more than this. It is a constant process of integration, communication and adaption, 
which is based on trust and common aims. In the scope of this thesis only the risks for a 
high-tech start-up are presented, it would go too far giving proposals for a solution.  
 
4.4.4.3. Critical Examination of Strategic Alliances as International Entry Mode 
for a high-tech Start-up 
Evaluating strategic alliances as an international market entry mode is not a 
straightforward task. The last two chapters highlight both positive and negative aspects 
of this entry mode for a high-technology based start-up. To begin with, it is discussed 
that the high-tech industry is a global market, hence entering several foreign markets is 
necessary. Corporations might be a comprehensible step towards internationalization, 
but the question remains if it is an adequate decision?  Kelly et al. (2002, p. 20) state 
that strategic alliances increasingly lead to a competitive advantage for companies, but 
is this valid also for high-tech start-ups? 
 
From a financial perspective establishing a strategic alliance as a high-tech start-up is 
within the realms of possibility. The lack of resources that the new established firm 
faces would also welcome this type of flexible collaboration. Sunken costs could be 
avoided or split between the partners. This seems to be financially rewarding in high-
technology businesses as extensive investments for establishing foreign market entries 
are necessary. 
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Further in today’s economic interfirm corporations are widely used and far from being a 
rarity, a kind of “explosion” of alliances has occurred over the last years. One possible 
reason might be that firms consider their internal knowledge as insufficient, especially 
in the technology industry. In addition companies concentrate more on their “core 
competence” which again increases the need for external collaborations to fulfill the 
market demands. 
 
It is quite evident that the existence of strategic alliances and its increasing 
dissemination is traceable. But this method involves many risks and downsides, 
especially for high-tech start-ups. Often the aspirations of the partners are greater than 
the resources they invest in, mostly when a start-up cooperates with a larger, more 
established firm. 
 
Nueno (1999, p. 321) concludes in his study that a strategic alliance is only meaningful 
and advisable if the start-up owns sufficient core competencies to differentiate itself 
from the partner(s). In addition a start-up has to secure that it has enough fundamentals 
and the required critical mass of resources to maintain its business. If this is not the 
case, then the start-up has to obtain these immediately because this kind of dependency 
would not be beneficial in strategic alliances. Quite the contrary, Nueno (1999) further 
states that it is dangerous being reliant on strategic alliances for gathering basic strategic 
know-how. In this certain case a start-up should prefer being acquired by another firm. 
 
This study shares the skeptical approach if start-ups consider entering strategic 
alliances. A win-win collaboration in the long run is challenging to achieve, the start-up 
is obviously not established enough for entering an equitable corporation.  
 
The positive aspects attract new established companies, but risks in this phase should 
not be underestimated. Before taking a step towards this entry mode, a comprehensive 
evaluation of the start-up’s business situation, the partner(s) involved, the aims and the 
reasons for collaboration have to be conducted. 
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4.4.5. Joint Ventures 
If a high-tech start-up decides to enter international markets by establishing a joint 
venture, it has to set up a new enterprise conjointly with its partner(s). This newly 
created enterprise is settled in a foreign market in the case of an international joint 
venture, which is the main focus in this thesis. For this kind of cooperation literature is 
very comprehensive, as many different types of joint ventures exist. (Kutschker and 
Schmid, 2005) Here the different alternatives are illustrated: 
 
- The number of cooperation partners often varies within a joint venture. 
- The cooperation fields often vary (from a single function to total value chain). 
- Location of a joint venture could be in a third country, in the home market of the 
high-tech start-up or that of the joint venture partner. 
- Geographical scope of joint venture varies (from single country to world 
market). 
- Different integration level of joint ventures (horizontal, vertical or conglomerate 
cooperation). 
- The temporal existence of joint ventures may vary (temporary or indefinite). 
 
Besides these different specifications and features, summarized by Kutschker and 
Schmid (2005, p. 860f), some further special types of joint ventures exist. Due to this 
high number of different specification possibilities, it is hardly possible to evaluate 
precisely joint venture as an international market entry mode at all and especially not in 
the case of high-tech start-ups. Besides, the motives and risks are very similar to those 
of the strategic alliance. For avoiding repetition, this chapter is based on the most 
essential criteria of joint ventures, which is the planning and the implementation of this 
mode especially for high-tech start-ups.  
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4.4.5.1. Motives and Chances of Joint Ventures 
Due to the similarity to strategic alliances and for avoiding repetition this chapter is 
shortened to the most important information for high-tech start-ups. In some cases a 
joint venture may be an alternative for export if the chosen foreign market is restricted 
by for example import bans. (Börsig and Baumgarten, 2002, p. 555f) 
 
An essential criterion for high-tech start-ups demonstrates the rapidness of foreign 
market entry. Joint ventures may offer an accelerated market entry. If special market 
knowledge is necessary, this kind of entry mode may have advantages. Sometimes 
foreign firms are not accepted in countries; when cooperating with a local partner the 
high-tech start-up’s products would be accepted faster and more willingly. (Kutschker 
and Schmid, 2005, p. 863)  
 
In the special case of high-tech start-ups joint ventures make it possible to obtain 
economies of scale and scope, which is hardly or very complicated to reach at an early 
business development stage. Expenditures on R&D and the complexity of technology 
can be managed and split within the joint venture, which might be interesting for start-
ups due to its financial and human resource restrictions. (Glowik, 2008, p. 81) 
 
In high-tech industry the required technological expertise for developing products is 
often beyond a single firm. Hence if companies in the joint venture bring together their 
technological know-how, this could lead to new products, which couldn’t be developed 
by one single firm. Partners may conduct joint research and development that stimulates 
innovation and utilize resources more efficiently. (Glowik, 2008, p. 82) 
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4.4.5.2. Risks of Joint Ventures 
Here again the risks are similar to those of the strategic alliances. Crucial for the success 
of a joint venture is the existence of trust between the partners. This is more a complex 
process of establishing confidence than a straightforward task. It has to be ensured that 
partners concentrate on adequate values and inter-organizational relations. (Newburry 
and Zeira, 1997, p. 96f)  
 
Additionally the effort to manage a joint venture should not be underestimated. Here a 
start-up often faces its limits for being able to fulfill this task due to missing resources. 
Further the start-up has to be capable of adopting the gathered external know-how from 
the partner and absorb it into the own organization. (Glowik, 2008, p. 82) This seems to 
be a logical process but a start-up is often overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
processes and tasks. 
 
Glowik (2008, p. 82) further states that organizational instability is a multi-faceted risk 
in joint ventures, especially if partners are of different size or at unequal levels of 
development. This results from different situations as for example the position taken by 
the partner, lack of trust and adequate organizational structures or undetermined 
decision authority. 
 
Yan and Gray (2001, p. 411f) claim that in joint ventures often the partners do not share 
the same objectives and motives. The authors further state that this cooperation includes 
competitive and cooperative perspectives at the same time by participating partners. 
Yan and Gray (2001, p. 411) define this as a “mixed-motive situation”. 
 
Further challenges for the start-up are problems of evaluating the adequate partner, 
know-how drain, instability and performance measurement. (Kutschker and Schmid, 
2005, p. 867f) 
 85 
 
4.4.5.3. Critical Examination of Joint Ventures as International Entry Mode for a 
high-tech Start-up 
Based on the included information of the chapters treating the motives and risks of joint 
ventures, it is difficult to give a concrete evaluation whether a high-tech start-up should 
or should not apply this mode. Several different specifications of joint ventures exist, 
which make it impossible to narrow down arguments to a precise recommendation. 
 
The critical examination of joint ventures is very similar to the one of strategic 
alliances, but includes a few decisive distinctions. First, this entry mode is more 
resource intense compared to strategic alliances. Joint ventures need the appropriate 
support of management and adequate personnel resources (e.g. expatriate managers). 
(Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 866) This might be hard to realize as high-tech start-
ups at this stage rely on a few and irreplaceable persons. But a key criterion in joint 
ventures presumes the availability of personnel resources for establishing and 
maintaining this mode.  
 
In addition, the instability of a joint venture complicates an international market entry 
enormously. Especially start-ups face inconstancy due to their less established 
processes. Combining this situation with the establishment of a joint venture would not 
enhance the economic duration of a high-tech firm. Many authors treat the major 
problem of instability as Das/Teng (2000). 
 
As described in the critical examination of strategic alliances, know-how drain presents 
a further risk in joint ventures. Particularly in the high technology industry the 
developed and gathered knowledge and experience constitutes the core of start-ups. 
High-tech start-ups in general have just a few core competencies. If this (mostly tacit) 
know-how and experience is shared with a partner, this could put the smaller entity at 
high risk. (e.g. Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 869) Furthermore the partner may poach 
employees from the start-up. 
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Apart from the downsides of joint ventures, there are also positive aspects for high-tech 
start-ups considering this entry mode. But a joint venture simply requires certain 
conditions, which are very difficult to obtain in new firms. A joint venture might 
accelerate the foreign market entry, would partly split capital demand between partners 
for R&D. Additionally learning from the cooperation partners is possible. But all these 
positive aspects assume that the start-up is able to manage this entry mode. Due to the 
high-tech start-up’s less established economic development stage a joint venture might 
not be the accurate entry mode at this stage of establishment, as it requires 
circumstances a start-up at this stage cannot provide. When comparing joint ventures to 
strategic alliances, the latter would be more recommendable, if the preconditions are 
fulfilled by the high-tech start-up (compare chapter 4.4.4.3.). 
 
4.4.6. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
Table 3 on page 52 illustrates possible market entry modes in general by Perlitz and 
Seger (2000, p. 93) and direct investment presents an additional category. This includes 
on the one hand wholly owned subsidiaries and on the other hand joint ventures (treated 
in chapter 4.4.5.), both entry modes with possible different specifications. Figure 1 
clearly demonstrates that wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures require 
additional capital and management resources, which have to be invested in the chosen 
foreign market(s). Often at this stage of business development start-ups are not able to 
enter markets with resource intensive entry modes, but  studies exist that claim that both 
are of importance for high-tech start-ups. Hence including these modes in this study 
presents a necessity for completeness. 
 
This chapter treats the fourth entry mode that is interesting for high-tech start-ups in 
more detail. Glowik (2008, p. 86) defines a wholly owned subsidiary as a “firm that 
owns all capital invested abroad such as procurement, R&D, sales and production 
facilities.” The enterprise can decide between establishing a new affiliate (also called 
Greenfield) or acquiring an existent company in foreign markets (so called Brownfield). 
Glowik (2008, p. 87f) and Brouthers and Brouthers (1999, p. 96) rate the possibility 
higher that small firms, which are active in the field of technology, establish a new 
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organization (also: Greenfield) compared to acquiring a developed firm. Hence this 
thesis focuses here on Greenfield investments. When setting up an organization abroad 
the company usually sends expatriates, whose task is to supervise the progress of 
business development and also the hiring process of local employees. (Glowik, 2008, p. 
87) 
 
4.4.6.1. Motives and Chances of Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
One of the most important motives in general for deciding for a wholly owned 
subsidiary is the reason of control. Those established subsidiaries belong one hundred 
percent to the firm, hence decision making authority remains within the organization. 
Control also means that quality can easily be supervised and the firm can react rapidly 
to market changes and trends. (Glowik, 2008, p. 87f) 
 
Another decisive motive for establishing a wholly owned subsidiary is that the firm has 
no expenditures for observing its business partners like in cooperation modes as 
strategic alliances. Hence all the risks that are caused by cooperation are not significant 
in the case of setting up an organization. Cooperation covers several decisive problems, 
for instance the risk that the partner violates terms of an agreement. (Cannice et al., 
2003, p. 171f) Additional risks are described in detail in all chapters that treat entry 
modes of business cooperation. 
 
The delicate issue of protecting intellectual property rights is another motive why firms 
enter foreign markets by establishing a wholly owned subsidiary. As conducted in 
chapter 4.4.2.1. more precisely, intellectual property can be evaluated as the core of 
high-tech start-up’s business, hence protecting it is one of the firm’s main challenges. 
Cannice et al. (2003, p. 171) claim that it’s a motive for high-technology based firms 
keeping their technology within their organization. If it becomes publicly accessible the 
benefit and usefulness drops immediately. As described in the chapter concerning the 
significance of patents, the risk of violating intellectual property rights cannot be 
removed totally. Cannice et al. (2003) argue in their study that in markets like China 
protection of intellectual property, also within wholly owned subsidiaries, remains 
difficult. Definitely it depends on the type of product if copying is possible or not. 
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From a structural perspective wholly owned subsidiaries have the advantage of being 
integrated rather easily into the entire organization and its structure.  
This is another advantage compared to the Brownfield possibility firms have when 
deciding for this entry mode because integrating an established entity might be more 
difficult compared to a new one. From a strategic perspective through the establishment 
of a wholly owned subsidiary the firm is able to follow the same business strategy in the 
chosen foreign market. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 883) 
 
In the case of high-technology based firms it is decisive that technologies remain up-to-
date or can be developed further. All these can be realized by the set up of a new 
organization abroad, hence the start-up is able to develop innovations, which is a 
precondition for business existence. (According to Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 
883).  
 
4.4.6.2. Risks of Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
Besides the positive aspects of wholly owned subsidiaries, risks also exist, which are 
especially of prior importance for start-ups. These problems are treated here in this 
subchapter.  
 
Welge and Holtbrügge (2006, p. 112) state that wholly owned subsidiaries in foreign 
markets require enormous capital expenditures and involve high economical and 
political risk. Resources are tied up for a long duration and the firm’s flexibility is 
constricted dramatically. All these factors affect the high-tech start-up’s business 
negatively. Furthermore the start-up does not have the access to sufficient financial 
resources for such a highly resource intensive organization set up. 
 
Besides the problem of excessive financial expenditures the establishment of wholly 
owned subsidiaries is very time-consuming. The start-up phase is a long haul and the 
actually planned stage of expansion to international markets is not reached before a 
couple of years. (Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 884) Hence expenditures for the set 
up of a wholly owned subsidiary incur a long time before the firm has the chance of 
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making profits and amortizing its expenses. This is especially problematic for start-up 
firms, as they have to generate returns on investments rather rapidly to be able to grow 
further. So economies of scale cannot be earned before the planned stage of expansion is 
reached. 
 
4.4.6.3. Critical Examination of Wholly Owned Subsidiaries as International Entry 
Mode for a high-tech Start-up 
Wholly owned subsidiaries as defined in the definition by Glowik (2008, p. 86) are the 
most risky and long-ranging direct investments a start-up could decide on. This entry 
mode requires enormous financial resources that a high-tech start-up does not usually 
have available.  
 
To sum it up, this type presents a high-risk internationalization entry mode especially if 
the entire value chain is integrated. It should only be considered after gaining 
experience in lower-risk entry modes as licensing or exporting. (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977) Hence setting up wholly owned subsidiaries at the start-up phase of a firm is not 
recommendable and also not widespread for an entire production abroad.  
 
Alternatively a start-up could establish an organization abroad that is restricted to some 
few divisions of value creation. As an example a high-tech start-up could set up solely a 
sales organization abroad, which is more resource friendly. Further production and 
process know-how remain in the home market. This option is far more advisable to 
implement compared to a wholly owned subsidiary, which covers entire production, 
R&D, procurement and sales. The high-tech start-up should implement an entry option 
that fits to the actual business development stage of the firm. A sales subsidiary is a 
more appropriate entry mode at this stage. 
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4.5. Timing of International Market Entry (Peter Nemes) 
This thesis shares the idea of for example Welge and Holtbrügge (2006, p. 135) that the 
adequate choice of the market entry time is the third and at the same time last decision 
made within an internationalization strategy. This chapter evaluates the applicability of 
the two different strategies, namely the first mover and follower strategy, in the case of 
high-tech start-ups. In addition there is some more general analysis concerning the 
adequate timing of an international market entry for high-technology based start-up 
firms. 
 
Starting with the latter topic, Bürgel et al. (2001) state that for high-tech start-ups the 
question is not whether they enter foreign markets, it is more when they decide on 
internationalization. If companies spend a large proportion of their efforts on R&D, then 
such firms in general prefer rapid internationalization. This statement fits the 
characteristics of high-tech start-ups, which can be described as industries that are 
internationalized to a large extent and their competitive environment has a worldwide 
scope. An additional motive that supports the rather high-speed of internationalization 
of technological based start-ups is the capability and force of introducing technological 
innovations. This argumentation is very generally applicable. Of course factors exist 
that lead to a quicker or rather slow-going market entry. 
 
Bürgel et al. (2001, p. 7f) define in their study drivers that influence the speed and 
timing of the foreign market entry. The most relevant for high-tech start-ups are listed 
as follows: 
 
- Country-specific differences: Start-ups rapidly enter markets that are similar to 
the home market, for example Germany and Austria.  
- Industry Effects: In the high technology industry the own market is often small 
in size (e.g. medical equipment) hence firms prefer a quick foreign market entry 
to increase. 
- Firm Size: larger start-ups enter foreign markets more rapidly compared to 
smaller ones. 
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- Kind of Technology: R&D intensive firms in general with higher R&D 
expenditures internationalize quicker than firms with lower expenditures. 
Technological superiority also increases the speed of foreign market entry. 
- Know-how and Experience: If the start-up’s management has access to a 
personal network, business contacts and international experience, a firm is able 
to internationalize more rapidly.  
 
It is obvious that the characteristics of start-ups only allow for a limited speed of 
internationalization. Those businesses face many restrictions in terms of financial and 
personnel resources. But due to the fact that the timing presents the last step in the 
internationalization strategy these drawbacks can be reduced by choosing the adequate 
entry location and mode.  
 
Autio et al. (2000, p. 919) concentrate on the adequate speed of internationalization for 
a high-technology based start-up. In general entering foreign markets by taking small 
steps is reasonable because a step-by-step learning approach can be realized. This might 
be logical but it is theoretically not the most effective procedure for high-tech start-ups. 
Ideally these firms conduct quick and large steps towards internationalization to avoid 
missing opportunities. Theoretically this seems to be the ideal case, but at the same time 
impossible to put it into practice as the start-up faces for instance resource restrictions. 
Autio et al. recommend start-ups take small and incremental steps that are taken faster 
than older firms do. 
 
So the question how to internationalize in terms of speed can be answered. Now it is 
interesting if a high-tech start-up should rather be a first mover or an early and smart 
follower. 
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4.5.1. First Mover or an Early and Smart Follower? 
Many theorists consider this question differently. Problems arise for instance how to 
measure the potential first mover advantage. Even some experts state that in fact such a 
benefit does not exist. This chapter concentrates on how a high-tech start-up in general 
should enter an already chosen foreign market in terms of time. This is based on the 
characteristics, limitations and advantages of such business types.   
 
Due to the fact that start-ups have a limited and narrow product portfolio, they rely on 
few, but at the same time innovative products. Hence it is comprehensible that they 
cannot wait until a competitor enters the chosen market with the same or a similar 
technology. Choosing the “wait-and-see-strategy” can put the start-up’s survival at risk. 
Apart from this the competitive situation in a particular high-tech area is in addition 
questionable (for example existence of competitors) and differs extremely between 
technology branches.  
 
Surely the first entrant faces higher uncertainty and risk when entering a market. But on 
the other hand the smaller and more flexible start-up in general enters a foreign market 
as a pioneer for gaining time advance and for skimming profits from being the first. 
(Meffert and Pues, 2002, p. 412) Agarwal (1996) claims that in some industries being 
the first is of greater importance compared to other industries. He further states that in 
the high technology industry the first mover strategy is decisive for the survival of the 
firm. Agarwal (1996) is also convinced that the viability rate of high-tech start-ups is 
higher if they are the first in a market compared to most other industries. 
 
The high-tech start-up profits from a pioneer strategy by acquiring experience and 
benefits during the first mover monopoly period. The duration of the monopoly period 
cannot be estimated because it is dependent on the market attractiveness of the foreign 
country. For the competitor the level of difficulty to enter the same market has an 
impact on the length of the monopoly period. Especially in high technology industries 
patents can extend this period, which increases the first mover advantage. A first mover 
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monopoly period is very lucrative for the start-up, as for instance market share and the 
awareness level can be improved. (Knuutila, 2003) 
 
Knuutila (2003) specifies the determinants favoring a first mover strategy that suit well 
to the high-technology branch: 
 
- Very few early followers 
- Small industry growth rate 
- Very high-tech oriented industry 
- Very capital-intensive industry 
- Short product life cycles 
- Low potential for competitors to copy product 
 
This listing in addition confirms the high-tech start-up in choosing the first mover 
strategy when timing an international market entry. 
 
But it is obvious that the pros and cons of entering a foreign market as a first entrant 
should be weighed up against the possibility of entering as an early follower. Applying 
this pioneer strategy does not automatically lead to business and internationalization 
success in any case; it is also dependent on the qualification of the management. Hamel 
(2001) states that successful timing relies on whether smart or dumb movers are 
responsible for the entry.  
 
To sum it up the theoretical consideration of the adequate timing of an international 
market entry conducted by a high-tech start-up should be earlier and faster compared to 
older firms. Small, incremental, quick and considered steps in general are 
recommendable for a new established high-tech firm, combined with a first mover 
strategy when targeting effective foreign market timing. 
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5. Synoptical Table (Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
The following table includes a summary and overview of all in chapter four presented 
market entry modes including further arguments of the internationalization theories. The 
first column demonstrates various conditions that favor the specific entry mode. 
Furthermore the table illustrates motives, advantages, risks and challenges, which are 
triggered by a high-tech start-up when choosing a certain entry mode. The table is 
sorted from low equity entry modes to more resource-intensive ones. Further the table is 
not exhaustive, it rather presents significant criteria for high-tech start-ups when they 
internationalize and have to evaluate different entry modes. Hence in this chapter all the 
before included and most important information for high-technology based start-ups is 
summarized.  
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6. Case Study Methodology 
The thesis’ practical part is based on case analysis research. Although this methodology 
faces many criticism, for instance due to the lack of generalizing findings, it is applied 
in this thesis. Also because there are situations or cases that perfectly fit to this certain 
methodology. As for example Feagin recommends that if there is need for an integrated 
and in-depth investigation, qualitative research should be used for analyzing a problem 
set. (Feagin et al., 1991)  
 
Case study research satisfies three principles of qualitative analysis: Describing, 
understanding and explaining, which is an essential goal of this thesis. Complex 
phenomena, as the internationalization, are described by case analysis. Based on that, 
differences from the theoretical part and explanations therefore can be elaborated. 
(Locke, 2001, p. 95f) 
 
In addition a comprehensive analysis is necessary due to the complexity of the 
internationalization process itself. A case study analysis allows for open questions, 
which is helpful in studying relations and causes. 
 
Case study research uncovers information from respondents’ standpoint including 
different sources of data. This thesis focuses on in-depth interviews with founders 
and/or entrepreneurs of high-tech companies in the industry of medical engineering.  
In addition information from newspaper articles and administrative documents are 
included. The decision for having involved different types of sources is based on the 
aim to ensure construct validity (Yin, 1994) 
 
6.1. Case Study’s Starting Point: Aim and Research Questions 
(Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
The aim of the case study analysis is to point out if differences exist in 
internationalization arguments, problems, risks and chances in theory compared to the 
practical conduction. A lot of literature treating internationalization of SMEs and start-
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up companies exist. Some information incorporates in particular high-tech start-ups, but 
is mostly based on Nordic countries (e.g. Sweden) and on English speaking countries. 
Smaller European markets like Austria and Hungary are not treated in empirical studies.  
 
Due to the reason that the authors were born and raised in those countries the decision 
for choosing these familiar markets can be seen as a logic way for avoiding 
misunderstandings and barriers. In addition these markets are smaller in size; hence 
studying these could deliver deeper insights and new findings for these countries. 
 
- For a deeper understanding chapter four examines high-tech start-ups’ 
internationalization strategy more precisely. 
- The summarized findings of theoretical arguments for the adequate 
internationalization strategy of high-tech start-ups are described in chapter five. 
- This case analysis is based on the gathered theoretical arguments, hence 
demonstrating the consistence between theoretical and applied investigation is 
seen as the aim of this study.  
 
The following research questions should be answered on the basis of this case study 
research: 
 
- What are the motives and hurdles of internationalization of high-tech firms 
practically in comparison to theoretical stimuli? (Theoretical investigation: 
chapter 4.1. and 4.2.) 
- Which entry modes are preferred by high-tech start-ups in practice? Hence are 
the motives therefore the same compared to the ones illustrated by theoretical 
investigation? (Theoretical investigation: chapter 4.4.) 
- How does the entrepreneur evaluate the different entry modes concerning 
chances, risks and the possibility/suggestion applying them in which situation? 
(Theoretical investigation: chapter 5 – aggregated table) 
- When and in which market(s) did the interviewed high-tech enterprises 
internationalize? Did the internationalization process follow the theoretical 
recommendations? (Theoretical investigation: chapter 4.3. und 4.5.) 
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- How do they evaluate the “Born Global” approach in practice? (Theoretical 
investigation: chapter: 4.3.1.) 
- Overall estimation: Is there a general fit of theoretical arguments to the practical 
investigation? 
 
Subsequently the industry of medical engineering in Austria and Hungary is described 
more precisely. Afterwards the case study findings for the two firms, namely the 
Austrian high-tech firm Anagnostics Bioanalysis GmbH and the Hungarian start-up 
Thor Medical Systems Kft are presented. In the final step there is a conclusion with a 
comparison between the chosen high-tech firms. 
 
6.2. Industry of Medical Technology in Austria and Hungary 
(Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
This thesis focuses in its practical part on the industry of medical technology, an 
important sector of the high-tech industry. This branch is an innovative, multifaceted 
and still growth oriented global industry. Despite the economic and financial crisis this 
market appears to be rather independent from cyclical fluctuations and from market 
crises. Due to the actual demographic development, the demand for innovative and 
technological medical products will rise in the future.  The main causes are the 
increased life expectancy, the extended duration of diseases and the rising need in care 
resulting from the increasing average age of  society. (AWO, 2009)  
 
These factors were decisive for the decision to focus on the sector of medical 
technology. When analyzing the market situation of medical technology in Austria and 
Hungary, it quickly turned out that in both markets important born globals are active 
and successful. To name only a few of such enterprises in Austria: Roche Diagnostics 
GmbH which focuses on critical care medicine, Philips Ltd. developing Speech 
Recognition Systems, Greiner Bio-One International AG specializing on preanalytic 
technology, Akatech GmbH which manufactures for instance optoelectronic full blood 
analysis devices or Afreeze GmbH that produces cryablation catheters. All these 
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companies became product specialists in a global niche and their key to success relies 
very much on internationalization.  
 
Further it is interesting that all mentioned Austrian medical technology companies offer 
a wide scope of solutions. These include installation of the product or system, 
consulting and services. They rely on their networks and cooperation with universities. 
In Austria several medical technology clusters exist such as Ecoplus (Lower Austria), 
Human Technology Styria, Life Science Austria Vienna Region, Tyrolean Future 
Foundation and Life Science Cluster, and Upper Austrian Technology and Marketing 
Company (TMG & Health Technology Cluster). In 2008 about 800 enterprises in 
Austria offered consulting, engineering or other services in this field of medical 
technology. (LISA, 2008) 
 
Compared to other markets like Germany, Austria at the moment seems to be far behind 
looking at the quantity side. In the sector of medical engineering about 110,000 people 
are employed in Germany, in Austria just around 6,000.  
 
Austrian companies sparsely use the chance of being part in one of the world’s most 
interesting growth markets, with 1.4 % of European’s total employees dedicated to this 
industry. At the moment the global market volume of medical technology is around 200 
billion euro. Hence the medical engineering market is an attractive and growing future 
industry. Some experts are convinced that Austria has the potential to become an 
important player in this field of industry. According to these experts Austrian 
companies are used to fulfill high quality standards despite the higher production output 
levels. These characteristics can be observed in the automotive supply industry in which 
Austrian companies are very important. (Bauer et al., 2010) 
 
The Hungarian medical technology industry is comparable to the Austrian sector. About 
4,250 employees are active in the field of medical technology, 1.0% of total employees 
in the European Union. According to the Eucomed Member Association about 434,560 
employees are engaged in the European Union medical technology up to now. 
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(Eucomed, 2007) It is obvious that both markets, Austria and Hungary, are rather small 
players in this global industry.  
 
Compared to Austria in Hungary two important clusters exist, the so-called 
MediCluster, which is specialized in medical technology, and the Budapest MediPólus 
Cluster, which focuses on Life Sciences. The former is based on a network of profit and 
non-profit oriented enterprises and institutions. Further it includes Hungarian key 
players in the medical technology sector, all owned by Hungarian players with the aim 
to offer high-quality medical solutions. Budapest MediPólus Cluster in an important 
network in the life science sector formed in 2008 with domestic and international 
members active in the health care sector. (ITDH, 2010)  
 
Besides these clusters some important associations exist like the Association of Medical 
Technology Manufacturers and Suppliers (OSZ). Members of this association are 
Hungarian and international organizations, mainly the top fifty manufacturers and 
suppliers in this sector. (IDTH, 2010).  
 
Some economically successful enterprises are for instance the Medicor Group, which 
manufactures medical equipment, Innomed Medical Zrt., which focuses on the research 
of cardiology and defibrillator technology. 77 Elektronika Kft. produces reflexive 
photometers and reagents for measuring blood sugar for the home and professional use. 
(IDTH, 2010, p. 4f) 
 
The fact that the medical technology sector is rather independent from financial and 
economic crises is valid for Hungarian medical companies as well. According to IDTH 
(2010) enterprises in the medical technology sector achieved an increase of more than 
ten percent in revenue during the last five years. To sum up, both countries have rather 
small players comparing it to the global medical technology industry.  
 
Despite this deficit both countries have important national and international companies 
that develop and manufacture innovative medical solutions. But considered from a 
global perspective are rather lagging behind.  
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Experts forecast a huge growth potential for this industry, as a consequence profiting 
from this increase should be the main interest for both markets. One further reason for 
focusing on companies in the medical technology in this thesis is the huge prospect of 
sales potential which has not been exploited yet. 
 
6.3. Case Study 1: Anagnostics Bioanalysis GmbH (Austria) 
(Marlene Wiedorn) 
The first company included and analyzed in this study is the Austrian high-tech start-up 
Anagnostics Bioanalysis GmbH. First there is a company overview and short 
introduction, followed by the case analysis and comparison to the theoretical part of this 
thesis. The following information is taken from the personal interview that is included 
in the appendix, website and press publications. 
6.3.1. Company Profile 
Anagnostics Bioanalysis GmbH was founded in 2005 in Linz by Dr. Bernhard Ronacher 
and Mag. Christoph Reschreiter. Dr. Ronacher delivered the product idea and carries the 
technical know-how and Mag. Reschreiter is business manager with international 
experience, financial and administrative know-how. At the moment Anagnostics is 
located in St. Valentin (Upper Austria) and has ten employees. Mag. Markus Jaquemar 
joined the company in June 2009 and is responsible for sales and marketing. Mag. 
Jaquemar studied Biology at the University of Vienna and has more than 19 years 
experience of  life science industry and is an internationally experienced sales and 
marketing professional. The interview was conducted with Mag. Jaquemar who is an 
expert for questions about business internationalization and commercialization. Dr. 
Ronacher, Mag. Reschreiter and Mag. Jaquemar together form the management team.  
 
To give a review, at the moment six employees are responsible for R&D with university 
background of biochemistry, biology and mechatronics. The remaining four are 
involved in administrative and business tasks. Personnel costs demonstrate the highest 
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cost factor for Anagnostics, followed by the variable costs of the device itself, which 
costs 70,000 euro per unit at the moment.  
 
Anagnostics is specialized in developing solutions for two markets, for the clinical in-
vitro-diagnostics and life science research market. The firm provides innovative 
solutions with the focus on nucleic and protein acid tests. This solution includes the 
product itself, the so called “hyborg”, the self-developed software (“hybwiz”), and in 
the home market also installation and service. The hyborg is a fully automated and 
integrated (“all in one device”) device for processing and analyzing cylindrical DNA 
and protein microarrays, named “Hybcells”. The patented Hybcell presents a cylindrical 
micro array and is the core of this technology. It measures the affinity of thousands of 
antibodies at the same time and is especially interesting for drug discovery testing. 
(WKO, 2010) 
 
There are a lot of different methods available for drug discovery; however the 
technology Anagnostics developed is unique. The advantages and differentiations of 
this hybcell technology are the following: (WKO, 2010) 
 
- Efficiency in time, costs and sample material 
- Highly flexible test design 
- Kinetic measurements 
- Simple, fully-automated implementation 
 
The company’s aim is to provide solutions for unmet needs especially in the field of 
diagnostics and research. Their vision is to establish this innovative hybcell technology 
in pharmaceutical research and clinical diagnostics. (Anagnostics, 2009) 
 
At the moment Anagnostics clients are hospitals and laboratories for drug discovery. 
The company develops its technology in cooperation with universities and business 
partners. In addition the start-up faces capacity problems, so currently they cannot 
accept further projects or requests, due to the fact that present projects use the whole 
 105 
capacity available. This is a typical characteristic of high-tech start-ups, as already 
mentioned in the theoretical part. 
 
6.3.2. Internationalization Strategy and Markets 
Anagnostics Bioanalysis is active on two large markets, both global in size. The first 
market is the clinical in-vitro-diagnostics market with a global market volume of 40 
billion euro where the Austrian market volume is around 230 million euro. The second 
global market Anagnostics operates with its solution is the Life Science research market 
with a global volume of 30 billion euro. This market is especially global because the 
products can be offered worldwide without significant adaptation needs. 
The in-vitro-diagnostics segment is more complex to internationalize, as different 
market circumstances require a deeper analysis. It needs to be verified if the market 
entry into a specific country has advantages and comes with good sales prospects for the 
company. This analysis is of major importance for prioritizing specific markets as 
regulations differ massively in this segment.  
 
To sum up it is obvious that for Anagnostics internationalization is essential. 
Conducting research and development solely for Austria is not sufficient for economic 
success and survival as the Austrian market is too small in sales potential. Anagnostics 
was not only established to fulfill the demand from Austrian costumers in the fields of 
medical technology. Hence internationalization was part of the business strategy from 
the beginning, supporting the born global approach. 
 
Anagnostics sees itself operating in a global market, but as a start-up it is restricted in 
all possible resources. Being global from the beginning is not in the realm of possibility. 
For the firm a considered and stepwise internationalization process is a logical strategy 
for managing their limited resources. Anagnostics is convinced that they should be born 
globals, but in practice such a strategy cannot be applied. Hence the theoretically 
recommended born global approach remains hypothetical and can hardly be realized in 
practice.  
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However the start-up fulfills many factors that would recommend a born global 
approach.  The restricted size of the domestic market, the innovative industry the firm is 
active in and the already existent international experience and knowledge of the 
management team are only few factors which would favor the born global approach. 
Although Anagnostics is convinced that a born global approach might be the adequate 
strategy, the restriction of human and financial resources prevents this approach. 
 
Hence Anagnostics started its business in Austria, followed by a market entry in 
Germany and Switzerland. The next markets the company wants to enter in the future 
are the Belgian, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Scandinavian and UK markets. This 
planned future approach supports the stepwise or incremental internationalization 
approach. 
 
6.3.2.1. Competitive Situation 
Anagnostics’ solutions at the moment are rather unique; no direct competitor exists for 
the technology itself. However there is a competition in the field of application. 
Anagnostics for instance develops drug discovery tests and the market for these tests is 
defined by many enterprises offering different solutions and technologies in this field. 
For instance there are rapid tests in drug discovery, which have, from a technological 
perspective, nothing in common with Anagnostics’ solution. So the market for drug 
discovery is diverse, but the technology Anagnostics developed is unique in its field. 
The start-up differentiates from its competitors by many factors, as illustrated in the 
company profile before. A main differentiation Anagnostics holds is the multiplex 
technology, which allows testing many parameters at once. 
 
Counterfeiting presents one reason why Anagnostics avoids the rapid test drug 
discovery market. Ninety percent of rapid tests originate in China; due to the low labor 
costs Chinese companies are able to offer their products at very low prices. However 
Anagnostics focuses on innovative technology which differentiates from low price 
solutions. As a consequence the start-up does not estimate counterfeiting as a definitive 
risk.  
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6.3.2.2. Evaluation of Patents’ Importance 
For Anagnostics patents are important in their internationalization strategy. If there is a 
technology to protect, a patent should be registered and applied. Anagnostics protects its 
innovation by a patent that is valid in the European Union, Switzerland, United States 
and in Singapore. However the high-tech firm is convinced that through a patent a firm 
cannot protect itself from abuse. Their reason to apply for patents is that the company’s 
value increases by registering patents. Especially if the firm has the objective to gain 
venture capital patents can be seen as a decent method to attract strategic investors as 
investors see registered patents as an increase in company value. This reason is also 
mentioned in the theoretical part. 
 
The problem of know-how abuse despite  patent registration is treated in the theoretical 
part in more detail. Arundel (2001) mentions the problem of disclosing a technology 
when applying for a patent. Anagnostics does not agree with this statement.  According 
to them a firm patents an innovation if the technology is fully developed and therefore 
other competitors cannot catch up with technology. In addition the patents are 
formulated very abstractly, but to an extent that it is detailed enough for patent 
registration. Anagnostics is convinced that at least ninety percent of all registered 
patents cannot be copied one-to-one. Even if the patent is described in full detail 
inventions are hard to copy as there is still some tacit knowledge required to copy a 
product.  The firm states that the reason therefore is that know-how in general is rooted 
in the firm, and a publication in general would not help to create an exact copy of the 
product. 
 
Summing up, the main reasons for Anagnostics applying for patents is the increased 
value of the firm, less the idea to protect the company’s innovation from abuse. Many 
authors such as Arundel (2001) or Mann (2007) share a similar perspective, apart from 
the problem of disclosing technology, which Anagnostics does not estimate as a real 
risk in the industry of medical technology. Obviously patents are necessary for the entry 
mode of licensing, which might also be relevant for Anagnostics in the future. Patents 
are especially important for Anagnostics reaching the aim of becoming attractive for 
investors. 
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6.3.3. International Market Entry Modes 
After five years of business existence Anagnostics is active on three markets, namely in 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The first order from abroad was triggered by a 
direct request to Anagnostics. All these countries are served by direct exporting. The 
reasons therefore are comprehensible from the start-up’s perspective. Financial 
considerations are the main reasons for entering Germany and Switzerland by direct 
exporting, but also the geographic closeness to Austria is a decisive factor. The 
complexity and effort serving these markets is within the realms of possibility, even at 
that stage of business development. This goes along with the theoretical consideration 
of exporting, as describing it as a straightforward and resource friendly mode.  
 
In addition Anagnostics is convinced that the “going-alone-model” isn’t efficient and 
smart in a global industry, hence cooperation is also important and valuable for them, 
which is also treated in the theoretical part.  
The firm cooperates with different institutions in Austria and abroad, as the University 
of Applied Science in Hagenberg or the University of Freiburg. Smaller cooperation 
with universities is attractive due to the fact that the financial burden is rather low. 
Hence this type of collaboration matches the resources of Anagnostic as a start-up 
perfectly. Know-how creation is the main reason for such a kind of collaboration, but if 
possible without time restrictions and pressure. University projects are only possible if 
they operate without urgency, and therefore are not adequate for every situation and 
problem.  
 
In addition Anagnostics is involved in projects with industrial partners. This is of 
importance due to the fact that for smaller firms like Anagnostics it is difficult to offer 
complete solutions. A product portfolio from hardware, over software to maintenance 
isn’t possible for a start-up in the long run, especially in the case of Anagnostics, as they 
want to enter additional markets in the near future. Hence a business partner for 
accelerating commercialization is really necessary. For a start-up company on its own it 
is a really long and tough way to become international. This again conforms to the 
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theoretical analysis, as cooperation speeds up internationalization by saving start-up’s 
financial- and personnel resources.  
 
Anagnostics has already applied cooperations for on-site services due to the fact that the 
devices have to be maintained. This would not be efficient in foreign markets as they do 
not have sufficient resources. For this reason Anagnostics has tasked a service partner 
for all maintenance issues. From a theoretical perspective this is a smart decision, as 
Anagnostics can still focus on the development of its products. As innovative products 
developed by R&D represents the core competence of Anagnostics this decision is 
comprehensible and is also reflected in the theoretical part.  
 
6.3.3.1. Evaluation of other Entry Modes 
Anagnostics is convinced that business growth is accompanied by additional entry 
modes. Hence at this stage of development the firm is not able to estimate which entry 
mode they would decline. Further they state that it would be difficult to prioritize the 
different entry modes for their company and are also dependent on the chosen market to 
enter.  
 
The start-up’s planned internationalization is a mixture of different entry modes, 
including the option of distribution partners and direct selling. Sales representatives are 
especially important for the life science market. Commercial agents are necessary, as 
they know the markets in which they are active in, whereby Anagnostics has no 
experience.  
 
According to Anagnostics wholly owned subsidiaries are a smart strategy for entering 
key markets. Especially if they require a company to be represented locally and 
proximity to customers is needed. At the moment this might be out of reach due to 
financial and organizational resource restrictions, but Anagnostics could imagine to 
begin with the establishment of a sales subsidiary abroad. This resource friendly 
alternative is also recommended in the critical examination of wholly owned 
subsidiaries in the theoretical part.  
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Further there are some specific markets where access is difficult. For the field of in-
vitro-diagnostics the United States would represent such a complicated market. Here the 
FDA presents an additional problem, which represents another hurdle for small foreign 
firms in this industry field.  
 
This implies that a partnership in the US is a key criterion, not only for entering this 
market but also for necessary on-site assistance. Anagnostics would prefer a Strategic 
Alliance when operating within the United States. The same strategy might be applied if 
entering for instance the Middle East.  
 
The start-up would avoid establishing Joint Ventures, due to the fact that they are more 
resource intensive. Such cooperation presents a rather long and complex process. This 
goes along with the theoretical evaluation of Joint Ventures, in which Strategic 
Alliances are more recommendable for high-tech start-ups. 
 
Altogether Anagnostics would not exclude any entry mode due to the reason that the 
mode must fit perfectly to the market itself and its circumstances. This might be for 
instance regulations or cultural and geographical distance of the chosen market, which 
have to be considered when choosing an entry mode.  
 
At the moment Anagnostics has to focus on rather resource friendly entry modes, which 
are realizable because the entered foreign markets are still geographically and culturally 
close to the home market. However in the future additional modes have to be applied, 
which seems to be traceable. In Europe Anagnostics will try to manage German-
speaking markets on its own, the following markets by distributors and other types of 
cooperative modes.  
 
6.3.3.2. Preconditions for International Market Entry 
Anagnostics considered the following criteria as preconditions for an international 
market entry. It is obvious that this listing is not complete; it rather describes the most 
important requirements for this start-up. 
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- Certificates: General certificates in this industry field are a pre-condition for 
being allowed to enter foreign markets. For instance quality prerequisites differ 
from market to market.  
 
- Experience: this factor is evaluated by theory as very decisive and also 
Anagnostics agrees with these findings. The management team comes with long 
lasting experience in internationalization and foreign markets. But experience 
alone is not sufficient for being able to apply a global approach from the 
beginning. Financial restrictions remain even if international networks existed at 
the foundation of Anagnostics. But experience is helpful in accelerating business 
internationalization. 
 
- Trade Fairs: having the opportunity to join international trade fairs presents a 
decisive factor in internationalization. Anagnostics is a member of the Austrian 
institution LISA (Life Science Austria), which organizes a stand for start-ups at 
important international trade fairs like the MEDICA. This is much valued by 
Anagnostics, as a trade fair participation incorporates high organizational and 
financial effort without the help of institutions like LISA.  
In the theoretical analysis the possibility for a start-up taking part at a trade fair 
is rated as a very motivating and important factor in internationalization, which 
matches Anagnostics’ perspective. 
 
- Economic Development Scheme: Anagnostics in general is satisfied with the 
amount and extent of trade promotion that was granted to the high-tech start-up 
during the development stage. Anagnostics perceives the amount of support as 
unequally distributed across the provinces within Austria. For the start-ups phase 
the economic support was adequate and at the same time really necessary to 
establish the business further. 
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6.3.5. Future Aims 
Starting from short to long-term goals, Anagnostics’ aim until the end of 2010 is to 
bring further products to the already entered markets. This should increase the cash 
flow, which is necessary for hiring additional personnel to reduce the actual capacity 
problems.  
 
Anagnostics isn’t averse to any type of cooperation. It is decisive if the collaboration 
suits  all partners and the chosen entry market. The market for Anagnostics’ solution is 
a global one, so the market potential is logically not solely in Austria.  
 
For a global strategy Anagnostics is convinced that this is only possible through 
cooperation and subsidiaries abroad. Especially for markets that are not as close or the 
markets Anagnostics planned to enter within the next years. In general the start-up’s 
internationalization strategy could be a mixture of all possible entry modes, depending 
on external and internal factors. 
 
Further Anagnostics is convinced that in about twenty years the firm will not exist as 
they exist today. Normally a global player in this industry field in general buys such 
high-tech start-ups if they are attractive enough (e.g. company value). Hence the firm’s 
overall aim for the next years is that their solution becomes more attractive and 
marketable. This will be reached by registered patents and an established international 
market access. From Anagnostics’ perspective it is decisive for the future of this start-
up to have a flexible and innovative basis technology, which can be developed further. 
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6.4. Case Study 2: Thor Medical Systems Kft. (Hungary) 
(Peter Nemes) 
The second start-up company analyzed in this thesis presents the Hungarian founded 
firm Thor Medical Systems, which is located in Budapest. The company is also active 
in the industry of medical engineering. This second case analysis follows the same 
structure as the former Austrian one. It starts with a short company profile, followed by 
a description of the firm’s international strategy and markets, including the competitive 
situation. Afterwards the applied international market entry modes of Thor Medical 
Systems are presented and analyzed. Concluding with some future aims of the start-up. 
This practical part is based on an in-depth interview with Mr. Ferenczi, CEO of Thor 
Medical Systems Kft. Additionally information is included that is available on the 
Internet on the company website. 
6.4.1. Company Profile 
Thor Medical Systems Kft. was founded in 2005 in Hungary and is dedicated to the 
research and development of medical systems. At the moment around 95 percent of the 
firm’s turnover is generated abroad, which pictures the significance of 
internationalization. The firm describes its business niche as delivering qualitative and 
at the same time affordable equipment for the industry of medical monitoring. One 
product specialty presents its mobility. Thor Medical Systems develops handheld 
devices that are mobile and at the same time straightforward in use, which is an 
important precondition for the global medical home care market.  
 
Besides the development of the product itself, Thor Medical Systems additionally 
develops the corresponding software itself and offers its customers technical support. 
As the Austrian company this start-up also offers a solution for a certain niche in the 
industry of medical engineering. The firm evaluates its products not as a revolutionary 
invention, rather as an innovative solution that solves existing problems. Respiratory 
diagnostics devices typically are used with disposables and calibration systems that are 
all large in size and difficult in use.  
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The start-up developed a solution that does not require such calibration systems due to 
the fact that the product calibrates itself and disposables need not be replaced for each 
measurement operation. Summing up, the firm’s solution is mobile, straightforward and 
reliable.  
 
At the moment Thor Medical Systems has about seven employees, predominantly active 
in the field of research and development. The firm is constantly searching for software 
developers, electronic engineers, experts in plastic design and specialists for medical 
devices in the field of pulmonary and cardiac medical systems. The management team 
of the start-up has know-how in a variety of business and scientific fields. A typical 
characteristic of the firm’s employees is international experience originating from 
working or writing their PhD abroad. Based on this experience in the field of medical 
engineering the founders of Thor Medical Systems recognized that Hungary has a long 
history in this field and hence presented an ideal starting point. Moreover due to its 
history Hungary has specific local know-how in the field of medical engineering. This  
in addition was a crucial factor in setting up the start-up in this country.  
 
Thor Medical Systems cooperates with universities located in different countries mainly 
in Europe, such as the Technische Universität Wien or the University of Utrecht. The 
start-up regularly cooperates with the Hungarian Semmelweis University and the 
Budapest University of Technology. This kind of cooperation is decisive for the start-up 
with the aim to establish new technologies and for advancing the firm’s products. Some 
of the employees are students, who are at the moment working on their PhD thesis and 
on Master thesis. Furthermore the start-up invests all the profit into R&D, which is 
necessary for the firm to stay innovative. 
6.4.2. International Strategy and Markets 
Thor Medical Systems operates in a global niche market, a sub field of medical 
engineering. The firm is active in a specific sector and concentrates on ultrasonic flow 
measurement and sensor technology. This niche market is global in size due to its 
limited national magnitude and the globally standardized applicability. For Thor 
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Medical Systems this niche is additionally interesting because international groups of 
companies like Philips, GE or Siemens are not paying attention to this field. These are 
some of the reasons why Thor Medical Systems based its firm in Hungary.  
Furthermore there is a strong knowledge base on the Hungarian market in the field of 
medical engineering resulting from political influences in the former Soviet Union. 
 
The start-up did not set up a strategy for internationalization at the beginning. This was 
rather scheduled from time to time or happened accidentally. However Thor Medical 
Systems recognized from the beginning that internationalization is inevitable in this 
niche high-tech market, as the theoretical analysis supports. The internationalization 
process was triggered by participation at an international trade fair. The start-up 
socialized and from this occasion the start up generated several international contacts 
and orders. 
6.4.2.1. Competitive Situation 
The competitive situation of Thor Medical Systems involves one direct competitor in 
the field of ultrasonic diagnostics. The firm NDD Medizintechnik AG in Switzerland 
operates in a similar and with the same sensor technology. Besides this strong 
competitor there are about fifteen other companies that devote their business to the field 
of respiratory diagnostics, but operate with an older technology in a different market.  
 
Compared to the firm’s competitors Thor Medical Systems is one of the cheapest 
suppliers in this field of medical technology.  An Italian company exists that operates at 
the same price level but offers a different kind of technology. The remaining 
competitors are oriented at a different price level or offer a discriminative technology.  
6.4.2.2. Evaluation of Patents’ Importance 
Thormed is frightened of the attitude towards intellectual property in Asian markets 
where counterfeiting is not forbidden by law. In Shanghai one of the start-up’s German 
competitors has been copied already, in Beijing the Italian solution. Hence the firm 
appreciates the patents and knows about its importance, they are also aware of the fact 
that this does not protect them from being copied. Thor Medical Systems therefore 
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invests a tremendous amount of resources on the encryption and securing of their 
technologies to protect their own solution from illegal copying. 
 
Thor Medical Systems possesses pending patents, especially for the firm’s core sensor 
technology. For the company patents are essential, even if on Asian markets intellectual 
property is copied in many cases. The start-up does not disclose the invention in every 
detail; hence the problem of unfolding a firm’s invention and idea in a patent does not 
exist in this case. In the theoretical part the problem of know-how disclosure in patents 
is treated in detail. The practical examination cannot reconstruct this problem due to the 
reason that firms like Thor Medical Systems state that inventions aren’t completely 
unfolded in patents.  
6.4.3. International Market Entry Modes 
At the moment Thor Medical Systems applies the entry mode of direct and indirect 
exporting, implemented via distributors and sales partners. The start-up exports to a 
wide range of countries such as Austria, Germany, Brazil, Hong Kong, New Zealand, 
Norway, UK and the US. The firm’s major OEM partners are located in the 
Netherlands, UK and US. 
 
Besides exporting, the start-up is focusing on the establishment of a production 
subsidiary in Hong Kong at the moment. Due to the fact that capacity at the Hungarian 
production site has reached its limits. Hence for being able to fulfill orders at higher 
quantities the start-up future intention is to found a manufacturing plant in China.  
 
However Thor Medical Systems does not plan to outsource special knowledge and 
intellectual property. This knowledge has to remain in Hungary. The decision for setting 
up a production entity in Hong Kong can be also traced back to the past international 
experience of Mr. Ferenczi. He organized many manufacturing outsourcing projects to 
Hong Kong in the past and therefore has a wide network there. 
 
Summing up, at the moment the start-up focuses on rather resource friendly entry 
modes which are in the realm of possibility due to the restricted available resources. 
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However the start-up also develops the most resource intensive entry mode, namely a 
wholly owned subsidiary in Hong Kong. There are several theoretical reasons why this 
is traceable. The most decisive factor could be the past experience of Mr. Ferenczi in 
China. Further he conducted this outsourcing process several times in his past so that he 
is aware of the potential risks. 
6.4.3.1. Evaluation of other Entry Modes 
Thor Medical Systems is not able to exclude any entry mode from being applied in the 
future. At the moment the firm uses exporting to fulfill foreign orders and plans to 
establish a production subsidiary in Hong Kong in the near future. 
 
In addition licensing is also interesting for the start-up especially for the firm’s core 
sensor technology for respiratory signals. At the moment the firm is negotiating with 
two major customers, one located in the Netherlands and the other in the UK, for 
supplying those markets with OEM products.  
 
Tighter types of cooperation the start-up could imagine are with countries like Germany 
as this market is characterized by an excellent partnership according to the experience 
of Mr. Ferencsi. Thor Medical Systems is convinced that every high-tech start-up 
evaluates Germany as the best possible business partner for tighter cooperation as Joint 
Ventures or Strategic Alliances. With Dutch business partners the start-up could also 
imagine such closer partnerships, but the firm would prefer German partners. 
 
6.4.3.2. Preconditions for International Market Entry 
It is obvious that the following listing is not complete. It rather illustrates the most 
important preconditions for Thor Medical Systems in the case of internationalization. 
 
- Economic Development Scheme: Thor Medical Systems at the moment 
operates on self-generated money. But this was not the case from the beginning. 
The start-up relied on many different support sources as start-up grants, 
international funding and European grants. The firm, for instance, received a 
start-up grant of about € 100,000 which was necessary for starting business. This 
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monetary support was used primarily for developing products and for the first 
steps towards internationalization. 
 
Thor Medical Systems appreciates this absolutely necessary support and is 
convinced that every start-up in this technological field relies on external support 
programs. But the firm perceives that the amount of support has decreased 
during the last few years.  
 
Further in Hungary it is very time-consuming and difficult for a start-up to 
receive any grants. Thor Medical Systems considers itself as one of the few 
Hungarian start-up business success stories. 
 
- Certificates: The most difficult precondition that is absolutely necessary in the 
medical engineering field is to obtain certificates for the target markets. 
Certificates are a prerequisite to sell medical technology products but they also 
have an impact on the firm’s reputation. For instance Thor Medical Systems 
perceived that Hungarian certificates have less significance for the reputation of 
a product than German ones.  
Besides these certificates are very hard to obtain. In some key markets like the 
US the certification process of the FDA is perceived as a very complex and 
lengthy certification process, which can even hinder start-ups from entering the 
US market. Thormed is still processing to get access in the US market, but this 
seems to be a long and complex procedure.  
 
- Investors: For the start-up the adequate investor presents a key criterion for 
being able to internationalize. Thor Medical Systems found a local investor that 
supports the start-up in an adequate way. For Thormed it is important that the 
investor shares the same modern way of thinking.  
 
- Cooperation: Thor Medical Systems applies different kinds of cooperation with 
universities or with companies. Collaboration with universities is primarily 
important for knowledge creation, partnerships with companies for further 
 119 
developing products. Both are necessary for creating an innovative solution that 
is technically mature for international markets.  	  
In addition the start-up had the chance to learn from various start-ups as its main 
investor had several shares in other high-tech start-ups. As a consequence 
Thormed had the chance to learn from the failures from the other start-ups. This 
experience is perceived to be very important for avoiding own business 
mistakes. 
 
- International Trade Fairs: such events are important for Thor Medical 
Systems to advertise its products and for expanding its contact network. The 
start-up receives a lot of support from the Hungarian government. At important 
international trade fairs such as the Medica in Düsseldorf joint stands for 
Hungarian small and medium sized companies are organized, which is a great 
possibility for firms with restricted financial budgets. For Thor Medical Systems 
such international trade fairs are decisive to internationalize its business and for 
advertising its products. 
6.4.4. Future Aims 
Future aims of Thor Medical Systems can be described by three terms: Growth, Asian 
markets and reputation. The latter often hinders the company in sales. In countries like 
Germany the start-up is convinced that German consumers favor national products as 
German products are considered to be extremely reliable and safe. Therefore in some 
countries the Hungarian firm has to invest in the establishment of a more reliable 
reputation and image. However markets exist that have a totally different perspective 
concerning the firm’s reputation. In India Thor Medial Systems has a good reputation 
due to the fact that European products are perceived to have a high quality standard. But 
in total the start-up tries to focus more on the establishment of higher value reputation, 
which can be considered as a long-term goal. 
 
The aim of growth and the targeted Asian markets can be considered as one aim, as the 
start-up estimates the future of this industry field lying in Asian markets. The firm 
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argues that it will focus on the Asian markets due to the fact that the rest of the world 
markets suffer from a continuous economic crisis. In contrast to these stagnating 
markets, China, India and the Asian region have incredible growth rates so the firm 
wants to capitalize. One statement, which enforces this argument, is that Thormed 
should have invested sooner and more intensively into Asian markets and less into the 
European and US markets. Another reason why Thor Medical Systems concentrates on 
Asian regions is the fact that the company’s reputation is perceived much higher there.  
 
6.5. Comparison and Findings (Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
This part of the thesis tries to compare both interviewed companies by reflecting the 
main arguments given by the questioned companies. One further objective of this 
comparison is to answer some of the research questions mentioned in chapter 6.1.  
6.5.1 Similarities  
Both companies operate in the same industry of medical engineering and are similar in 
structure and were established in the year 2005. They are similar in size with seven full-
time employees at Thormed and ten full-time employees at Anagnostics.  
This makes both companies ideal for comparing and analyzing their internationalization 
process. Both companies are niche players and have a similar product policy. In the 
interview both indicate that their products require very few customization and 
calibration efforts from the customer side. This represents the main product strategy of 
both players and can be classified as a differentiation (niche) strategy from main global 
players that mostly produce highly sophisticated machinery mainly for hospitals, which 
require high calibration and maintenance efforts.  
 
Both companies rely heavily on the cooperation with universities in the area of research 
but also product development. Anagnostics indicated that they have professional 
partners especially in the area of the applied product development especially because 
professional partners are more reliable and dedicated to project milestones.  
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Both companies have a management team with a very international experience profile. 
From the interview it can be argued that the management team from Thormed has 
international experience as the main management team completed studies in various 
foreign universities and also has professional foreign experience especially with 
Chinese partners.  
 
It can be stated that the management team from Anagnostics has pronounced experience 
and focus in German speaking areas namely Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Further 
it can be argued that this international experience level is also reflected in the 
concentration and actual expansion of the business in these German countries. Based on 
these statements the theoretical arguments regarding the influence of international 
experience on international market entry is supported.  
 
Both companies filed patents for their technologies. But both companies are skeptical 
about the use of patents for know-how protection. Thormed for example regards patents 
only as one small part for protecting their inventions. They rely heavily on encryption 
and securing technology built in their products. Thormed argues that especially in China 
and Asian countries the protection with patents is less useful as the enforcement of 
patent laws is less developed. Anagnostics primarily does not use patenting for know-
how protection, as they believe that tacit knowledge is more important for know-how 
protection. Anagnostics states explicitly that they use patents to increase their market 
value and only secondarily to protect against product counterfeiting. The main reason 
for this may be the global aim of the entity, which is to increase market value.  
 
Both companies have a similar attitude to patenting. Both state that the disclosure of the 
underlying technology is not seen as an obstacle and is not perceived as being 
disincentive for filing patents. As the invention is mostly formulated in a very abstract 
way a counterfeiter could not copy an invention from the patent itself. At this point the 
theoretical arguments are not supported.   
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Anagnostics and Thormed do not exclude any market entry mode. The market entry 
decision must fit  the market situation and should according to Anagnostics be decided 
on various individual factors.  
 
Furthermore both companies highlight the importance of external support for start-ups 
in their industry. Both companies relied heavily on government support in their 
beginning phase. Furthermore both point out the importance of governmental support at 
trade fairs and the knowledge exchange with governmental agencies especially for trade 
promotions and the support with export partners. This reasoning is treated in the 
theoretical part and is supported in the interview with both partners.  
6.5.2 Differences  
To begin with, the main difference of Anagnostics and Thormed lies in the business 
objective. Anagnostics tries to become more attractive for potential future investors, by 
for instance having some interesting pending patents available, as described before. On 
the other hand Thormed’s goal is business growth, hence becoming a more important 
player in this global industry niche. So most of the subsequent differences could be 
rationalized by a different business objective. 
 
For reaching this defined objective both firms decided to internationalize and are not 
able to exclude any possible entry mode from adapting in the future. However the start-
ups apply different entry modes at the same business development stage. Anagnostics at 
the moment focuses on exporting; Thormed additionally establishes a production 
subsidiary in Hong Kong. A potential explanation for the different approach could be 
traced back to the overall business objective. Anagnostics chooses the more resource 
friendly mode for being able to keep on concentrating on R&D, which might lead to 
new pending patents. Thormed tries to reach a prospective organic growth by the set up 
of a production entity abroad for managing the current capacity problem. It is obvious 
that additional factors could have influenced the start-ups in their decisions, as for 
instance a different amount of granted governmental support. 
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The start-ups also differentiate in their internationalization approaches. Thormed rather 
applies the Born Global approach compared to Anagnostics, which on the other hand 
follows a stage development approach. Both firms would fulfill the preconditions for 
being global from the beginning onwards, but only Thormed follows this approach. This 
could again be explained by the different business aim of both start-ups and also the 
level of international experience varies. 
 
Besides that, the start-ups have different target groups, Anagnostics develops for the 
labor and clinical market, Thormed focuses on the clinical and home care market. This 
is traceable when having the product portfolio in mind. Anagnostics, with its innovative 
drug testing solution and Thormed, with its mobile pulmonary diagnostic devices.  
 
From a competitive perspective both start-ups face a different number of competitors in 
their field of application. Thormed has one direct competitor offering the same 
technology and about fifteen indirect ones with a different technology. Anagnostics at 
the moment is not confronted with any direct competitor, solely with indirect ones, 
which offer a different technology. 
 
Overall, the commonalities of Anagnostics and Thormed definitely outweigh the listed 
distinctions. The different business objectives could be the trigger of the above-
mentioned differences between these two start-ups. In general the statements of 
Anagnostics and Thormed are comprehensible and match to a large extent the 
theoretical assumptions. 
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7. Summary (Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
The goal of this thesis is to illustrate the internationalization process of start-up 
companies, which turns out not to be a straightforward task. Moreover it is hardly 
possible to offer a precise recommendation how this process should be configured that 
start-ups in the long run can reach defined business goals. Focusing especially on start-
ups in the high-tech industry does not facilitate reaching this thesis’ aim. Quite the 
contrary, analyzing an innovative and fast moving branch in which not established firms 
are active is far more challenging.  
 
Literature connected to this task is available, even if sometimes out of date or not 
accessible. Hence literature is analyzed, considered critically and if useful and valuable 
included in this diploma thesis. The included theoretical information is subsequently 
compared to the conducted case analyses. As a consequence the question why high-tech 
start-ups are motivated to internationalize business can be answered in a way that it is 
valid theoretically and also practically as the gathered information matches well with 
the two case analyses.  
 
The main argument why high-tech start-ups internationalize is because of the home 
market’s size. Developing an innovative and at the same time technological-advanced 
product solely for the firm’s home market seems not to be lucrative from different 
perspectives. Hence striving for internationalization is a necessary and logical step, 
generally formulated at company establishments especially in small domestic markets 
as Hungary and Austria. There are far more reasons that motivate start-ups in the high-
tech industry to internationalize, all discriminatively relevant and dependent on the 
start-up’s business aim. 
 
Besides trying to give an explanation why high-tech start-ups internationalize another 
interesting and at the same time main question is how these firms implement this 
integrated internationalization process. Every international market entry is separated 
into three interrelated decisions. Therefore the start-up has to decide where, how and 
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when to internationalize. Besides this internationalization is always accompanied by 
challenges, risks and chances that have to be included into every decision. 
 
The first major decision a start-up has to consider is which market(s) to enter. Several 
authors describe the circumstances a start-up faces as suitable for being globally active. 
Theoretically high-tech start-ups tend to apply a Born Global strategy, which may be 
the case if the firm is fulfilling the seven factors by Baronchelli and Cassia (2008). The 
instable and fast changing environment, the limited size of the domestic market, the 
innovative branch in which start-ups are active, the available knowledge and experience 
of the management team, its previous gathered business experience and the available 
network links leading those firms to a global internationalization strategy from the  
company’s beginning. These factors explain traceably why and when start-ups are in the 
situation of being able to apply a Born Global Strategy. Considered from a critical 
perspective, often the firm’s set business goal(s) and existing restrictions, and limited 
access to financial resource thus prevent start-ups from being global from the beginning. 
The executed case analyses disclosed clearly this circumstance. When these firms were 
asked about their entered markets, they numerate several countries but never state that 
they apply a Born Global strategy. However they are convinced that being global is a 
wise and effective strategy especially in their industry. Financial and personal 
restrictions at the moment prevent them  being able to apply a Born Global strategy. So 
theoretically Anagnostics GmbH and Thormed Kft see and evaluate their marketplace 
as a global one, but practically they entered several markets at once and also stepwise 
one by one, due to existing limitations.  
 
The second question a start-up has to ask itself is which markets to enter. Here a firm 
can choose between various modes depending on the degree of risk and dependence the 
start-up wants to take. The thesis treats exporting, licensing, contract manufacturing, 
strategic alliances, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries in more detail, 
analyzed from a start-up’s perspective. Considering limited resources as a main 
characteristic of a start-up, it would suggest that export presents the most adequate entry 
mode for these businesses. This theoretical assumption is affirmed in the practical 
examination. The main applied international market entry mode is exporting.  Export 
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matches optimally with the situation of new established enterprises. It is a low-risk and 
low-involvement entry mode and therefore very resource-friendly. An unsolicited order 
often presents the trigger to begin with exporting, which again conforms to the 
interviewed start-ups.  
 
However exporting is not implemented exclusively, which again is assumed in theory. 
Thormed Kft already applies different entry modes even at that young business 
development stage. Both conduct direct and indirect exporting, Thormed is additionally 
developing a production subsidiary in Hong Kong at the moment. Hence this firm 
combines the most resource-friendly mode with a more cost-intensive one. The 
literature says that start-ups prefer low-risk modes, but in general apply several different 
modes at the same time. Further both firms state that they cannot exclude any entry 
mode, when asking them which possibility they would introduce in the future. Both 
firms explain that the chosen mode has to fit  the chosen entry market.  
 
Exporting supports high-tech start-ups in entering several markets at once. This is 
especially important when considering the Born Global approach. Bürgel and Murray 
(2000, p. 35f) explain that technology-based firms most likely enter more than one 
foreign market within a short time period. So the decision to implement a resource-
friendly entry mode at that business development stage seems to be traceable again.  
 
Bürgel and Murray (2000) further mention that product’s characteristics play an 
important role when deciding on direct or indirect exporting, as the degree of 
customization and innovativeness. The interviewed start-ups apply both types, 
dependent on the markets like geographic and cultural distance. Besides both firms offer 
rather simple products, which additionally simplify indirect exporting.  
 
When asking Anagnostics and Thormed about licensing both state that this mode is 
interesting for them, although they don’t apply it at the moment. Especially a start-up 
can profit a lot from licensing, which is confirmed by the theoretical and practical 
examination. It is a very resource-friendly mode and especially for products that have a 
large part of R&D expenditures, licensing contributes to a faster amortization. Licensing 
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presumes an applied patent, which is lucrative from different perspectives. The 
questioned firms have different reasons for applying a patent. For Thormed the decisive 
reason is that patents protect the start-up’s invention, Anagnostics on the other side 
appreciates that patents enable start-ups to attract venture capital. These discriminative 
perspectives result from different business aims the start-ups follow. In literature both 
aspects lead to a higher significance of patents. (e.g. Arundel, 2001, EPO, 2007; Mann, 
2007)  
 
However negative aspects exist as well. Authors like Arundel (2001) examine the 
problem of disclosing the invention when applying for a patent. Thereby the firm’s 
(most) valuable information is disclosed and accessible to competitors or imitators. For 
a high-tech start-up it is essential to protect its technology, any illegal action against the 
firm could have an impact on the economic survival. In literature patents present a kind 
of double bind; in practice this cannot be reconstructed. The interviewed firms state that 
when applying for a patent in general the technology is developed so far that any 
competitor cannot follow rapidly. In addition the companies claim that patents are only 
superficial and that they have to be precise. This implies that with the disclosed 
information a competitor is not able to counterfeit the start-up’s product. So the 
negative aspects explored in the literature are not included in the case analyses. 
 
Summing up, the decision to apply for a patent always results from the start-ups 
business strategy and goal. If the firm plans to cooperate or to raise venture capital, 
patents enhance the start-up’s value. Although patents are ignored in several markets 
like China, the positive aspects in the practical examination clearly exceed the negative 
ones.  
 
Particularly high-tech start-ups are coping with capacity problems when 
internationalizing business. Hence including contract manufacturing as a possible and 
at the same time recommendable entry mode seems to be logical also because this 
method is widely spread in high-technology industries. (Wu et al., 2005) But contract 
manufacturing in theory is also described as a double-edged sword. A start-up should 
never outsource core competencies or processes the firm relies on. Especially in the 
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high-tech industry long-term contracts should be defined due to the reason that it might 
not be that easy to find a substitute for the chosen partner. (Arruñada and Vázquez, 
2006) Thormed and Anagnostics are both aware of this double-edged situation, but 
limited capacity really presents a problem for them. Furthermore both firms develop a 
solution, consisting of hardware, software and service, and contract manufacturing 
solely affects the hardware. So the problem of know-how transfer can be lowered and at 
the same time this emphasizes the positive aspects of contract manufacturing in the 
practical examination. 
 
Strategic alliances and joint ventures are further entry modes the start-up can decide on 
when going international. Both types share to a certain extent similar advantages, 
disadvantages, challenges and chances. As for any start-up the traditional go-it-alone 
model seems to be rather unrealistic and far away from financeable, these cooperation 
modes definitely justify an inclusion in this thesis. 
Especially in the high-tech industry nearly all incumbents are connected to each other in 
form of networks of cooperative settlements, which also strengthen the practical 
relevance. (Duysters et al., 1999, p. 347f)  
 
These modes enable start-ups to develop new markets, accelerating the market entry, 
exchanging ideas, gaining professional insight and also lowering uncertainty in 
technology and market. These positive aspects are confronted with negative ones, as the 
risk of choosing the wrong partner(s), the availability of a secret agenda or the lack of 
trust between the cooperation partners. Know-how drain and the difference in size and 
market position are problems that especially concern a start-up. Further Nueno (1999, p. 
321) conclude that a cooperation is only meaningful and advisable if the start-up owns 
sufficient core competencies to differentiate itself from the partner(s). So the question 
remains: What is more advisable – implementing a strategic alliance or a joint venture? 
 
A strategic alliance is more flexible compared to a joint venture, which might be 
important if the cooperation has to be adapted or in the worst case terminated. 
(Kutschker and Schmid, 2005, p. 872) Further, it is less cost- and resource-intense, 
again important for a newly established firm. Due to the high-tech start-up’s less 
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established economic development stage a joint venture might not be an accurate entry 
mode at this stage of establishment, as it requires circumstances a start-up at this stage 
can hardly provide. So a strategic alliance might be more recommendable, when 
considering start-up’s characteristics.  
 
The last mode treated in this thesis and at the same time most risky and long-ranging 
international market entry are wholly owned subsidiaries. Literature advises against 
establishing a foreign subsidiary that integrates the entire value chain at that business 
stage. Alternatively for the start-up setting up a sales organization abroad is more 
recommendable. Thormed Kft at the moment is planning to develop a production 
subsidiary in Hong Kong, restricted to the production of the firm’s hardware. The 
reasons for the establishment are on the one hand capacity problems and on the other 
hand business experience in China. Further, Thormed has already gained experience in 
lower-risk entry modes as exporting which is necessary for an establishment of wholly 
owned subsidiaries due to some authors. 
 
The next question a start-up has to ask itself is when the firm should internationalize. 
Bürgel et al. (2001) state that if firms spend a large proportion of their efforts on R&D 
then such companies in general prefer rapid internationalization. This statement is 
affirmed by the questioned start-ups, both having high R&D expenditures. Start-up’s 
size and available resources limit the speed of internationalization, but choosing the 
adequate entry location and mode can reduce these drawbacks.  
 
 Theoretical consideration of adequate timing of an international entry mode conducted 
by a high-tech start-up should be earlier and faster compared to older firms. Small, 
incremental, quick and considered steps in general are recommendable for new 
established high-tech firms. Anagnostics and Thormed both follow such a strategy. 
 
Summing up, in general the included theoretical information matches the practical 
examination to a large extent. There are no huge differences or surprises, sometimes in 
literature problems become more important than they are actually are in practice. In 
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addition the questioned Hungarian and Austrian firms use almost the same arguments, 
perhaps this can be ascribed to the similarity of these start-ups or geographic closeness. 
 
7.1. Limitation 
To mention some limitations of this thesis it is important to cite the problem of validity. 
The practical examination is based on two case analyses, both very similar to each 
other. For offering a generally valid proposition this quantity is obviously not enough. 
The reason for including just two cases can be traced back to the length restriction of a 
diploma thesis. Further, the aim of this thesis is not to give a universally valid 
proposition, rather analyzing two very similar high-tech start-ups in different countries 
and comparing the results with the available literature.  
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8. Abstract (English) (Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
This thesis deals with the theoretical analysis of the internationalization process of high-
tech start-up companies, expanded by a practical examination. The latter is conducted 
with the help of the case study methodology by interviewing an Austrian and Hungarian 
high-tech start-up firm. The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the internationalization 
process of high-technology based start-up firms theoretically and compare the findings 
with a practical investigation. 
Describing and analyzing the internationalization process of high-tech start-up is not a 
straightforward task, due to the fact that at this business stage the firm’s processes are 
not developed completely. In addition this firm always faces restrictions, for instance 
from a financial as well as from a personnel perspective. Besides the high-technology 
industry additionally complicates a precise analysis, as the branch can be characterized 
as instable, unpredictable and short-dated. Hence when analyzing the market entry of 
high-tech start-ups many parameters have to be considered. 
The thesis is separated into three main parts. The first concentrates on international 
theories with the focus on the validity for the chosen business type. Afterwards the main 
theoretical part deals with the international market entry of high-tech start-ups, 
subdivided into several strategic decisions as why (not), where, how and when to 
internationalize. The third part involves the practical investigation by applying case 
study methodology. The focus lies on analyzing two similar start-ups in different 
markets, which are of the same age, active in the same industry and are of the same size. 
The information was gathered by an in-depth interview and from additional sources 
such as company website or magazine publications, afterwards compared to literature 
publication.  
The combination of theoretical and practical investigation offers a deeper insight into 
the international market entry of high-tech start-ups, with the aim of answering the 
defined research questions. 
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Abstrakt (Deutsch) (Marlene Wiedorn, Peter Nemes) 
Diese Magisterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der theoretischen Analyse des 
Internationalisierungsprozesses von High-Tech Start-up Unternehmen, erweitert durch 
eine praktische Untersuchung. Letzteres ist mit Hilfe der Fallstudienmethodik 
durchgeführt, anhand einer Befragung eines österreichischen und ungarischen High-
Tech Start-ups. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, den Prozess der Internationalisierung von 
High-Tech Start-up Unternehmen theoretisch zu veranschaulichen und die Ergebnisse 
mit der praktischen Untersuchung zu vergleichen. 
Den Prozess der Internationalisierung eines High-Tech Start-ups zu beschreiben und zu 
analysieren ist keine einfache Aufgabe, aufgrund der Tatsache, dass bei dieser 
Geschäftsstufe die Unternehmensprozesse nicht vollständig entwickelt sind. Zusätzlich 
ist ein solches Unternehmen immer mit Einschränkungen konfrontiert, zum Beispiel aus 
finanzieller als auch aus personeller Sicht. 
Außerdem erschwert die High-Tech Industrie zusätzlich eine genaue Analyse, da diese 
Branche als instabil, unvorhersehbar und kurzfristig charakterisiert werden kann. Daher 
hat man bei der Analyse des Markteintritts von High-Tech Start-ups viele Parameter zu 
berücksichtigen. 
Die Diplomarbeit ist in drei Hauptteile untergliedert. Der erste konzentriert sich auf die 
Internationalisierungstheorien mit dem Fokus auf deren Gültigkeit für den gewählten 
Geschäftstyp. Danach beschäftigt sich der Haupttheorieteil mit dem internationalen 
Markteintritt von High-Tech Start-ups, dies untergliedert in mehrere strategische 
Entscheidungen, wie beispielsweise warum (nicht), wo, wie und wann zu 
internationalisieren. Der dritte Teil umfasst die praktische Untersuchung, hierbei ist die  
Fallstudienmethodik angewandt. Der Fokus liegt auf der Analyse zweier ähnlicher 
Start-ups, die in unterschiedlichen Märkten angesiedelt, jedoch gleich alt und in 
derselben Branche tätig sind, und dieselbe Größe besitzen. Die für die Analyse 
notwendige Information stammt von eingehenden Befragungen mit den ausgewählten 
Firmen und von weiteren Quellen wie Unternehmens-Websites oder Publikationen in 
Zeitschriften. Danach sind die gesammelten Aussagen und Informationen mit 
Literaturveröffentlichungen verglichen.  
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Die Kombination aus einer theoretischen und praktischen Untersuchung bietet einen 
tieferen Einblick in den internationalen Markteintritt von High-Tech Start-ups, mit dem 
Ziel die definierten Forschungsfragen zu beantworten. 
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Interview Questionnaire 
Company Profile 
1) When was the company founded and how? (E.g. as a management buy-out, foreign 
subsidiary of other independent, newly established company) 
a.  Does the company receive any funding or other external monetary means? 
 
Staff / Founder Profile 
2) What did you do professionally before setting up this company? 
a. Have you generated valuable experience through your past work experience for this 
company? For instance? 
b. What kind of experience do the founders and the senior management team possess? 
(e.g. any training, international experience, network, qualifications, experience) 
 
Product characteristics 
3) How would you best describe the innovation of your company’s product? What does 
the start-up exactly produce? 
a. Does the product need a great deal of explanation / configuration / customization / 
maintenance / training? 
 
4) How would you describe the domestic and foreign competition? Does any exist? 
How close are competitors to this firm? (Innovation leadership) 
 
5) How are the products distributed domestically? 
 
International Activities / Market Entry 
6) Are your products / services  represented in foreign markets?  
a. In which foreign market(s) is the start-up represented? 
b. If abroad: Since when? And how many years after the foundation? 
c. What percentage of turnover is generated abroad? 
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7) Why have you chosen to internationalize? What were the reasons / motives? (e.g. 
growth, domestic market is small, promotions, collaborations, to generate knowledge 
and know-how) 
a. Was internationalization part of the company’s strategy / plan, or was it spontaneous 
(trigger)? Formal strategy or chance? 
b. If funding was available: Which? Would you expect to gain more support from the  
government etc? Why? 
c. Does your start-up cooperate with others (suppliers, university etc)? Is there  
cooperation with universities (for experience and knowledge generation, etc.)? Why? 
 
8) Which entry mode(s) did your company decide on during the start-up phase? Several 
at once? Why exactly this/these? 
a. What were the advantages/disadvantages of your chosen entry mode(s) (during the 
start-up phase)? (e.g. in the case of export: Trade Promotions) 
b. If you decided for several modes: Why? Why not? 
c. What enabled you to use this entry mode? 
d. What kinds of risks and problems have occurred? 
e. Have you ever considered direct investment methods? If so, which ones and why? 
Why not? 
f. Compared to now: Which modes does the company apply at the moment? 
g. Why have the applied entry mode(s) changed over time? When and how 
(progressive/stepwise)? 
 
9) In retrospect, what would you have done differently? 
a. Enter other markets, different order? 
b. Other time? 
c. Other modes? Which ones? 
 
10) What is your attitude towards patents in your company? 
a. Did you have some patents during your start-up phase? If so: in which field? 
b. Did  any problems occur? 
c. Was/is licensing an issue for your company? 
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11) Do you rate your company as a firm that operates in the high-tech industry as a 
"Born Global" company? 
a. Why (not)? Reasons therefore? 
b. Was this the case from the beginning? 
c. What do you think are the preconditions for a Born Global? 
d. Or have you chosen  gradual internationalization? Why (not)? 
e. Do you evaluate internationalization as a decision-making process? Why (not)? 
 
13) Why haven’t you decided for (here mention: Joint venture, foreign offices, Strategic 
Alliances, etc.) during the company’s start-up phase? 
a. Would this mode illustrate a reduction of the financial risk? 
 
14) Do you currently have sufficient production capacity? How would you rate the 
workload? If above 100 percent: Do you consider expanding capacity? (e.g. to other 
countries with lower labor costs) 
 
15) What is your estimate of the financial expenditure on research and development 
compared to your company’s turnover? In percent. 
 
16) What do you plan for the future related to internationalization? 
 
 
This questionnaire presents a guideline for the in-depth interviews. Since such an 
interview should be more a discussion than a question-and-answer game, the questions 
could be arranged or formulated differently. This questionnaire should in fact deliver an 
overview so that no topic is missed during the interview. 
 147 
Interview Transcript of Case Study Anagnostics Bioanalysis 
GmbH (Austria) 
Wiedorn: Wann und wie wurde Anagnostics Bioanalysis GmbH gegründet? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Die Firma wurde 2005 offiziell gegründet und zwar wirklich als 
komplettes Start-up. Nicht als ein Spin-Off der Universität oder als eine Neugründung 
eines Unternehmens, sondern wirklich gegründet aus der Idee eine neue Technologie 
umzusetzen und zwar ist der ursprüngliche Ideenlieferant und Gründer Herr Dr. 
Ronacher. Herr Ronacher war vor Anagnostics bei der Firma Lambda, das ist eine 
andere Biotec-Firma, die inzwischen zu Greiner Bio-One gehört, und dort hat Herr 
Ronacher auch in der Entwicklung gearbeitet, hatte viele Ideen die aber in der Firma 
Lambda nicht wirklich umzusetzen waren. Darum die Gründung von Anagnostics. 
Diese hat er mit Christoph Reschreiter zusammen gegründet, er ist der zweite Gründer. 
Dr. Ronacher ist sozusagen das Scientific-Brain mit der Produktidee, Mag. Reschreiter 
hat den administrativen und finanziellen Background dafür. Gegründet wurde 
Anagnostic natürlich mit wenig Eigenkapital, dann hat man sich natürlich um 
Förderungen, Start-up Förderungen, umgesehen.  
Wiedorn: Wie würden Sie die Förderunterstützung einschätzen? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Die Förderhöhe war durchaus angemessen. Interessant ist hierbei 
noch zu bemerken, dass die Firma in Oberösterreich gegründet wurde, dort gabs 
bezüglich Seed-Kaptial und Start-up Finazierung gute Möglichkeiten. Die Firma war 
auch angesiedelt im Tech-2-Be, in der Hafenstraße in Linz, und dort hat es mit den 
Förderungen eigentlich gut funktioniert. Da gibt es in Österreich einige Möglichkeiten, 
beispielsweise übers AWS. Da konnte sich Anagnostics gut durchhanteln. Natürlich nur 
bis zu einem gewissen Zeitpunkt. Eben wenn es zur Kommerzialisierung kommt, das 
muss natürlich anders angestellt werden.  
Wiedorn: Über wieviele Mitarbeiter verfügt Anagnostics und in welchem Bereich sind 
diese tätig? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Aktuell haben wir zehn Mitarbeiter. Dies ist aufgeteilt wie folgt, es 
gibt eben ein Management Team, das sind die beiden vorher genannten Gründer und 
ich. Dann haben wir noch eine Person in der Administration, die restlichen sind in der 
 148 
Forschung und Entwicklung. Mit Herrn Ronacher sind es sechs Leute die für Forschung 
zuständig sind. Daher 6:4. 
Nemes: Über welchen Hintergrund verfügen diejenigen in der Forschung tätig sind? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Diejenigen in der Forschung haben alle ein Studium gemacht. 
Biochemie, Biologie, Mechatronik etc. 
Wiedorn: Wird mit anderen Partnern wie Universitäten oder Unternehmen kooperiert? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja natürlich. Immer so kleinere Projekte mit Universitäten. Viel 
gemacht wurde in Zusammenarbeit mit der FH Hagenberg, weil es aus der Nähe ist und 
unser IT-Zuständiger, der für die Hardwareentwicklung zuständig ist, kommt von dort. 
Und so hat sich das ergeben, zusammen hat man beispielsweise Software entwickelt. 
Dann gabs noch weitere Projekte mit anderen Universitäten, auch außerhalb von 
Österreich. Aktuelle Projekte gibt es mit Universität Freiburg, wobei ich sagen muss die 
Universitätskooperationen sind halt was sie sind. Wenn Sommer ist passiert gar nichts, 
man darf halt bei solchen Projekten nicht so zeitgedrängt sein, vorsichtig ausgedrückt. 
Dies ist halt mit industriellen Partnern anders. Die gibt es natürlich auch. Uni ist 
sicherlich gut für Know-How, da kommt man auch ohne viel finanziellen Aufwand 
heran, klarerweise ein Vorteil. Andererseits sind die industriellen Partner für uns sehr 
wichtig. 
Wiedorn: Wer sind die Kunden von Anagnostics? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Wir haben zwei große Märkte. Das ist einerseits der In-Vitro-
Diagnostik Markt, der Markt ist 40 Milliarden Euro insgesamt, ein globaler Markt. Das 
kann man wirklich als eigenständigen Markt sehen. In Österreich ist dieser Markt 230 
Millionen Euro groß. In Deutschland das Zehnfache. Der zweite Markt in den wir sind 
ist der Life Science Research Markt. Wo es in die Forschung hineingeht, aber auch 
pharmazeutische Produkte entwickelt werden. Dieser Markt ist auch in etwa 30 
Milliarden Euro. Wir haben somit Partner in beiden Bereich, die sind entweder in 
Österreich oder in Deutschland. Teilweise arbeiten wir in Projekten die gefördert 
werden, wie FFG Projekte. Mit solchen Partnern sind auch schon welche erfolgreich 
abgeschlossen worden. International geförderte Projekte sind für uns natürlich wichtig. 
Dort sind oft zwei industrielle und ein akademischer Partner involviert. Ziel bei solchen 
Projekten ist entweder eine Technologie weiter zu perfektionieren oder eben ein 
gemeinsames Produkt auf den Markt zu bringen. Beides ist möglich.  
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Wiedorn: Wie sieht der Marktzugang bei diesen Märkten aus? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Dieser ist beispielsweise bei In-Vitro-Diagnostik nicht ganz einfach. 
Dieser ist zum einen stark reguliert, es gibt keine Markteintrittsblockaden, aber man 
braucht gewisse Zertifizierungen um ein Produkt für die Diagnostik einführen zu 
können. Vergleichbar mit dem Vorgang bei pharmazeutischen Produkten. In vielen 
Bereichen bei In-Vitro-Diagnostik muss man auch als Gesamtanbieter am Markt sein. 
Das heisst wenn man z.B. dem AKH etwas verkaufen möchte für die Labordiagnostik, 
dann ist es am besten wenn ich von der Adminsitration  Hardware bis zur Software alles 
anbieten kann. Sprich für eine kleine Firma ist dies schwierig. Da wäre natürlich ein 
Partner hilfreich, um diese Kommerzialisierung zu beschleunigen. Ich habe 19 Jahre 
Erfahrung in internationalen Unternehmen, beides in Life-Science und In-Vitro-
Diagnostik und da weiß ich dass es für eine kleine Firma ein sehr schwieriger und 
langer Weg ist. Darum ist man natürlich bestrebt einen Partner zu finden. Da gibt es 
verschiedenste Möglichkeiten, wie die gemeinsame Kommerzialisierung. 
Kooperationen haben wir auch, dass der Partner uns bezahlt um zu entwickeln. 
Entwicklungsprojekte eben.  
Wiedorn: Wie sieht es mit der Konkurrenzsituation in Österreich und Weltweit aus? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Im genau selben Bereich in dem wir aktiv sind, gibt es sowieso 
niemanden weiteren. Konkurrenz gibt es aber immer für die Anwendung. Das heisst als 
Beispiel, Drogentests, da gibt es natürlich viele am Markt. Da gibt es verschiedene 
Firmen die solche Tests anbieten. Aber so wie wir es anbieten, mit dieser Technologie, 
gibt es niemanden. Wir haben ein Differenzierungsmerkmal zu anderen. Unsere 
Zielgruppen, wenn wir jetzt bei Drogentests bleiben, sind Einrichtungen zur 
Suchttherapie, Drogenambulanzen und sonstiges. Und nicht im speziellen 
Drogenschnelltests, das machen wir eben nicht, sondern mit unserer Technologie 
können wir sehr viele Parameter auf einmal testen, die sogenannte 
Multiplextechnologie. Das ist eben das neue und innovative an unserem Produkt. Da 
gibt es praktisch niemanden, der dassgleiche macht. Es gibt eine Firma, die eine 
ähnliche Technologie hat, aber gleich eben nicht.  
Nemes: Wie definieren Sie den Markt? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Der Markt für uns ist natürlich ein globaler Markt. Aber derzeit sind 
wir eben hauptsächlich in Österreich und Deutschland. Und wir beginnen gerade in der 
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Schweiz und Benelux. Wovon wir aber überzeugt sind, dass wir nicht für jedes Land die 
komplette Kommerzialisierung selbst übernehmen können. Das ist finanziell gesehen 
außer Reichweite. Daher ist unser Ziel ein gemischtes Modell, mit Distributionspartnern 
und Eigenvertrieb agieren. Oder auch mit unabhängigen, freischaffenden Partnern, freie 
Handelsvertreter. Diese gibt es im Life-Science Bereich, sie verfügen eben über 
verschiedene Produkte diverser Hersteller. Stellen somit ein Portfolio zusammen, sind 
aber selbstständig, arbeiten auf Provisionsbasis. Das wär eben auch eine Möglichkeit. 
Wiedorn: Wie wird derzeit die Internationalisierung der Länder Österreich, 
Deutschland und Schweiz gehandhabt? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Derzeit machen wir noch alles selbst, daher direkter Export. Für die 
ein oder andere Kooperation die wir haben, siehts anders aus, eben durch 
Partnervertrieb. Aber allgemein gesehen machen wir derzeit noch alles selbst.  
Wiedorn: Wieviel des derzeitigen Umsatzes wird im Ausland generiert? 
Mag. Jaquemar: unsere Umsätze sind derzeit noch sehr gering. Wir haben bis heute 
vielleicht Umsätze von in etwa 200.000 Euro gemacht. Das ist keine Größe, aber das 
Potential liegt natürlich nicht in Österreich. Die Firma exisiert nicht deshalb weil man 
glaubt in Österreich viel Umsatz zu erwirtschaften. Beide Märkte sind global. Der Life-
Science Markt sogar noch mehr, weil die Produkte weltweit angeboten werden können 
so wie sie sind. Im Gegensatz dazu ist der In-Vitro-Diagnostik eher regional 
unterschiedlich z.B. werden Tests in manchen Ländern von der Krankenkasse bezahlt, 
in anderen wiederum nicht. Daher muss man in diesem Bereich überprüfen für welche 
Länder das Produkt geeignet ist. Am Life Science Markt ist das Produkt fertig, da muss 
nur mehr die Gebrauchsanleitung übersetzt werden, aber im In-Vitro Bereich kommt es 
bei jedem neuen Markteintritt zu zusätzlichen Kosten.  
Wiedorn: Wie sieht es mit der Anpassung/Customization der Produkte aus, wenn man 
diese im Ausland einführt? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Bei Life Science muss nichts angepasst werden, bei In-Vitro-
Diagnostik schon. Generelle Dinge wie Zertifizierungen sind notwendig, dass man 
überhaupt ein Produkt verkaufen kann. 
Wiedorn: Wie ist es zu dem ersten Auslandsauftrag gekommen? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Dies war eine direkte Ansprache.  
Wiedorn: Wie sieht es mit Messen aus. Sind sie dort auch vertreten? 
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Mag. Jacquemar: Ja bei Messen sind wir auch vertreten, zum Beispiel die größte in 
Europa für den Diagnostics Markt ist die Medica. Dort sind relativ viele österreichische 
Firmen vertreten. Messen sind ein sehr wichtiger Aspekt für uns. Wir sind Teil der 
sogenannten LISA (), das ist eine sehr gute und nützliche Einrichtung für uns. Weil wir 
über diese Dachmarke, die zusammengesetzt ist aus verschiedenen Clustern in dieser 
Branche, eben der Gesundheitscluster OÖ, Humantechnology Styria oder die LISA 
Vienna Region. Und eben die LISA organisiert Gemeinschaftsstände bei Messen, 
übernehmen die Organisation, uns so kommt man als kleines Unternehmen ohne großen 
Aufwand und relativ günstig zu einem Messestand bei bedeutenden Messen wie der 
Medica. Das ist für Unternehmen wie uns extrem wichtig. Klar, wenn man eine gewisse 
Größe hat, macht man es selbst, aber bis dahin ist die LISA eine sehr sehr große Hilfe 
für uns. Allein schon der administrative Aufwand für eine solche Messeteilnahme ist 
nicht zu unterschätzen. 
Nemes: Anagnostics produzieret die Geräte und Software selbst? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Wie produzieren den Hyborg, das ist das Gerät. Aber unsere 
Technologie steckt in der Hybcell, da ist unser Know-How drinnen, darauf haben wir 
ein Patent und dass ist unsere IP. Die Einzelteile werden für uns hergestellt, z.B. die 
Formen mit Spritztechnik erstellt. Das Gerät, der Hyborg, wird für uns von der Firma 
Microtronics hergestellt, dass eigentlich auch ein Start-up ist. Die bauen für uns, aber es 
ist eine Gemeinschaftsenwicklung, wir zahlen dafür dass diese niederösterr. Firma es 
uns erstellt. Zusammen mit dem Hyborg, der Hybcell und unserer selbsterstellten 
Software ergibt es dann eine Solution – unser Produkt. Entscheidend ist was wir 
machen, die Chemie dahinter, damit die einzelnen Komponenten zu einer Solution 
werden. Das ist unser Know-How.  
Nemes: Wie weit ist dieses Patent gültig? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Dieses Patent ist weltweit gültig. Patente sind ein wichtiger Punkt in 
der Kommerzialisierung. Wenn man eine Technologie hat, so wie wir, sollte man recht 
rasch patentieren. Also IP schützen. Wobei es heute eigentlich so ist, dass man sich 
dadurch heute nicht mehr wirklich schützt. Die Technologien sind so schnelllebig 
geworden, dadurch sind Patente ohne hin nicht lange von Wertigkeit. Aber was ganz 
wichtig ist für kleine Unternehmen wie uns, Patente sind Teils des Wertes einer Firma. 
Zum Beispiel wenn man Venture Capital lukrieren möchte, dann wird der strategische 
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Investor immer sehen was man an Patente hat bzw. wie es mit der IP aussieht. Daher 
muss man ein Patent angemeldet haben und es auch einen gewissen Wert entsprechen. 
Dafür braucht man natürlich Patentanwelte, weil es sauber gemacht gehört, damit es 
funktioniert. Hierbei schützt man natürlich nicht jedes Land, daher meine ich mit 
weltweit, die EU und Schweiz, USA und der dritte Markt für den Fernen Osten ist 
Singapur. Für alle anderen Ländern braucht man das eh nicht schützen lassen, die 
kopieren das ohnehin, denen ist das egal ob Patent oder nicht. Singapur ist da eben 
anders, sehr viele große und internationale Unternehmen sind auf diesem Markt. 
Wiedorn: Ist die Offenlegung der Innovation bei der Patentanmeldung ein Problem? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Naja man macht dies eben zu einem gewissen Grad. Man macht es 
auch dann wenn man mit der Technologie schon sehr weit ist, wenn einen kein anderer 
mehr einholen kann. Das Problem ist natürlich auch das Patente oft sehr allgemein 
gehalten sind, so allgemein wie möglich, aber trotzdem so dass das Patentamt sagt es sei 
spezifisch genug. Aber wenn Sie sich Veröffentlichungen im wissenschaftlichen 
Bereich ansehen, würde ich behaupten das mindestens neunzig Prozent der 
angemeldeten Patente nicht 1:1 nachgekocht werden können. Selbst wenn es im Detail 
publiziert wurde. Das spezifische Know-How steht eben darin nicht. Darum ist die 
Offenlegung nicht problematisch. Für kleine Firmen wie für uns ist eine 
Patentanmeldung sicherlich wichtig, große Firmen mittlerweile Patentieren gar nicht 
mehr. Zuviel Aufwand und wenns es dann zu Streitigkeiten kommt, zieht sich das über 
Jahre und wenn man Glück hat bekommt man dann die Anwaltskosten herein. Das weiß 
ich aus eigener Erfahrung. Große „Sachen“ werden natürlich noch patentiert, aber nicht 
jede Kleinigkeit. Auch von den Kosten her darf man es nicht unterschätzen, pro Land 
oder Entity kann es schon bis 4000 Euro kosten. Dann kostet es noch etwas pro Jahr und 
die Anwälte auch noch. Patentkosten von ein paar Millionen sind für große Firmen ja 
keine Seltenheit.  
Wiedorn: Bezüglich Patente, ist oder war es schon Thema Lizenzierung anzustreben? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Bis jetzt noch nicht, aber es ist durchaus möblich. Es ist auch möglich 
dass wir Einlizenzieren können. Wir sind auch in Gespräch mit Firmen wo wir eben 
Einlizenzieren. Selbstverständlich ist das ein Thema.  
Wiedorn: Ist es durch Ihre Patente bis dato zu Problemen gekommen? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Gar nicht.  
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Wiedorn: Was sind für Anagnostics die Gründe für einen ausländischen Markteintritt? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Das resultiert bei uns einfach aus der heimischen Marktgröße. 
Österreich ist viel zu klein. Und der Markt an sich ist generell ein globaler. Das wären 
die Hauptgründe. 
Wiedorn: Ist Auslandsfertigung ein Thema? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja selbstverständlich. Zum Teil lassen wir ja schon jetzt z.B. die 
Plastikteile fertigen, daher Outsourcing ist für uns ein Thema. Wir müssen ja auch 
schauen dass wir die Produktionskosten niedrig halten. Derzeit ist es ja noch eine Art 
Manufaktur, jedes Gerät wird von Hand gefertigt. Einzeln gebaut nach Auftrag. Wenn 
man auf beiden Märkten nun standardmäßig produzieren lässt, wären die Kosten nur 
mehr ein Viertel so hoch. Daher natürlich interessant. Wir könnten um ein Viertel 
produzieren. Das ist aber derzeit nicht das wichtigste für uns. Jetzt geht es viel mehr um 
den Ausbau unserer Märkte um eben eine Stückzahl zu erreichen bei der sich dieses 
Outsourcing wirklich auszahlt.  
Nemes: Das Managementteam von Anagnostics hat also derzeit Erfahrung im D-A-CH 
Raum? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Nicht notwendigerweise. Christoph Reschreiter war bei einer 
Automationsfirma vor Anagnostics, und da ein Jahr in Korea und hat dort 
Verkaufsorganisationen aufgebaut. Und bei mir ist es weltweit, ich war davor in 
Positionen in denen ich global agiert habe. 
Wiedorn: Derzeit exportiert Anagnostics ja alles noch selbst und direkt. Warum haben 
Sie sich genau für diese Eintrittsmethode entschiden? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Das resultiert aus unserer Größe. Die Märkte sind auch noch alle sehr 
nah an Österreich. Das ist einfach so, natürlich wenn man wächst macht man das 
klarerweise nicht mehr selbst. Allein der logistische Aufwand wie Lagerhaltung etc. 
Aber mit unserer Größe ist das derzeit noch kein Problem. Das ist alles unter einem 
Dach derzeit. 
Wiedorn: Und wie stellen Sie sich die Internationalisierung von Anagnostics in der 
Zukunft vor? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja beispielsweise kann ich mir Auslandsniederlassungen vorstellen. 
Es gibt im wesentlichen natürlich für jeden Bereich, also für Life Science und In-Vitro-
Diagnostics, gewisse Zielmärkte. Und so sieht es auch mit dem Marktzugang aus. Für 
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Diagnostics ist der Marktzugang in die USA sehr schwierig. Da macht es wirklich erst 
ab einer giewissen Größe Sinn einzutreten, oder mit einem starken Partner. Die FDA 
kontrolliert dort alles, und dies ist eine gewisse Hürde. So gesehen werden wir mit Life 
Science beginnen, über einen Partner, weil auch der Vorort-Service und die Wartung 
ein wichtiger Punkt sind. Das können wir nicht von St. Valentin aus bewerkstelligen. 
Dafür benötigt man eben Partner. Ab einer gewissen Größe wäre es natürlich auch 
sinnvoll in den USA selbst vertreten zu sein. Aber das kann auch nur in Form eines 
Representitative Office sein. Die finanziellen Aufwendungen sind natürlich relevant. Im 
Life Science Bereich würde man in der USA erst an die Ost- und an die Westküste 
gehen, dort ist unser Life Science Markt. Dort sind auch andere große Firmen wie 
Therme etc. Was Europa betrifft, wir haben uns gesagt, den deutschsprachigen Raum 
machen wir selbst, und alles andere machen wir über Distributoren. Der nächste 
geplante Schritt ist Skandinavien, Benelux und UK. Alles ist natürlich abhängig davon 
ob es Life Science oder In-Vitro-Diagnostics ist. Bei Diagnostics benötigt man eben 
einen guten Vertriebspartner, weil die Märkte an sich sonst sehr schwer zugänglich 
sind.  
Wiedorn: Nehmen wir das Beispiel USA, würden Sie eher zu Joint Ventures oder doch 
zu Strategischen Allianzen für eine solche Kooperation tendieren? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ein Joint Venture würde ich mit den USA nicht machen. Unbedingt 
etwas dass wiederum schnell aufgelöst werden kann. Natürlich muss man sich aber die 
Zukunft von Unternehmen wie uns vor Augen halten. Wie sieht die Zukunft aus? Wir 
glauben nicht dass wir mit Anagnostics in zwanzig Jahren tausend Mitarbeiter haben. 
Uns wird es so oder so nicht mehr als Anagnostics geben. Voraussgesetzt es 
funktioniert alles, dann wird es so sein dass wir einen strategischen Investor irgendwann 
einmal haben, oder uns jemand kauft. Und so wird es sein. Das ist unser Ziel.  
Wiedorn: Bei Kooperationen sind die Größenunterschiede problematisch? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Seit über einem Jahr haben wir zwei Venture Capital Investoren. 
Nichts geheimes, entweder Privatinvestor oder eben institutionalisiert vom Land 
Niederösterreich. Die haben investiert, und im Jahr 2011 haben wir eine nächste 
Finanzierungsrunde. Und das benötigen wir gerade eben für die Kommerzialisierung 
und Produktionsausweitung. Und dieses dafür notwendige Kapital bekommt man nicht 
mehr allein in Österreich. Da muss man schon internationaler agieren. Investoren aus 
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Deutschland, Schweiz, vielleicht auch aus UK. Da muss man sehen, aber es wird 
notwendig sein. Eine zweite Möglichkeit wären Firmen die in diesem Bereich schon 
aktiv sind. Im Diagnostics Bereich wären das Firmen wie Siemens  oder kleinere 
Firmen. Die Gefahr bei strategischen Investoren ist das diese nur ein Produkt 
interessiert und wir eben eine One-Product Firma werden. Da muss man sich eben 
entscheiden ob strategische oder finanzielle Investoren. Bei letzteren entscheidet man 
als Firma noch eigenständiger. Es steht natürlich beides zur Diskussion, wir wissen 
noch nie wie es nächstes Jahr läuft.  
Wiedorn: Wie sieht es derzeit mit den Kapazitäten und der Auslastung aus?  
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja wir sind an den Grenzen angelangt. Das heißt wir haben so viele 
Projekte an Land gezogen, sei es Kooperationen, Forschungsprojekte oder 
Kundenprojekte, sodass wir derzeit nicht mehr mehr machen können. Was für uns jetzt 
wichtig ist, dass wir bis Ende des Jahres eine gewisse Anzahl an Produkten im Markt 
haben, dass wir unseren Cash-Flow erhöhen und somit neues Personal einstellen 
können. Also Ziel ist es Kapazitäten in Österreich auszubauen. Einen Mitarbeiter im 
Bereich Verkauf planen wir in Deutschland einzustellen.  
Wiedorn: Was ist derzeit der höchste Kostenfaktor bei Anagnostics? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Personal. Und das zweite ist das Gerät, weil wir die Entwicklung und 
Produktion finanzieren. Und das liegt derzeit pro Stück bei rund 70.000 Euro, und das 
ist eben nicht Nichts. Wichtig ist derzeit für uns eine Balance zu finden zwischen den 
Kapital das in Geräten gebunden ist und den Personalkosten, dass sind unsere 
Hauptkosten. 
Nemes: Werden die Produkte nach Kundenwünschen gefertigt, oder auf Lager? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Naja wir haben auch für uns selbst einen Bedarf an Geräten, eben für 
die Forschung. Aber wir haben eine gewisse Projektion, und da fertigen wir schon drei 
Stück auf einmal. Aber klarerweise wenn ich drei Stück auf Lager habe, und die werde 
ich nicht los, hab ich 200.000 Euro gebunden. Da ist sehr dynamische Planung 
notwendig, das ist bei uns sehr wichtig. Ein Fünf-Jahresplan ist schon nach kurzer Zeit 
alt.  
Wiedorn: Welche würde die nächste Internationalisierungsmethode sein, die 
Anagnostics in Zukunft anstrebt? 
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Mag. Jaquemar: Wie gesagt, der nächste Schritt läge außerhalb von D-A-CH. Auch 
möglichist es mittels Export. Eine Niederlassung ist derzeit nicht denkbar, aus 
finanzieller und organisatorischer Sicht. Einen Markt den ich noch vergessen habe zu 
erwähnen, der interessant ist für Diagnostics ist der Mittlere Osten. Das ist ein 
interessanter Markt mit ganz eigenen Charakteristika, dort sind viele österreichische 
Firmen vertreten. Das wäre ein eigenes Kapitel. Das ist aber ein Markt in dem man 
direkt nichts erzielen kann, dort geht es nur über Partner. Benelux sind wir gerade dabei 
wer Vertriebspartner wird. Die Geräte müssen klarweise gewartet werden, und das geht 
natürlich nur Vorort. Und wir haben das Service outgesourct. Denn wenn ein Gerät ein 
Service benötigt und dies in Frankfurt steht, dann sind das 800 km von St. Valentin, und 
das macht keinen Sinn. Das heißt wir haben uns einen Servicepartner gesucht, der 
generell diese Art von Geräten wartet. Das heißt bei Wartungen in beispielsweise der 
Schweiz kommen Techniker von diesem Servicepartner zum Einsatz.  
Nemes: Wie hoch ist der Schulungsaufwand für die Geräte? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Das ist eine Schulung im Ausmaß von drei Tagen. Zum Glück ist das 
Gerät an sich nicht kompliziert zu bedienen. Wenn das Gerät funktioniert ist eigentlich 
alles straight forward. Als Beispiel wenn wir beim Kunden sind würde ich behaupten 
dass dieser nach einer Stunde das Gerät komplett selbst bedienen kann. Das ist nicht bei 
allen Produkten in dem Markt so. Das ist für uns aber ganz wichtig, darum nennen wir 
sie auch smart. Im Background eine relative komplexe Technologie, aber relevant ist 
dass es für den Kunden ganz einfach zu bedienen ist. Das normales Laborpersonal 
damit umgehen kann, also nicht nur hochspezialisierte Laborkräfte. Und dies ist 
gewährleistet. Die letzte Installation beim Kunden hat in etwa eine halbe Stunde 
gedauert.  
Nemes: Produktpiraterie, ist dies ein Thema? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja sicherlich, einer der Gründe warum wir im Bereich Schnelltests 
nichts anbieten. 90% der Schnelltests kommen aus China, da ist das Thema nur billiger. 
Denn Schnelltests sagen nur Ja oder Nein, und das ist billig herzustellen. Darüber gehen 
unsere Methoden aber hinaus. Da braucht man Know-How. Ganz ausschließen würde 
ich Produktpiraterie auch nicht, aber es ist in genau unserem Markt eher unbüblich. Bei 
lange am Markt befindlichen Produkten kommt es schon vor, eben bei Schelltests, die 
werden schon mal nachgebaut.  
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Wiedorn: Ja oft wird angenommen dass bei aufwändigeren Produkten das Know-How 
am Standort verankert ist und dadurch man nicht einfach kopieren kann. Trifft das zu? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja genau so ist es. Selbst wenn sie jedes Einzelteil herstellen können, 
könnten Sie damit relativ wenig anfangen. Da ist viel Know-How dabei, das nicht in 
einer Beschreibung steht.  
Wiedorn: Rückblickend betrachtet würden Sie bezüglich Internationalisierung anders 
vorgehen? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Rückblickend betrachtet, würde ich einen anderen Niederlassungsort 
für die Firma wählen. Da die Gründer am Standort Linz waren, wurde die Firma auch 
dort gegründet. Und Life-Science und Diagnostics am Standort Linz ist nicht ideal. Dort 
die entsprechenden Leute zu finden ist schwierig. Linz ist eher technisch orientiert, 
Chemie, Sofware, IT von mir aus, aber Life Science gar nicht. Es gäbe drei Standorte 
die in Frage kommen, das wäre Innsbruck, Graz und Wien. Dort tut sich in diesem 
Bereich auch etwas. Es gibt einige Clusters dort. Aber es ist schon schwierig für unser 
eigenes Labor Leute zu bekommen. Weil eben unser Investor das Land Niederösterreich 
sind, haben wir uns unter anderem für den Standort St. Valentin entschieden. Die 
Investoren wollen klarerweise dass wir unsere Wertschöpfung im Land Niederösterreich 
machen. Darum St. Valentin. Dort tut sich halt leider recht wenig, aber für die 
Kommerzialisierung ist das egal. Für die Entwicklung ist es von Bedeutung. Außerhalb 
von Österreich tut sich viel rund um München, Basel und Zürich, Freiburg auch. Auf 
alle Fälle braucht man die richtigen Leute. Startförderungsmöglichkeiten gibt es in 
Oberösterreich gute, nach dieser Phase tut sich aber rund um Wien mehr. Aber gut, dass 
ist eher eine subjektive Beobachtungen.  
Wiedorn: Und rückblickend betrachtet, hätten andere Märkte angezielt werden sollen? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Die Überlegung hat schon etwas an sich, dafür müsste man schon in 
sehr frühen Stadium wissen in welchen Bereich, ob Life Science oder In-Vitro, man 
arbeiten möchte. Und das wussten wir damals noch nicht.  
Nemes: Also kann man sagen die Internationalisierung war ein inkrementaler Prozess? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja absolut. Und den muss man einfach organisch machen. Wie gesagt 
im Life Science Bereich kann man in Österreich nicht überleben. Man kann in 
Österreich überleben als Vertriebsorganisation, in der man viele Produkte bündelt und 
diese dann vertreibt. Aber mit so einen Produkt wie unseres nur in Österreich zu 
 158 
vertreiben, das geht einfach nicht. Außer man könnte das Gerät billig in der Garage 
erzeugen, das ist aber auch nicht Ziel des Unternehmens. Somit ist man auch 
gezwungen das Produkt überregional einzuführen. Aber man kann durchaus Märkte 
auslassen, man kann sich beispielsweise entscheiden nicht in die USA zu gehen. Wir 
haben den Markteintritt in die USA auch noch nicht zeitlich definiert. Das ist etwas das 
stimmen muss, da fühlen wir vor, sehen uns um Partner um etc.  
Nemes: Das Ziel des Unternehmens ist es also dass man irgendwann attraktiv genug ist 
um aufgekauft zu werden? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Ja so ist es. 
Nemes: Und dies schafft man in dem man Profitabilität vorweist? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Man benötigt in diesem Stadium eine erfolgreiche Markteinführung. 
Profitabilität ist eher egal, sicherlich macht es Sinn wenn es Umsätze gibt oder das die 
Produktionskosten sehr viel höher sind als der mögliche Verkaufspreis. Das Produkt 
muss natürlich marketable sein, das spielt schon eine Rolle. Profitabilität ist nicht 
relevant, wir werden sicherlich in den nächsten zwei Jahren auch noch nicht profitabel 
arbeiten können. Ziel ist es einen Marktzugang zu haben, eine Technologie, und 
natürlich auch Leute die von der Technologie überzeugt sind. Das Gerät könnte ich 
sicherlich auch in Singapur produzieren, mit dem entsprechenden Know-How. Aber 
ohne Know-How geht es eben nicht. Das Potential des Produkts ist entscheidend um 
Attraktivität zu schaffen, ist es flexibel, ist es ausbaubar. Nicht nur das man einen 
bestehenden Markt hat, sondern eine Basistechnologie auf der man aufbauen kann. 
Dafür gibt es auch einen Business Plan, für die nächsten drei Jahre, den auch unsere 
Investoren natürlich kennen. Wichtig ist auch dass wir Know-How aus den 
verschiedensten Bereichen bündeln.  
Wiedorn: War von Beginn an ein Netzwerk vorhanden? 
Mag. Jaquemar: Auf ein Netzwerk lege ich persönlich viel Wert. Das ist durchaus in 
dem Bereich wo man sicherlich im Nachhinein früher anfangen hätte können. Aber man 
kann natürlich nicht alles machen, da ist man eben natürlich als Start-up in den 
Ressourcen auch sehr eingeschränkt. Es gibt Firmen im Life Science Sektor, die erst seit 
vier fünf Jahren am Markt sind, die aber das Netzwerk gut genutzt haben. Die haben das 
Produkt und die Technologie zuerst wissenschaftlich bekannt gemacht, und über Nacht 
sozusagen wollten alle in diesem Netzwerk dieses Produkt haben. Sehr smarte Strategie. 
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Dafür braucht man natürlich einen langen Atem, da viele Investoren eben Umsätze 
sehen wollen. 
Wiedorn und Nemes: Vielen Dank für dieses hilfreiche und ausführliche Gespräch. 
 
Duration of Interview: 1 h 15 minutes 
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Interview Transcript of Case Study Thor Medical Systems 
Kft. (Hungary) 
Wiedorn: Could you tell us how the company Thor Medical Systems was founded?  
Ferenczi: In the former communist block the different industries were divided into 
sections that were geographically restricted. In the Eastern European and Soviet block 
all these industries were shared and specifically indentified who manufactured what. 
Medical technologies were mainly manufactured in Hungary for a market of more than 
a billion people. Even though communism was quite restricted in politics and freedom 
of speech, technology and science was free to do as they pleased. As a result of this 
freedom in technology and science a huge company evolved called Medicore 
Corporation. This cooperation was the 4th largest medical cooperation in the world after 
General Electrics, Siemens, Philips. At that time it employed 10, 000 people. During the 
collapse of communism the company was gradually destroyed and absolutely collapsed 
in the end. A huge and incredible amount of intellectual property was simply lost. Some 
of the assets were taken by entrepreneurs especially the real estate of the company. In 
some cases under very suspicious manners it was transferred to private companies and 
then sold at the fraction of the actual price so it was complete and total destruction.  
Some of the technologies stayed and remained.  One of the biggest remaining from 
Medicore was Innomed, which still exists. But Medicore Corp was manufacturing all 
kinds of medical products ranging from the smallest devices to the largest ones. From 
blood pressure monitors to computer tomography from X-ray systems to incubators.  
 
One very interesting small field in the Medicore Corparation was the respiratory 
diagnostics field. It was partly continued by a private company called Piston Lmtd. This 
company still exists and at that time continued the technologies of Medicore 
Corporation. They didn’t develop anything new at that time and their products 
especially in the terms of spirometry were no longer competitive on an international 
level. 
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 A couple of my engineer colleagues and I were doing our PhDs and studying abroad in 
the US, in Finland, in Germany and other parts of the world. We met at meetings about 
medical technologies and markets. We understood that this medical technology had a 
history in Hungary and we understood that it could be modernized and if we could make 
it competitive we could create products that would be successful on international 
markets.  
 
We returned to Hungary and decided to work in this field. We understood that there was 
a technology history in Hungary. This country is capable of having companies in this 
niche market. It is especially suitable for the Hungarian knowledge base and what is 
available locally. We understood that if we create this niche markets then we do not 
disturb the interests of huge companies like Phillips, GE or Siemens, because this is 
such a small industry that big companies are not interested in it. This is typically in the 
range of a couple of million-dollar market. It is perfectly suitable for this small country. 
 
Secondly, we met an old person Gyula Satori who had been working for Medicore 
Corp. since 1963. He was the first to create open type spirometers in Central Eastern 
Europe in former East Germany. He became our teacher and we learned everything 
from him and how it had been done in Medicore for 40 years. We modernized his 
knowledge and created products based on our international experience with high 
technology like microprocessors and micro controllers, prototype plastic solutions and 
sensor technologies, etc., also based on the old knowledge that was available in 
Medicore Corp. Gradually we created new sensors and based on the sensor technology 
we created products and found international customers. We took the business on a 
global, international level immediately.  
From New Zealand, Norway, Brazil and to Hong Kong we have distributor partners. 
Furthermore we have major OEM partners in the Netherlands and UK.  
Nemes: Have you received any external funding for establishing Thormed? 
 
Ferenczi: For four years we were working on our own. We applied for European grants 
and received a Start-Up grant of 100,000 €. That was a very important step. Without 
that money it would have been almost impossible to start anything. So these European 
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grants for start-up companies are very useful. Sadly these European grants have been 
reduced in the last few years.    
 
Especially in Hungary it is very difficult to receive any start up grants. In most of the 
cases Hungarian start-ups went bankrupt or have not been continued at all. We are one 
of the few success stories. Most of the money was lost. The money which was used for 
us was used for creating products and helped us to become successful on a international 
level. This was the first step, in the second step we found a local investor who had 17 
companies in the Hungarian region. We were very lucky with the investment group 
because they were very modern thinking. The investor, who graduated at the George 
Washington University, is manager and the main owner of the group. We also 
cooperated with a couple of his companies. We learned a lot from some of these 
companies. Some of these companies were successful and some of them were not. We 
observed that we could learn more from the failures of others than from their success. 
 
Eventually we arrived at the stage we are right now where we have reached a higher 
level. Probably the local investor will sell a stake of the company, so we will belong to 
an even bigger organization and will create a entity in Hong Kong and then we could 
proceed with manufacturing in China. This is happening right now.  
Nemes: Where are you producing right now? 
Ferenczi: We are manufacturing in Hungary right now. Our quantities are increasing so 
our plan is that if we have major orders and we have larger quantities we will start 
producing in China. The special knowledge and products are still made in Hungary. We 
keep all the intellectual property in Hungary, because in China it is difficult to keep  
intellectual knowledge. So whatever is safe to manufacture in China will be 
manufactured there.  
Nemes: Do you use patents for protecting your intellectual knowledge? 
Ferenczi: Yes we have patents, but in China they do not respect these patents.  
Wiedorn: Is licensing interesting for Thormed?  
Ferenczi: Yes, we have core sensor technology for the respiratory signals were we have 
two partners. We have two major customers one in Eindhoven and another one in the 
UK. Also we are discussing with partners to supply the market with OEM products. 
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We also have a very good partner in Germany, actually it looks as if the most friendly 
cooperation place for Hungarian high-tech companies is in Germany. Any high tech 
company in Hungary usually finds the best partners in Germany. This is also true for the 
Dutch. I do not know if it has cultural reasons but typically we have the best 
cooperation with Germans. We have also got  OEM partners in Florida Miami and we 
are also supplying to Latin America.  
Nemes: What do you think is so innovative about your products?  
Ferenczi: We didn’t invent anything that is revolutionary. We created a solution that 
solved problems. The respiratory diagnostics products are typically used with 
disposables and with calibration systems and older systems are big and difficult to use. 
We created solutions, which do not require calibration systems as they calibrate 
themselves and which do not need disposables.  Especially in less developed countries 
they do not need to buy the disposables for each measurement they just buy the device 
once. We supply them with disinfection solutions and we created the first and only 
waterproof  spirometer which can be disinfected, which is used for testing lung function 
and asthma.  
For home care we have created a small medical device with artificial intelligence which 
has got automated interpretation and it actually speaks and informs the patient about 
their respiratory disease. 
Wiedorn: Do you have any direct competitors? Domestically or internationally? 
Ferenczi: Yes, for our newest sensor technology our biggest competitor is in the 
ultrasonic diagnostics there is  NDD Medizintechnik in Switzerland.. With older 
technologies for respiratory diagnostics there are about 15 companies  that are related to 
this field. and the players know each other.  
Nemes: Would you describe yourself as the price leader on the market?  
Ferenczi:  I think if we really wanted to we could be the real price leaders. We are one 
of the cheapest. There is an Italian company with a different kind of technology, which 
is also quite cheap. In terms of price and non functionality but for similar diagnostic 
purposes we are competing with the Italians. But we are really afraid of the Chinese 
evolving, because we already know that a Chinese company in Shanghai is already 
copying the German solution and a company in Beijing is copying the Italian device. So 
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we are very afraid and therefore created encryption technologies and securing 
technologies to make it secure from copying.  
Nemes: Do you think that the disclosure of patents is a problem in this sense?  
Ferenczi: We understand that this patent world is not exactly about protecting your 
inventions. This has its own rules and very strange rules. So you do not write down all 
your inventions and ideas in a patent but you write down those topics and features, 
which can be protected with a legal text. So we do not write everything down in our 
patents.  
Wiedorn: Do you also join international trade fairs? 
Ferenczi: Of course, yes. It is part of  marketing. We receive a lot of help from the 
Hungarian state. Mostly from European funding it provides help for small and medium 
sized companies to go to international trade shows, and also advertising in papers etc. 
We applied for this and won a lot of support from them and also at major shows they 
organize common joint national stands. For example this year we are already at the end 
of our budget for marketing. We are very grateful that there is a joint stand in 
Düsseldorf at the Medica. We are participating and exhibiting at the Hungarian stand, 
which is far cheaper than having our own stand.  
Nemes: Did you have a clear strategy before you tried to internationalize. Or did you 
receive an unsolicited order?  
Ferenczi: I remember the first Medica exhibition. When we started this company we 
did not have much money I traveled to Düsseldorf myself for the first time and I took 
the prototypes with me. I  put down the prototype on empty places without having a  
reservation or anything like that until they sent me away. In the end it was quite 
successful as we found a lot of international customers.  
Nemes: According to your statements would you say that the market is a global one?  
Ferenczi: Of course in Hungary we are market leader for the new device. For the old 
technology Medicore is still the market leader. But we sell most of the new devices in 
Hungary. Our biggest Hungarian distributor has a big market share in Slovakia and in 
Rumania, especially in the Western part of Rumania. In Austria we have a very good 
distributor; the Menzl family which is in Vienna, Schwarzenbergisches Krankenhaus in 
Innsbruck, in Graz and in Salzburg. In Austria we are quite good and sales are 
increasing. In Austria the Italian manufacturer was the market leader in Western Austria 
 165 
especially in Innsbruck the Swiss company is preceding. But it looks as if our price and 
quality is good and our market share is rising.  
Nemes: What professional experience did you have before you started this cooperation?  
Ferenczi: Mr. Zoltan is a software engineer and algorithmic expert and he was working 
for GE Medica a consultant company. I was working in Finland for a company called 
Innovative Ideas working with innovative IT solutions. I was also working for British 
and Italian companies. I was also organizing manufacturing outsourcing projects to 
Hong Kong that is why I also have connections in Hong Kong. But I was also working 
for a bigger Hungarian medical engineering company that is quite successful on the 
international market.  
Wiedorn: Is it difficult to distribute the product? Do you need to customize products to 
different countries? 
Ferenczi: First of all for sales reputation is important. The country’s reputation is 
sometimes hindering us in sales. For example in Germany people are really interested in 
buying local products, because German products are more reliable that everything else 
from other countries. This makes it very difficult to sell Hungarian products in 
Germany. But in many parts of the world we have a high reputation as being Europeans. 
For example we have very good sales in India because we have European products and 
also in Vietnam.  
Most of the sales are straightforward so the products are standard with a broad range 
from home care to hospital care also including primary care. Depending on the local 
market and the level of the markets’ healthcare system. For example in China there is 
only hospital care and no primary care system. On the other hand in the US the primary 
health care system is the strongest. So a different approach is required.  
Nemes: Are there difficulties with law and regulations? 
Ferenczi: This is the most difficult question. The European certificate is obviously 
necessary because we are in a European country and we have a local certifying body. 
Actually we certify our products with SGS, a Swiss based certification agency. Also for 
reputation issues because jt could be also certified in a Hungarian certification agency 
but that agency does not have much of a reputation for example in Germany. The Swiss 
one has the required reputation. The Swiss agency has a medical certification center in 
the UK and that certification is accepted in India and Hong Kong and also in Argentina.  
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In the US the FDA approval is very difficult to obtain as we are still processing it and 
also for the new product we have to do it again and again. There is one person who  
works twelve hours a day for the regulatory issues, as it is very difficult. Also in Brazil 
we have started to process the local certification. We have realized that they do not take 
it too seriously in the Ukraine. It is very strict in Russia, the Russian certificate is 
difficult to obtain. Also in SFD approval for China is complicated because you need to 
provide certifying information to the local authorities. 
 
We had a very interesting experience with Taiwan. We had a partner in Taiwan and we 
were doing the certification process with this Taiwanese partner. They ordered a sample 
product from us. This particular sample product we protected with every possible 
securing mechanism we had. We had filled it up with glass, strong materials so that it 
was absolutely impossible to take apart. If they took it apart there would be fibers in it, 
which would cause the system to die if it was manipulated. It would lose the memory 
and we encrypted the pcp, chipsets everything was fully encrypted. So there was no way 
to take it apart and understand how it worked.     We sent this sample out to them and 
they were very disappointed. It turned out that they only wanted to have the 
documentation for the certification to copy the product. Afterwards it turned out that 
they did not want to order anything else. In the end they did not want to do the 
certification.   
Wiedorn: Is there any cooperation with universities? 
Ferenczi: Of course yes. We have excellent cooperation with the Semmelweis 
University. Especially in the pneumology center. It is Hungarian but has also faculties 
in Hamburg, Germany and is also very popular with German students. It has quite a 
high reputation and they help us a lot in testing the devices and providing medical 
information. We also apply for grants together; we sponsor some of their doctors 
especially some of their researchers and PHD students.  
We also have an excellent relationship with the Budapest University of Technology  and 
the Technische University Vienna, especially with TeleMedica Systems. We have got a 
good connection to the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands. We have also got some 
cooperation with the University in Szeged. So we try to have as much cooperation as 
possible with universities.   
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Nemes: Do you have conjoint projects with universities? How is the cooperation 
organized? 
Ferenczi: Half of the company is still doing their PHD or masters. We are located 
around 100 meters from the Technical University of Budapest and so around half of our 
staff is still studying at university.   
Wiedorn: How many employees do you have at the moment? 
Ferenczi: That’s a good question. We have around 20 to 25 cooperative partners but 
about 7 of them are full-time employees.   
Nemes: How much of the turnover is invested in research? 
Ferenczi: We put all our profit into research so the owners do not take any profit. 
Everything is returned to R&D.  
Wiedorn: What percentage of the turnover is generated abroad?  
Ferenczi: Around 95 % of the turnover is generated abroad. Only about 5 % is 
generated on the Hungarian domestic market.  
Nemes: What are your plans for further internationalization? Do you plan to sell the 
company to a bigger investor, maybe in the US? 
Ferenczi: We do not go to the US. Our future is in Asia not in Europe or the US. These 
markets are in a continuous crisis. Whatever anybody says the investors are all in Hong 
Kong and Asia even the US investors. In the US we plan to open a sales-office. But for 
future investment we will go to Hong Kong. Also because in Hong Kong we have a 
much higher reputation than in the US. Actually among the Chinese it is very interesting 
that the Chinese people believe that the Hungarian (They say Shongjali the name of 
Hungary) came from the East and we are a kind of a eastern nation. They still believe 
that we are descendants of the Hun. Despite the fact that we are genetically Europeans 
we are still descendants of Asians. So we are kind of their European brothers. As a 
consequence they like us and I believe that this is also a benefit we can use.  
Nemes: If you are going to China, do you plan to solely manufacture your products or 
maybe try to sell your intellectual know how?  
Ferenczi: No, in China the legal protection is not strong enough to sell our intellectual 
knowledge. We would only sell our products. The Chinese culture is very unique in this 
sense. The way of doing business there is very  different to doing business in Europe, 
but if somebody understands these differences one could do very good business there. 
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That part of the world is growing. China and India have an incredible growth rate and 
Europe and the US are just lagging behind.  
Wiedorn: Do you plan to do other forms of cooperation apart from direct and indirect 
exporting? Like Joint Venture or Strategic Alliances. 
Ferenczi: For example, in India we are creating a Joint Venture. But it is more a sales 
organization for the purpose of creating a joint brand. This is called Thormedica 
Systems India and also with our partner in Brazil we are creating the brand Thormedica 
Systems Americas. We are creating the framework with the joint venture and mainly try 
to establish and upgrade the brand.  
Nemes:  Again back to your customers. Who are the main customers?  
Ferenczi: First of all it is a niche market. The most traditional market is pneumology 
departments in hospitals. In every hospital there is normally a pneumology department. 
They need respiratory- and lung function testing devices. This is market number one.    
The second market is the general practitioners especially in very advanced markets as in 
the US or Western Europe. The number of general practitioners is growing. In general 
practitioners are those who are not specialized in respiratory diseases. They have these 
small mobile portable devices for general check ups. This is market number two.  
The third market is home care for asthmatic people. Asthma is a chronic incurable 
disease which cannot be cured yet.  
The second biggest market is COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), which is 
the fastest growing disease in the world especially in developing countries like China, 
because it is caused by  air pollution and smoking. In the Western world the number of 
smokers is declining and in Asia it is increasing. In China the government even supports 
smoking. Furthermore they work in highly polluted environments and live in extremely 
polluted cities. So the market potential is increasing.  
Nemes: Do you regret anything in the process of internationalization? Do you regret 
some steps or some cooperation with partners?  
Ferenczi: After all my experiences I would do many things differently, but overall it 
was not that bad.  
Nemes: Do you have any special memories or some special cases? 
Ferenczi: When the crisis started in Europe I should not have invested so much in 
European markets. This might not be true for Austria, but for example in Sweden, Italy 
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and Spain everything went down. We should have invested  in India, the Arabic 
countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China and Australian region instead. We should have 
invested more in marketing and should not have invested so much in Western Europe.  
Nemes: Is it  also because your product is aimed more for developing countries?  
Ferenczi: No, because Western markets are down. In India nobody has the respiratory 
care systems yet so they start from scratch.  In the Western market a lot of people have 
these highly developed devices. They do not replace them that often due to the crisis 
and just use them for a longer period.    
Nemes and Wiedorn: Thank you so much for this interesting discussion! 
 
Duration of Interview: 55 minutes 
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